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Abstract 
The CDM has boosted various GHG reduction activities in developing countries and its 
contributions to the promotion of sustainable development in host countries have been 
recognized. There remains however a controversial issue which is a skewed distribution of 
CDM projects amongst eligible host countries. In reality, while some emerging economies, 
especially China and India, have benefitted from the CDM as a form of CER sales and 
various multi-benefit (e.g., an increase in electricity generating capacity and better air quality), 
most LDCs do not host any CDM activities or host only a few. Therefore, several studies 
were conducted in this dissertation to specify more precise and appropriate factors affecting 
CDM project hosting utilizing both cross- country data and panel data sets in order for LDCs 
to suggest more promising approaches to achieve multi-benefit from implementing GHG 
reduction project activities such as CDM projects. 
Prior to conducting empirical analyses, the effects of the CDM on the host country’s 
GHG emission tax rate and GHG reduction policies were investigated by examining the 
effects of increased environmental awareness in the Annex I country using the two-country 
model created by Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002). This macroeconomic analysis shows that, in a 
Nash equilibrium where the Annex I country chooses the amount of CDM investment and the 
host sets the proportion of CDM revenue used in GHG reduction activities and GHG 
emission tax rate, a rise in environmental awareness of the Annex I country increases the 
CDM investment, does not affect the GHG emission tax rate, and plausibly reduces GHG 
emissions of the host country. Moreover, the results indicate that the degree of effectiveness of 
CDM projects in reducing GHG emissions affects the behavior of the Annex I country. This 
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means that, in a plausible case, the more effective the CDM investment is, the greater the 
reduction of GHG emissions in the host country is. If the effectiveness reflects the recipient 
country’s ability to adopt advanced technologies (e.g., education levels or human capital stock 
of the country), the Annex I country tends to undertake CDM investments in such countries 
with greatest human capital. This prediction arises from our theoretical consideration. 
With respect to empirical analyses, several significant factors have been confirmed 
by both cross-country and panel data analyses. The result of cross-country analyses indicates 
that several factors regarding a business environment (i.e., “ease of registering property,” 
“ease of getting credit,” and “ease of trading across borders”) are significant for both bilateral 
and unilateral CDM projects. Similarly, the scientific and technical levels were found to be 
significant, but only for unilateral CDM projects. On top of these findings, panel data analyses 
reveal four important factors that have a significant and positive impact on CDM project 
hosting. They are: “GHG reduction potentials,” “government effectiveness,” “science and 
technology levels,” and “economic ties with advanced countries in the private sector.” The 
important point to note is that some determinants can be controlled by host countries, but 
other determinants cannot. LDCs, therefore, should focus exclusively on improving factors 
that they can control (i.e., “business environment,” “government effectiveness,” “science and 
technology levels,” and “economic ties between host and Annex I countries in the private 
sector”). If this is actually achieved, LDCs will have better conditions for attracting CDM 
investors. Alternatively, by taking a different perspective on a promising approach for LDCs, 
it seems feasible to implement the programmatic CDM that allows a collection of a vast 
number of small-scale interventions to be grouped, registered, and verified as a single CDM 
program. Because LDCs have a serious disadvantage in their lower GHG reduction potentials, 
they cannot be expected to simulate the major GHG emitters, such as China. It is hoped that 
more promising and useful new market-based mechanisms will be developed by international 
organizations such as UNFCCC. In addition, as a more realistic suggestion, LDCs should 
continue to request financial assistance from the international society by closely working 
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together. As mentioned above, a rise in the level of citizens’ environmental awareness in the 
Annex I country reduces GHG emissions in the host country and increases the amount of 
investment required in CDM activities. LDCs, hence, should raise the environmental 
awareness level not only by enhancing political dialogues, but also by implementing various 
activities at the grassroots level in cooperation with international organizations and NGOs. 
This is because, from a standpoint of equality, LDCs have a right to receive more financial 
assistance from developed countries and some emergent nations. 
In conclusion, an effective strategy to promote CDM activities in LDCs is 
constructed with three dimensions: 1) efforts made by the host country. LDCs should improve 
the significant factors that this paper identified by themselves and attempt to implement the 
programmatic CDM; 2) efforts of international organizations (i.e., UNFCCC) as it would be 
helpful to improve and/or simplify the CDM policies/rules and create new mechanisms, such 
as the programmatic CDM; and 3) efforts by the international community, particularly 
developed countries, which are responsible for a vast amount of GHG emissions that are of 
concern in the climate change discussion. Their further efforts are absolutely necessary to 
provide funds, subsidiaries, technical assistance, capacity development programs and other 
forms of assistance. 
Reference List 
This dissertation is based mainly on the following papers written by the author himself: 
 Kasai, Katsuya (2012a), “A cross-country empirical analysis of determinants of Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects”, Journal of Environmental Information 
Science, 40 (5), pp.1-10. 
 Kasai, Katsuya (2012b), "How can LDCs benefit from the CDM?: A panel data analysis 
of determinants of CDM project hosting", MPRA Paper 52137, University Library of 
Munich, Germany. 
 Kasai, Katsuya (2013), “Factors Affecting the Distribution of CERs: A Cross-Sectional 
Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Environmental Information Science, 41 (5), pp.37-46. 
 ACP (2014), Asian Co-benefits Partnership White Paper 2014: Bringing Development 
and Climate Together in Asia, Tokyo, The Ministry of the Environment, Japan. 
iv 
 
Doctoral Dissertation Committee: 
Principal Referee: Akira Yakita, Dean / Professor, The Graduate School of Economics 
Referee: Koichi Ohno, Professor, The Graduate School of Economics 
Referee: Ken Itakura, Professor, The Graduate School of Economics 
  
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstruct .............................................................................................................................. i 
Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. v 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................... vii 
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... x 
1.  Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.1  Climate Change Issue ..................................................................................... 1 
1.2  International Climate Change Negotiations .................................................... 4 
1.3  Contribution to Sustainable Development (SD) by CDM Projects ................. 7 
1.4  The Distribution Status of CDM Projects ........................................................ 8 
1.5  Objectives ...................................................................................................... 12 
1.6  Structure ........................................................................................................ 12 
2. The Effect of the CDM on GHG Reduction Policies: Macroeconomic Analysis ...... 14 
2.1  Background ................................................................................................... 14 
2.2  The model ..................................................................................................... 14 
2.3  Welfare effects in the host and Annex I countries ........................................ 20 
2.4  The case of the Nash equilibrium ................................................................. 24 
2.5  Conclusions ................................................................................................... 26 
3. Empirical Analysis focusing on Business Environment: A Cross-Country Analysis . 28 
3.1  Background ................................................................................................... 28 
3.2  Literature Review .......................................................................................... 29 
3.2.1  Theoretical Studies ............................................................................. 29 
3.2.2  Empirical Studies ................................................................................ 30 
3.2.3  Conceptual Framework ...................................................................... 31 
3.3  Data and Methodology .................................................................................. 33 
3.3.1  Data ..................................................................................................... 33 
3.3.2  Methodology ....................................................................................... 36 
3.4  Results and Discussions ............................................................................... 38 
4. The Revisit of Empirical Analysis: A Panel Data Analysis ........................................ 43 
4.1  Background ................................................................................................... 43 
4.2  Literature Review .......................................................................................... 43 
4.2.1  Theoretical Studies ............................................................................. 43 
4.2.2  Empirical Studies ................................................................................ 44 
4.2.3  Conceptual Framework ...................................................................... 48 
vi 
 
4.3  Methodology and Data .................................................................................. 55 
4.3.1  Methodology ....................................................................................... 55 
4.3.2  Empirical Strategy............................................................................... 58 
4.3.3  Data Descriptions ............................................................................... 59 
4.4  Results and Discussions ............................................................................... 71 
4.4.1  Cross-Country Data Analyses ............................................................ 71 
4.4.2  Panel Data Analyses .......................................................................... 72 
5.  Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 83 
5.1  Research Summary ...................................................................................... 83 
5.2  Policy Implications ......................................................................................... 86 
5.3  Remaining Challenges .................................................................................. 88 
5.4  Concluding Statement ................................................................................... 88 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 91 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 99 
Appendix I: Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) ........................................................ 100 
Appendix II: Registered CDM projects by Host Countries (2005-2010) .................... 101 
Appendix III: The programmatic CDM (PoA) .............................................................. 105 
 
 
  
vii 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ACP 
AR 
BPP 
CDM 
CER 
CMP 
 
COP 
 
EB 
ERF 
FCCC 
FDI 
DNA 
DOE 
FDI 
GDP 
GEF 
GHG 
HDI 
HFC 
IET 
IGES 
iid 
IPCC 
JCM 
JI 
LDC 
NGO 
N2O 
ODA 
Asian Co-benefits Partnership 
Assessment Report 
Beneficiary-Pays Principle 
Clean Development Mechanism 
Certified Emission Reduction 
The Conference of the parties serving the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol 
The conference of parties to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)  
The CDM Executive Board 
Effective Radiative Forcing  
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Designated National Authority 
Designated Operational Entity 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Gross Domestic Product 
Global Environment Facility 
Greenhouse Gas 
Human Development Index 
Hydrofluorocarbon 
International Emission Trading 
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies 
Independent and Identical Distributed 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Joint Crediting Mechanism 
Joint Implementation 
Least Developed Country  
Non-Governmental Organization 
Nitrous Oxide 
Official Development Assistance 
viii 
 
OLS 
PFC 
PoA 
PP 
PPP 
QML 
REDD+ 
RF 
SD 
SF6 
UNDP 
UNEP 
UNFCCC 
VCS 
WB 
WDI 
WGI 
WTP 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Perfluorocarbon 
Programme of Activities 
Project Participant 
Pollutant-Pays Principle 
Quasi-Maximum Likelihood method 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus 
Radiative Forcing 
Sustainable Development 
Sulfur Hexafluoride  
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Environment Programme 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Verified Carbon Standard 
The World Bank 
World Development Indicators 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Willingness To Pay 
   
 
  
ix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1-1  Chronological Breakdown of International Climate Negotiations ........... 6 
Table 1-2  Number of Countries Having Less Than 10 CDM Projects .................. 10 
Table 1-3  List of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) ............................................ 11 
Table 3-1  Definitions of Independent and Dependent Variables .......................... 33 
Table 3-2  Descriptive Table of Dependent and Independent Variables ............... 35 
Table 3-3  Correlations Among Independent variables .......................................... 35 
Table 3-4  Regression Result for Determinants of Bilateral CDM Projects ........... 41 
Table 3-5  Regression Result for Determinants of Unilateral CDM Projects ......... 42 
Table 4-1  Previous empirical studies on determinants of CDM projects .............. 47 
Table 4-2  Number of CDM Projects Reducing HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 ................ 49 
Table 4-3  Expected Regression Results ............................................................... 49 
Table 4-4  Descriptions of Dependent and Independent Variables ....................... 59 
Table 4-5  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2005) .................... 63 
Table 4-6  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2006) .................... 64 
Table 4-7  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2007) .................... 65 
Table 4-8  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2008) .................... 66 
Table 4-9  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2009) .................... 67 
Table 4-10  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2010) .................. 68 
Table 4-11  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients of the Panel Data 
(2005-2010) .............................................................................................................. 69 
Table 4-12  Estimation Results of Cross-Country Data Analysis in 2005&2006 ... 79 
Table 4-13  Estimation Results of Cross-Country Data Analysis in 2007&2008 ... 80 
Table 4-14  Estimation Results of Cross-Country Data Analysis in 2009&2010 ... 81 
Table 4-15  Estimation Results of Pooled and Panel Tobit Models (2005-2010) .. 82 
Table 5-1  Summary Table of Estimation Results .................................................. 86 
Table A-1  List of GWPs ........................................................................................ 100 
Table A-2  List of CDM Projects by Host Countries ............................................. 101 
Table A-3  List of Registered CDM Programme of Activities (PoAs) ................... 108 
  
x 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1-1  Global Annual Combined Land-Surface Air Temperature with 5-95% 
Error Bar Ranges........................................................................................................ 1 
Figure 1-2 Radiative Forcing (RF) of Climate Change during the Industrial Era 
shown by Emitted Components from 1750 to 2011. ................................................. 2 
Figure 1-3  Number of Sustainable Development Claims by Indicator  ................. 7 
Figure 1-4  Accumulated Numbers of Projects Submitted for Validation, 
Registered CDM Projects, and CDM Projects with Issuance ................................... 9 
Figure 1-5  Registered CDM Projects by Host Party ............................................. 10 
Figure 1-6  CERs Issued by Host Party ................................................................. 10 
Figure 4-1  Four Categories of Independent Variables .......................................... 49 
Figure 4-2  Number of CDM Projects by Investor Countries ................................. 54 
Figure 4-3  Periods Needed to Obtain CDM Status .............................................. 58 
Figure 4-4  Scatter Diagrams: Dependent Variable vs. Independent Variables .... 70 
Figure A-1  Comparison of the Project Based CDM and the PoAs ..................... 106 
Figure A-2  PoAs/CPAs included/registered and registering ............................... 107 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1.  Introduction 
This doctoral dissertation focuses on how least developed countries (LDCs) can benefit from 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Prior to the theoretical and empirical analyses, 
this section presents basic information about the climate change issue, including the history of 
climate change negotiations and background information on the CDM and the status of the 
unequal distribution of CDM projects followed by the objectives and structure of this paper. 
1.1  Climate Change Issue 
There is a wide agreement that, due to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gasses 
(GHGs) such as carbon dioxide concentration, it is expected that climate change will cause 
negative environmental and socio-economic impacts in the long run (e.g., Christensen et al., 
2007; UNEP, 2010a). According to IPCC (2007), the average annual temperature, in fact, has 
risen by 0.74 degree centigrade in the past hundred years (Figure 1-1). 
 
Figure 1-1  Global Annual Combined Land-Surface Air Temperature  
with 5-95% Error Bar Ranges 
The blue curve indicates decadal variations. 
Source: Brohan, et al. (2006) 
       The latest and the most accredited integrated assessment report on climate change 
(IPCC, 2013) alleges that: “It is extremely likely that human activities caused more than half 
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of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010.” The cause 
of climate change is GHGs that have radiative forcing (RF) effects. Six GHGs have been 
designated under the Kyoto Protocol, known as “Kyoto Six Gasses” (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, 
PFCs, and SF6). As can be seen from Figure 1-2, best estimators for totals and individual 
components of the response are shown in the right column. It can be confirmed that the six 
GHGs have strong RF. Values in the effective radiative forcing (ERF) column indicates an 
actual RF after considering the impact of aerosol-cloud interactions. The total RF due to 
aerosol-radiation interaction (-0.35 Wm-2) is slightly smaller than the sum of the RF of the 
individual components (-0.33 Wm-2) (IPCC, 2013). 
 
Figure 1-2  Radiative forcing (RF) of Climate Change during the Industrial Era 
shown by Emitted Components from 1750 to 2011 
The horizontal bars indicate the overall uncertainty, while the vertical bars are for the individual 
components (vertical bar lengths proportional to the relative uncertainty, with a total length 
equal to the bar width of a ±50% uncertainty).  
Source: IPCC (2013) 
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       In fact, a number of studies on climate change have been globally carried out 
globally and most conclude that the influence of global warming seriously threatens every 
person on earth. For example, significant negative impacts on agricultural productivity have 
been estimated by many studies (e.g., Mendelsohn et al., 1994; Seo et al., 2005) and climate 
change is surely one of the most complicated and complex issues human beings must contend 
with in the twenty-first century. Failure to respond to this issue will stall and then reverse 
efforts to reduce poverty (UNDP, 2007). One particularly problematic feature of climate 
change is that it influences human lives in various ways, not only the obvious temperature rise, 
but also changes in sea levels, rainfall patterns, and in frequency of droughts, heat waves, cold 
waves, and typhoons (IPCC, 2013), all of which directly and negatively affect our lives. In 
addition, Goodman (2009) indicates that the poorest nations and the most vulnerable regions 
will suffer the earliest and most severe damages, despite the fact that, on average, they have 
contributed the least to climate change. Regardless, no country would be immune from the 
adverse effects of global warming in spite of their economic standing. Although there are 
many uncertainties about the mechanisms of the climate system, it can be predicted that 
existing disadvantages resulting from global warming will be serious (UNDP, 2007). 
       In order to avoid the severe repercussions of climate change, ensuring a temperature 
rise of no more than 2°C has emerged as the principal focus of international consensus 
(Anderson and Bows, 2008). The Copenhagen Accord, which was adopted at the fifteenth 
session of the conference of the parties (COP15) in 2009, agreed that “deep cuts in global 
emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global 
temperature below 2 degrees Celsius” (UNFCCC, 2009). This is based on evidence that 
anticipates the world is reaching the point at which irreversible ecological catastrophes have 
becomes inevitable (UNDP, 2007). Osbahra (2008) states climate change will cause frequent 
and severe droughts, floods, and storms, which will destroy various opportunities (e.g., 
damage to food crops) and reinforce inequality. It therefore is imperative to curb the 
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temperature rise to below 2°C. 
1.2  International Climate Change Negotiations 
This section briefly summarizes the history of international negotiations on climate change. A 
chronological breakdown containing major events is listed in Table 1-1 below. 
       In general, the negotiations about climate change have been conducted based on the 
scientific evidence that has been published in the IPCC Assessment Reports since 1990 and 
the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was adopted in 1992 with the 
ultimate objective that aims to stabilize GHG concentrations below a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference in the global climate system (UNFCCC, 1992). 
After the issuance of IPCC AR2, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in the COP3 in 
Kyoto, Japan. The Kyoto Protocol has imposed legally binding targets only on industrialised 
countries (Annex I Parties)1 and introduced three market mechanisms, called the Kyoto 
Mechanism, namely CDM (Clean Development Mechanism), JI (Joint Implementation), and 
IET (International Emission Trading), in order to enable economical reductions of GHG 
emissions (UNFCCC, 1998). The Marrakesh Accord, containing the ground rules of the 
Kyoto Protocol, was adopted in COP7, followed by the Bonn Agreement adopted in COP6 
Part 2. Russia’s ratification of it in 2005 finally made the Kyoto Protocol effective.  
       Following the issuance of IPCC AR4 in 2007, the necessity of reducing 50% of 
global GHG emissions by 2050 to meet the 2°C threshold was highlighted at COP13 held in 
Bali, Indonesia (Boston, 2008). Likewise, in 2009, the Copenhagen Accord, adopted in 
COP15, declared it was necessary to largely cut global emissions in order to limit the increase 
of average global temperature within 2°C. As of 12 November 2010, 140 countries have 
associated themselves with the Copenhagen Accord and, of these, 85 have committed to 
reduce their GHG emissions or constrain their economic growth up to 2020 (UNEP, 2010b). 
                                                 
1 Annex I Parties are mainly industrialised countries comprised of the members of the OECD, the EU, 
and fourteen countries with “economies in transition” which are committed to greenhouse gas reduction 
targets. 
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This consensus has remained consistent throughout all international conferences after COP13. 
While the detailed rules of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol have not 
been determined yet, the international community, excluding Canada, Japan, and Russia, 
reached an agreement that secures the existence of the second commitment period in COP17 
in 2011. The Kyoto Protocol worked efficiently for the first several years, however, as time 
went by, there had been the eruptions of disputable issues, including uneven distribution of 
CDM projects, vague additionality, and each country’s future estimation on GHG emission in 
the first commitment period with elusive intentions. Meanwhile, the Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER)2 price started decreasing in 2009; and the latest price was listed at 0.08 
Euro/ton as of November 27, 2014 (ICE, 2014). There are three major reasons why the CER 
market has an imbalance of demand versus supply: first reason is the issue of equality on 
legally binding targets, as the targets were set with on the basis of inadequate evidence and 
inequitably. Due to this, Russia, Canada, and Japan did not join the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol; the second reason is the lower GHG emissions in Annex I 
countries as the Lehman Brother's fall in 2008 caused economic stagnation and many Annex I 
countries, especially within the EU, did not have much demand for CERs to fulfil their 
targets; and third, the increasing amount of CER issuance as this accelerated the sharp 
depreciation of CER price. 
       Currently, the governments involved have been working on negotiations for the 
details of the post-Kyoto Protocol. There is still a year until COP21 but time is running and 
the necessary decisions need to be made to realize the less than 2-dgree goal. 
 
  
                                                 
2 The Kyoto Protocol unit equal to one metric tonne of CO2 equivalent. CERs are issued for emission 
reductions from CDM project activities. Two special types of CERs called temporary certified emission 
reduction (tCERs) and long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs) are issued for emission 
removals from afforestation and reforestation CDM projects. 
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Table 1-1  Chronological Breakdown of International Climate Negotiations 
Year Event 
1990 IPCC First Assessment Report (AR1) issued. 
May 1992 FCCC adopted.   
March 1994 FCCC came into effect.  
1995 IPCC AR2 issued. 
December 1997 COP3 held in Kyoto, Japan. 
- The Kyoto Protocol adopted. 
November 2000 COP6 held in Hague, the Netherlands. 
March 2001 The United States seceded from Kyoto Protocol. 
2001 IPCC AR3 issued. 
July 2001 COP6 Part 2 held in Bonn, Germany. 
November 2001 COP7 held in Marrakesh, Morocco.  
- The Marrakesh Accord adopted. 
February 2005 Kyoto Protocol entered into force. 
December 2005 COP11 and the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP1) held in Canada. 
2007 IPCC AR4 issued. 
December 2007 COP13 and CMP3 held in Bali, Indonesia. 
- The Bali Action Plan adopted. 
December 2009 COP15 and CMP5 held in Copenhagen, Denmark. 
- The Copenhagen Accord taken note. 
December 2010 COP16 and CMP6 held in Cancun, Mexico. 
- The Cancun Agreement adopted. 
December 2011 COP17 and CMP7 held in Durban, South Africa. 
- The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP) established. 
- The Kyoto Protocol without Russia, Canada, and Japan continued. 
December 2012 COP18 and CMP 8 held in Doha, Qatar 
- Doha Climate Gateway adopted.  
2013 
December 2013 
IPCC AR5 issued 
COP19 and CMP9 held in Warsaw, Poland 
- Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with 
climate change impacts. 
December 2014 COP20 and CMP10 to be held in Lima, Peru 
2015 COP21 and CMP11 to be held in Paris, France 
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1.3  Contribution to Sustainable Development (SD) by CDM Projects 
The CDM has dual objectives: to reduce GHG emissions; and to contribute to sustainable 
development (SD) in host countries (UNFCCC, 1998). Prior to the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, many policy makers believed that CDM would address environmental and social 
problems while facilitating investment and technology transfer (Begg et al., 2003). 
       Some projects have indeed lived up to these expectations. For example, the Indian 
Bagepalli CDM Biogas Programme (registered in 2005) has not only provided clean and 
smoke-free cooking environments, it has also reduced the burden of fuel-wood collection, 
improved health, given women taking part in the project more time to engage in 
income-generating activities and shared its revenues with the 5,500 women who have 
received biogas units so far (ACP, 2014). Looking more broadly across CDM project design 
documents (PDDs), the majority of projects have a variety of positive effects on SD in host 
countries (Figure 1-3). 
 
Figure 1-3  Number of Sustainable Development Claims by Indicator 
Source: UNFCCC (2012f) 
 
       Certainly, positive effects leading SD in host countries can be expected from CDM 
projects but much of the literatures expresses scepticism about CDMʼs contribution to SD. 
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Illustrating this view, Sutter and Parreño (2007) states that CDM projects can generate  
employment, improve local air quality, or distribute CER sales equally but those positive 
effects are limited. Other researchers who have investigated a larger number of cases also 
conclude that the CDM does not greatly contribute to SD (e.g., Sirohi, 2007). This kind of 
negative feedback must be attributed to two major reasons: 1) various definitions of and 
different expectations for SD; and 2) a systematic problem of validation and verification of 
the impact of SD from CDM projects. 
       There have been some movements to secure and improve the contribution to SD, 
such as the facilitation of the gold standard. The important thing is how to design CDM 
projects to make them more sustainably attractive. Although there are some challenges, it can 
be said that CDM projects have huge potential to generate multi-benefit in addition to 
reducing GHG emissions.  
1.4  The Distribution Status of CDM Projects 
At the international level, the most promising climate mechanism with the potential to 
generate multi-benefit is the CDM. The CDM is a project-based offset mechanism that 
enables developed countries to fulfil their national GHG reduction targets under the Kyoto 
Protocol by implementing GHG mitigation activities in host countries (Non-Annex I Parties)3 
Host countries can earn tradable CERs issued by the CDM executive board and the amounts 
of CERs earned are determined based on the amounts of GHG emissions reduced by CDM 
projects. While it is likely that the CDM has been achieving the first objective, namely 
reducing GHG emissions in a cost-effective manner (e.g., Huang and Barker, 2008; Paulsson, 
2009; Sutter and Parreño, 2007), several controversial issues have since appeared, such as an 
unequal distribution of CDM projects and ignorance of the issues facing the LDCs (e.g., 
IGES, 2010; UNEP Riso Center, 2008). 
       Though CDM activities have been very slow now, the numbers of registered CDM 
                                                 
3 Eligible host countries are countries that ratify the Kyoto Protocol and establish a designated national 
authority. 
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projects and projects submitted for registrations have been steadily increasing in 2012 (Figure 
1-4). As of 2012, there were 4,322 CDM projects across developing countries (UNFCCC, 
2012b) yet the top two emerging economies, namely China and India, possess 2,121 and 855 
CDM projects, respectively (UNFCCC, 2012b). In other words, only two countries account 
for approximately 70% of total CDM projects (Figure 1-5) and it is undeniable that they 
benefit from the tremendous amount of funds that flow from the sales of CERs (Figure 1-6). 
Due to the aforementioned imbalance, there is a clear and wide-ranging agreement that the 
distribution of the CDM projects has been quite uneven among the developing nations (e.g. 
Muller, 2007; Boyd et al., 2009; Flamos, 2010). This can be seen in data as, despite 128 
non-Annex I countries being able to host CDM projects (UNFCCC, 2012b), 53 of these 
countries did not have any CDM projects and 50 of them hosted less than ten projects 
(UNFCCC, 2012c) (Table 1-2). Most LDCs listed in Table 1-3 belong to the latter group. As 
LDCs have emitted little GHGs in the past, Annex I countries and other emerging countries 
emitting a vast amount of GHGs must actively help LDCs reduce their GHG emissions and 
adapt to the adverse impact of climate change. 
 
Figure 1-4  Accumulated Numbers of Projects Submitted for Validation, 
Registered CDM Projects, and CDM Projects with Issuance 
Source: UNEP Risø Centre (2012) 
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Figure 1-5  Registered CDM Projects by Host Party 
    Source: UNFCCC (2012c) 
 
 
Figure 1-6  CERs Issued by Host Party 
     Source: UNFCCC (2012d) 
 
Table 1-2  Number of Countries Having Less Than Ten CDM Projects 
 Africa
Asia and the
Pacific 
Latin America and
the Caribbean 
EIT* TOTAL 
Countries with a DNA 
and 1-9 CDM projects 
18 16 11 5 50 
Countries with a DNA 
with NO CDM projects 28 13 9 3 53 
* EIT refers to a list of fourteen countries undergoing the process of transition to a Market 
Economy under the UNFCCC. Ten of those countries are members of the EU (27). 
Source: UNFCCC (2011)  
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Table 1-3  List of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
Africa (33) 
1 Angola 18 Madagascar 
2 Benin 19 Malawi  
3 Burkina Faso  20 Mali  
4 Burundi  21 Mauritania 
5 Central African Republic  22 Mozambique 
6 Chad  23 Niger  
7 Comoros  24 Rwanda  
8 Democratic Republic of the Congo 25 São Tomé and Príncipe  
9 Djibouti 26 Senegal 
10 Equatorial Guinea 27 Sierra Leone 
11 Eritrea 28 Somalia  * Not parties to the UNFCCC 
12 Ethiopia  29 Sudan 
13 Gambia 30 Togo 
14 Guinea 31 Uganda  
15 Guinea-Bissau  32 United Republic of Tanzania 
16 Lesotho  33 Zambia  
17 Liberia 
Asia (15) 
1 Afghanistan  9 Nepal  
2 Bangladesh 10 Samoa  
3 Bhutan  11 Solomon Islands  
4 Cambodia 12 Timor-Leste  
5 Kiribati  13 Tuvalu  
6 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  14 Vanuatu  
7 Maldives 15 Yemen 
8 Myanmar 
Latin America and the Caribbean (1) 
1 Haiti  
Source: UNFCCC (2012a) 
       In response to this imbalance in CDM project distribution, many developing nations 
have lodged complaints against the imbalance of CDM benefits distribution on the basis of 
Decision 17/CP.7 of the Marrakesh Accords that stipulates the necessity of the promotion of 
equitable distribution of CDM activities at regional and sub-regional levels (UNFCCC, 2001). 
This situation seems to be becoming critical as there are two conditions for the Kyoto 
Protocol to fully take effect: one is to secure the ratifications of no less than 55 countries; and 
the other is to secure 55% of the total GHG emissions of all developed nations at the 1990 
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level, regardless of the number of ratified nations (UNFCCC, 1998). If the issue were 
mishandled it could potentially result in the secession of many developing countries and 
remaining countries would be likely to criticize the protocol’s effectiveness. Because of this 
negative potential, the imbalance needs to be resolved to ensure equality among developing 
countries and to maintain stable operations of the Kyoto Protocol itself.    
1.5  Objectives 
As the most probable cause of the unequal distribution of CDM projects, lower GHG 
reduction capabilities are frequently mentioned in the corresponding literature (e.g., Haites, 
2004) and some empirical studies on the distribution of CDM projects have exposed several 
conflicting decisive factors for a CDM project hosting using cross-country data (e.g., Wang 
and Firestone, 2010; Flues, 2010; Winkelman and Moore, 2011: Kasai, 2012a and Kasai, 
2012b) and their findings are not identical. 
       The twofold objectives of this paper, therefore, are: 1) to specify more precise and 
appropriate factors affecting CDM project hosting using a panel data set and 2) to suggest 
more promising approaches for less endowed countries to achieve multi-benefit from 
implementing GHG reduction project activities. For those purposes, cross-country analyses 
and panel data analyses are carried out utilizing the data set between 2005 and 2010. 
1.6  Structure 
This doctoral dissertation is structured as follows: the effects of CDM impacts on the host 
country’s GHG emission tax rate and GHG reduction policies are examined through the Nash 
equilibrium in the two-country model which is developed based on the model created by 
Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002) in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 provides the results of an empirical 
analysis of determinants of CDM project hosing using a cross-county data and the study 
focuses on factors concerning business environment using the eight sub-indices of the Doing 
Business Index published by the World Bank. In addition, a superior analysis (i.e., a panel 
data analysis) is carried out in Chapter 4 to obtain more precise and reliable estimation results 
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in the identification of significant factors of hosting CDM projects. Finally, Chapter 5 
summarizes the highlights of each study and provides policy implications and 
recommendations advantageous for LDCs to disseminate multi-benefit type projects in an 
effective manner. 
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2. The Effect of the CDM on GHG Reduction Policies: 
Macro- economic Analysis 
2.1  Background 
Since the Kyoto Mechanism including the CDM took effect in 2005, various groups and 
individuals (e.g., policy makers, scholars, scientists, and environmental activists) have been 
contesting the effectiveness of the CDM due to diverse causes such as unequal distribution, 
leakage, and suspicious additionalities. The CDM nevertheless can be theoretically regarded 
as a cost-effective GHG mitigation mechanism on a global scale. For instance, Alexeew et al. 
(2010) states that renewable energy projects were thought to be particularly conducive to 
generating both climate and other developmental benefits. Therefore, prior to carrying out 
empirical analyses, this section attempts to verify how CDM investment influences the 
environmental policies of developing countries utilizing the model created by Hatzipanayotou 
et al. (2002) by examining the effects of increased environmental awareness in Annex I 
country. 
       The model is explained by being broken down into the following sections: Section 
2.3 carries out welfare analysis; the Nash equilibrium is characterized in Section 2.4; and 
concluding remarks are given in Section 2.5. 
2.2  The model 
In accordance with the model used by Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002), there are several 
assumptions in the model; first, this study sets a two-country model, namely the Annex I 
country (a CDM investor) and the host country (a recipient country); second, both countries 
have small open economies; third, commodity prices are exogenous; forth, for the sake of 
simplicity, only the host country emits GHG emissions but no GHG emissions are emitted by 
the Annex I country. However, the Annex I country suffers disutility from cross-border 
pollution (i.e., global warming) resulting from GHG emissions in the host country; fifth, the 
Annex I country can endogenously determine the amount of CDM investment; sixth, there 
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are private and public GHG reduction activities in the host country and the latter will be 
financed from both GHG emissions tax revenue and a part of CDM revenue4; seventh, the 
host country can freely choose their GHG emission tax rate and how much of the CDM 
revenue they allocate for public GHG abatement activities.  
       Based on the aforementioned assumptions, this study characterizes a Nash 
equilibrium in that the Annex I country chooses the amount of CDM investment and the host 
country chooses the proportion of CDM revenue allocated to GHG reductions and the GHG 
emission tax rate. At this equilibrium, it is expected that an increase in the Annex I country’s 
perceived rate of cross-border pollution (global warming) reduces GHG emission levels in the 
host country. 
       As mentioned above, the private producers and the public sector implement GHG 
reduction activities in the host country. The private sector changes its behavior in response to 
a GHG emission tax rate, t, and the public sector abates GHG emissions using the tax and 
CDM revenues. The private sector produces private goods with GHG emissions and behaves 
competitively, while the public sector determines its level of abatement by minimizing the 
cost of the public GHG reduction. The vector of total factor endowment, V, in the host 
country can be decomposed into two parts: one is a private sector ܸ௣ and the other is public 
abatement activities, ܸ௚; thus, ܸ ൌ ܸ௣ ൅ ܸ௚. The revenue function, തܴሺܲ, ݐ, ܸ௣ሻ, which is 
a host country’s maximum value of domestic production of private goods, can be defined as 
follows: 
തܴሺܲ, ݐ, ܸ௣ሻ ൌ max௫,௭ ሼܲᇱ௫ െ ݐݖ: ሺݔ, ݖሻ߳	ܶሺܸ௣ሻሽ, 
where ܲ is the vector of world commodity prices, ݔ and ݖ are the vectors of net outputs 
and GHG emission, respectively, and ܶሺܸ௣ሻ is a country’s aggregate technology set. 
       Assuming constant returns to scale in public GHG reduction activities, the 
                                                 
4 CDM project owners and/or CDM investors are normally required to pay fees (e.g., a registration fee) 
to the government when they start to develop CDM projects. The government of the host country can 
then spend the subsequent income as CDM revenue.  
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cost-minimization problem in the public sector generates a unit cost of GHG reduction 
function, ܥ௚ሺݓሻ, where the vector of factor prices (w), is given by 
ݓ ൌ ܴ௏೛	ሺܲ, ݐ, ܸ௣ሻ. 
       As is well known, the demand for factors of production in the public sector (ܸ௚) 
equals ܥ௪௚ሺݓሻ݃. Therefore, 
ܸ௣ ൌ ܸ െܥ௪௚	ሺݓሻ݃ ൌ ܸ െ ܥ௪௚ ൫ܴ௏೛ሺܲ, ݐ, ܸ௣ሻ൯݃. 
       We obtain ܸ௣=ܸ௣ሺܲ, ݐ, ݃, Vሻ by solving the above equation for ܸ௣ and because P 
and V do not vary in this analysis, the restricted revenue function can be defined as below. 
ܴሺ݃, ݐሻ ൌ ܴ൫ܲ, ݐ, ܸ௣ሺ݌, ݐ, ݃, ܸሻ൯. 
       ܴሺ݃, ݐሻ function is strictly convex in the GHG emission tax rate (i.e., ܴ௧௧ ൐ 0). 
This implies that an increase in the GHG emissions tax rate decreases GHG emissions in the 
private sector, while we assume ܴ௚௚ ൌ 0	in this analysis. This assumption indicates that 
changes in ݃, which changes factor supplies for the production of private goods, have no 
effect on its unit cost of production. For instance, in the Heckscher–Ohlin model (H-O model), 
factor prices are determined by commodity prices. Hence, when ݃ changes, we assume 
ܥ௚௚ሺݓሻ ൌ െܴ௚௚ ൌ 0. It is also well known that െܴ௚ሾൌ ሺ߲ܴ ߲݃⁄ ሻሿ is the unit cost of 
public pollution abatement and that െܴ௧ሺ݃, ݐሻ ൌ ݖ is the amount of pollution caused by the 
private sector. Additionally, in order to reflect on the effects of the CDM, the amount of GHG 
emissions reduced by CDM projects, ߝܾ, where	ߝ is an effectiveness of reducing GHG 
emissions by CDM projects and ܾ is CDM investment from the Annex I country, needs to 
be considered. We assume that ߝ is greater than 1 as it is expected that the CDM induces 
technology transfer from CDM investors to the host country, resulting from the fact that 
pollution-abatement technologies to be provided by investors are usually more efficient than 
those available in the host country. Another factor affecting ߝ is the capability of human 
resources in the host country. This is because individual CDM project owners in the host 
country operate CDM projects for a long stretch of time (e.g., a few decades) which requires 
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the separate projects to secure proper human resources in implementing CDM projects that 
adopt advanced technologies. As a result, considering the impacts of the technology transfer, 
ߝܾ is regarded as GHG reductions by CDM projects. Taking GHG reductions from the 
public and private sectors as well as the CDM into consideration, the net GHG emission in 
the host country r is defined as follows: 
ݎ ൌ ݖ െ ݃ െ ߝܾ.																					                         (1) 
ݖ ൌ െܴ௧ሺ݃, ݐሻ.																                            (1)’ 
where 
ݎ: net GHG emission in the host country;  
ݖ: gross GHG emission in the host country;  
݃: GHG reduction generated using the government expenditure (i.e., GHG tax revenue and 
CDM revenue) of the host country; 
ߝܾ: GHG reduction generated by the CDM projects in the host country; and 
ݐ: GHG emission tax rate in a host country. 
       Also, we assume that ܴ௧௚ሺൌ ߲ݖ ߲݃⁄ ሻ ൐ 0. This is because of ݖ ൌ െܴ௧ሺݐ, ݃ሻ 
which states that an increase in the government-provided GHG abatement reduces emissions 
by the private sector. In other words, it implies that GHG emissions and public abatement 
activities are substitutes in the host country. 
       Turning to the Annex I country perspective, their expenditure function ܧሺݎ, ݑሻ 
denotes the minimum expenditure required to achieve a level of utility ݑ when a net GHG 
emission is ݎ. The partial derivative of the expenditure function regarding ݑ	ሺܧ௨ሻ indicates 
the reciprocal of marginal utility of income. As GHG emission adversely influences the utility 
level in the Annex I country, the partial derivative of the expenditure function with regard 
to	ݎ	ሺܧ௥ሻ is positive and shows the households’ marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for GHG 
reduction. Thus, a larger amount of net GHG emission requires a higher level of spending on 
private goods in order to mitigate its detrimental effects to maintain the constant utility level. 
Furthermore, the expenditure function is likely to be strictly convex in ݎ, ܧ௥௥ ൐ 0. That is to 
18 
 
say, a larger level of net GHG emission raises households’ marginal WTP for its reduction. 
       Concerning a host country government’s budget constraint, it is assumed that the 
government finances the cost of publicly provided abatement (i.e., ݃ܥ௚ ൌ െܴ݃௚ሺ݃, ݐሻ) by 
using a proportion or the entire amount of CDM revenue provided by the Annex I country 
(e.g., income taxation and domestic registration fees). In principle, the proportion of β is 
strictly greater than zero, meaning that the host country’s government should provide 
measures, such as matching funds for public GHG emission reduction activities. The 
government revenue consists of the GHG emission tax revenue and a part of income 
generated by CDM investment in the host country. Therefore, the government’s budget 
constraint in the host country can be written as follows: 
ߚܾ ൅ ݐݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚ሺ݃, ݐሻ ൌ ߚܾ െ ݐܴ௧ሺ݃, ݐሻ ൅ ܴ݃௚ሺ݃, ݐሻ ൌ 0.																							ሺ2ሻ 
where 
ߚ: the proportion of CDM revenue allocated to GHG reduction activities (0 ൑ β ൑ 1); 
ܾ: CDM revenue of a host country; 
ݐ: GHG emission tax rate in a host country; 
ݖ: gross GHG emission in a host country; and 
݃: host country’s government expenditure for GHG reduction activities. 
       There is one observation on the above Equation (2); in defining the government 
budget constraint, it can be assumed that GHG emission tax revenue is basically earmarked 
for public abatement. This is the nature of special accounts in country budgetary systems as 
special accounts have their special purposes based on the idea of polluter-pays principle (PPP) 
or beneficiary-pays principle (BPP). An example of this would be that Japan’s gasoline tax is 
earmarked for road construction and maintenance.  
       The description of the host country is completed by writing its budget constraint 
function formula. The budget constraint requires that private expenditure, ܧሺݎ, ݑሻ, has to be 
equal to the revenue of the production of private goods, ܴሺ݃, ݐሻ, and the cost of GHG 
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emission tax, െݐܴ௧ሺ݃, ݐሻ, plus CDM revenue, ܾ. Therefore, utilizing Equation (2), a host 
country’s expenditure function can be written as 
ܧሺݎ, ݑሻ ൌ ܴሺ݃, ݐሻ െ ݐܴ௧ሺ݃, ݐሻ ൅ ܾ.																																											ሺ3ሻ 
where 
ݎ: net GHG emissions in a host country; 
ݑ: utility level of a host country; 
݃: host country’s government expenditure for GHG reduction activities;  
ݐ: GHG emission tax rate in a host country; and  
ܾ: CDM revenue (profits on CER sales from the Annex I country). 
       With regard to the Annex I country perspective, as conditioned, the Annex I country 
does not emit any GHG emissions. However, the utilities of the Annex I country are 
negatively affected by trans-boundary pollution generated in the host country, ݎ. Thus, using 
ߠ which is the perceived degree of trans-boundary pollution, the welfare of the Annex I 
country is adversely affected by the perceived amount of trans-boundary pollution, ߠݎ. An 
increase in ߠ seems to indicate that residents in the Annex I country are more aware of 
trans-boundary pollution. However, in reality, the actual level of trans-boundary pollution is 
not dependent on ߠ, but merely on net GHG emissions, ݎ. 
       Hence, the Annex I country’s income-expenditure identity requires that private 
expenditure. The expenditure function, ܧ∗ሺߠݎ, ݑ∗ሻ, has to be equal to revenue from the 
production of  private goods, ܴ∗, minus the amount of CDM investment transferred to the 
host country. Therefore, 
ܧ∗ሺߠݎ, ݑ∗ሻ ൌ ܴ∗ െ ܾ.																																																									ሺ4ሻ  
where 
ߠ: the perceived degree of trans-boundary pollution in the Annex I country;  
ݎ: net GHG emissions in the host country; 
ߠݎ: the perceived amount of trans-boundary pollution in the Annex I country: 
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ݑ∗: the utility level of the Annex I country; 
ܴ∗: revenue from the production of private goods in the Annex I country; and 
ܾ: CDM investment (investment in CDM projects and/or expenditure on CER purchase). 
       ܧ௨∗  denotes the reciprocal nature of the marginal utility of income in the Annex I 
country. It is assumed that ܧ௥௥∗ ൐ 0. The factors of production are inelastically supplied 
because the commodity prices are exogenous. No pollution and its reduction activities occur 
in both the public and private sectors in the Annex I country. Thereby, ܴ∗ is exogenous in 
this analysis. 
       Equations (1)’ to (4) constitute a system that may reveal four primary unknowns (i.e., 
ݑ, ݑ∗, ݃, ܽ݊݀	ݖሻ. The model contains one policy parameter for the Annex I country, the 
amount of CDM investment, ܾ , and two policy parameters for the host country: the 
proportion of CDM revenue allocated to GHG reduction activities, ߚ, and GHG emissions 
tax rate, ݐ. 
2.3  Welfare effects in the host and Annex I countries 
In this section, the Nash optimal levels of the policy parameters are characterized. Based on 
Equations (1)’ to (4) explained in the previous section, the system of basic equations can be 
written in a matrix form as shown below: 
ۏ
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       Before deriving welfare effect in the host and Annex I countries utilizing the above 
determinant, Equation (5) which explains how the policy parameters influence the level of net 
GHG emissions was obtained based on Equation (1): 
∆݀ݎ ൌ െൣߚ൫ܴ௧௚ ൅ 1൯ ൅ ߝ൫ݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚൯൧ܾ݀ െ ܾ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯݀ߚ 
																								െൣ൫ݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧൯൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ െ ܴ௧௧൫ܴ௚ ൅ ݐ൯൧݀ݐ.												ሺ5ሻ 
       As Equation (5) shows, an increase in ܾ or ߚ unquestionably reduces net GHG 
emissions. When it is assumed that ߚ ൌ 0, CDM revenue does not have a direct effect on net 
GHG emissions (i.e., ሺ݀ݎ ܾ݀⁄ ሻ ൌ 0) because Equations (1) and (2) determine the levels of 
݃ and ݎ uniquely, and CDM revenue has no impact in determining those two variables. An 
increase in	ݐ has an ambiguous effect on net GHG emissions: a rise in ݐ increases public 
reduction activities and reduces private production activities simultaneously, increasing 
demand for factors of GHG reduction in the public sector and decreasing demand for factors 
of production in the private sector. Hence, the overall effect on the demand for the factors is 
ambiguous. 
       With regards to welfare effects, changes in the level of welfare in both the Annex I 
and host countries can be obtained by differentiating the equations as follows: 
ܧ௨݀ݑ ൌ ∆ିଵܣ௕ܾ݀ ൅ ∆ିଵܣఉ݀ߚ ൅ ∆ିଵܣ௧݀ݐ																																																	ሺ6ሻ	
ܧ௨∗݀ݑ∗ ൌ ∆ିଵܥ௕ܾ݀ ൅ ∆ିଵܥఉ݀ߚ ൅ ∆ିଵܥ௧݀ݐ ൅ ∆ିଵܥఏ݀ߠ,																									ሺ7ሻ		
where 
ܣ௕ ൌ ߚܧ௥൫ܴ௧௚ ൅ 1൯ ൅ ൫ݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚൯ሺߝܧ௥ ൅ 1 െ ߚሻ, 
ܣఉ ൌ ܾሾܧ௥൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ െ ൫ݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚ሻ൧, 
ܣ௧ ൌ ൫ݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧൯ൣܧ௥൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ െ ሺݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚ሻ൧ െ ܴ௧௧ܧ௥൫ܴ௚ ൅ ݐ൯, 
∆ൌ ݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚ > 0, 
ܥ௕ ൌ ߚߠܧ௥∗൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ ൅ ሺߝߠܧ௥∗ ൅ 1ሻ൫ݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚൯, 
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ܥఉ ൌ ܾߠܧ௥∗൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ ൐ 0,		 
ܥ௧ ൌ ߠܧ௥∗ሾ൫ݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧൯൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ െ ሺݐ ൅ ܴ௚ሻܴ௧௧ሿ, 
ܥఏ ൌ െݎܧ௥∗൫ݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚൯ ൏ 0. 
       As ܴ௧௚ ൐ 0 and ܴ௚ ൏ 0, the term ܣ௧ is positive and CDM revenue, therefore, 
improves welfare in the host country. There are direct and indirect positive effects: a direct 
positive impact is owing to transferring funds and an indirect positive impact is owing to 
ߚܧ௥൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯.  The term ܥ௕  in Equation (7) denotes that CDM investment has an 
ambiguous effect for the Annex I country since CDM investment induces the direct negative 
effect due to possible income transfers. However, as long as a part of ܾ is spent on GHG 
reduction activities (i.e., ߚ ൐ 0ሻ, there is a positive indirect effect on the Annex I country’s 
welfare. The signs of ܣఉ and ܣ௧ are unclear as an increase in either ݐ or ߚ reduces GHG 
emissions. However, it results in taking resources away from the private sector and giving 
them to the public sector, which in turn result in the reduction of the budget of private sector. 
While the effect of the change in ݐ is unclear, as can be seen from the term ܥఉ, an increase 
in ߚ unambiguously improves the welfare of the Annex I country. The term ܥ௧ denotes that 
a rise in ݐ has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the Annex I country because, as 
explained above, a change in ݐ would have both positive and negative impacts on the level 
of net GHG emission. 
       Ultimately, as indicated by the term ܥఏ , an increase in the perceived level of 
trans-boundary pollution ሺߠሻ in the Annex I country has a detrimental impact on their 
welfare level, whereas it has no direct impact on the welfare level of the host country. 
       Next, this study analyses the optimal choice of the instruments by the two countries. 
To do this, it is assumed that the Annex I country decides the amount of CDM investment 
ሺܾሻ, while the host country decides the proportion of CDM revenue allocated to GHG 
reduction activities ሺߚሻ and the rate of GHG emission tax ሺݐሻ. In addition, this study 
assumes that the two countries behave non-cooperatively which is an essential condition of 
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the Nash equilibrium. Then, the first-order conditions (F.O.C.) are set as follows: 
ܧ௨∗∆ሺ݀ݑ∗ ܾ݀⁄ ሻ ൌ ܥ௕ ൌ 0																																																																												ሺ8ሻ 
ܧ௨∆ሺ݀ݑ ݀ߚ⁄ ሻ ൌ ܣఉ ൌ 0																																																																													ሺ9ሻ 
ܧ௨∆ሺ݀ݑ ݀ݐ⁄ ሻ ൌ ܣ௧ ൌ 0.																																																																											ሺ10ሻ 
       Under an optimality condition that Equations (8) to (10) simultaneously determine 
the optimal values of ܾ, ߚ, and ݐ, this study analyses the impact of changes in ߠ on the 
level of net GHG emission, ݎ. For this, this study differentiates Equations (8) to (10) 
utilizing Equations (5) to (7). The results are as follows: 
ܥ௕௕ܾ݀ ൅ ܥ௕ఉ݀ߚ ൅ ܥ௕௧݀ݐ ൌ െܥ௕ఏ݀ߠ,																																																			ሺ11ሻ 
ܣఉ௕ܾ݀ ൅ ܣఉఉ݀ߚ ൅ ܣఉ௧݀ݐ ൌ 0,																																																														ሺ12ሻ 
ܣ௧௕ܾ݀ ൅ ܣ௧ఉ݀ߚ ൅ ܣ௧௧݀ݐ ൌ 0.																																																																ሺ13ሻ 
where 
ܥ௕௕ ൌ െߚߠሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧௚ሻܧ௥௥∗ ∆ିଵൣߚ൫ܴ௧௚ ൅ 1൯ ൅ ߝሺݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚ሻ൧, 
ܥ௕ఉ ൌ ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ߠܧ௥∗ሾ1 െ ൫1 ൅ ܴ௚௧൯ߚܾሺݎ∆ሻିଵሺߟ௥௥∗ െ ߠߟ௥௨∗ ሻሿ, 
ܥ௕௧ ൌ ܥ௧ߚߠ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ሺݎ∆ሻିଵሺߠߟ௥௨∗ െ ߟ௥௥∗ ሻܧ௥∗, 
ܥ௕ఏ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧௚ሻߚܧ௥∗ሺ1 െ ߠߟ௥௨∗ ሻ, 
ܣఉ௕ ൌ ܾ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯∆ିଵ൛ܧ௥௨ܧ௨ି ଵܣ௕ െ ܧ௥௥ሾߚ൫ܴ௧௚ ൅ 1൯ ൅ ߝሺݐܴ௧௚ െ ܴ௚ሿൟ, 
ܣఉఉ ൌ െܾଶሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧௚ሻଶܧ௥௥∆ିଵ, 
ܣఉ௧ ൌ െܾሺ1 ൅ ܴ௚௧ሻ∆ିଵܧ௥௥ሾሺݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧ሻ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ െ ܴ௧௧ሺܴ௚ ൅ ݐሻሿ  
ܣ௧௕ ൌ ൣ൫ݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧൯൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ െ ܴ௧௧൫ܴ௚ ൅ ݐ൯൧ 
ൣሺ1 െ ߚሻܧ௥௨ܧ௨ି ଵ ൅ ߚ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ሺݎ∆ሻିଵܧ௥ሺߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ሻ ൅
ሺݐܴ௧௚ିܴ௚ሻߝܧ௥ሺݎ∆ሻିଵሺߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ሻ൧, 
ܣ௧௧ ൌ െܧ௥௥∆ିଵሾ൫ݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧൯൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ െ ܴ௧௧൫ܴ௚ ൅ ݐ൯ሿଶ െ ܴ௧௧ܧ௥൫1 ൅ ܴ௚௧൯, 
24 
 
ߟ௥௨ ൌ ݎሺܧ௥௨ ܧ௨⁄ ሻ, 	ߟ௥௥ ൌ ݎሺܧ௥௥ ܧ௥⁄ ሻ, ߟ௥௨∗ ൌ ݎሺܧ௥௨∗ ܧ௨∗⁄ ሻ, ߟ௥௥∗ ൌ ݎሺܧ௥௥∗ ܧ௥∗⁄ ሻ. 
       Having obtained the general expression for changes in the policy parameters (ܾ, ߚ, 
and ݐ), the case of the Nash equilibrium is examined in the next section. 
2.4  The case of the Nash equilibrium 
As defined before, this study assumes that the Annex I country endogenously decides the 
amount of CDM investment (ܾ), and that the host country optimally sets both the proportion 
of CDM revenue allocated to GHG reduction activities ሺߚሻ and the GHG emission tax rate 
ሺݐሻ by themselves. Under this condition, the Nash equilibrium is obtained when ܣఉ ൌ ܣ௧ ൌ
ܥ௕ ൌ 0. Moreover, the condition ܣఉ ൌ ܣ௧ ൌ 0 denotes ݐ ൌ ܧ௥ ൌ െܴ௚. 
       From a common sense perspective, GHG emission is a global public bad and its 
abatement, conversely, is a global public good. In this case, it can be interpreted that the 
optimality conditions would be the combination of the Samuelson rule and the Pigouvian rule. 
The first equality in the optimality conditions is attributable to the Pigouvian rule, that is, that 
the marginal WTP for GHG emission reduction equals a GHG emission tax rate. Then, the 
second equality is ascribable to the Samuelson rule which the marginal WTP for a public 
good equals the marginal cost of its production. 
       Differentiating these equations, we obtain followings: 
ܦሺܾ݀ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൌ െܥ௕ఏ൫ܣఉఉܣ௧௧ െ ܣ௧ఉܣఉ௧൯,																																																			ሺ14ሻ 
ܦሺ݀ݐ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൌ െܥ௕ఏ൫ܣఉ௕ܣ௧ఉ െ ܣఉఉܣ௧௕൯,																																																			ሺ15ሻ 
ܦሺ݀ߚ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൌ ܥ௕ఏ൫ܣ௧௧ܣఉ௕ െ ܣఉ௧ܣ௧௕൯.																																																							ሺ16ሻ 
where ܦ is the determinant of the matrix of coefficients for ܾ݀, ݀ݐ, and ݀ߚ in Equations 
(11) to (13). Stability requires that ܦ is negative. As mentioned before, ݐ ൌ ܧ௥ ൌ െܴ௚ is 
one of the conditions in this analysis. Therefore, the expressions of the coefficients on the 
right hand side are simplified as follows: 
ܣఉ௕ ൌ ܾ൫1 ൅ ܴ௚௧൯ൣܧ௥௨ܧ௨ି ଵ െ ߚ∆ିଵ൫1 ൅ ܴ௚௧൯ܧ௥௥ ൅ ߝݐݎିଵሺߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ሻ൧, 
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ܣఉ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ఉ ൌ െܾሺ1 ൅ ܴ௚௧ሻଶ∆ିଵܧ௥௥ሺݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧ሻ, 
ܣ௧௕ ൌ ൫ݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧൯൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ሾܧ௥௨ܧ௨ି ଵ െ ߚ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯∆ିଵܧ௥௥ ൅ ߝݐݎିଵሺߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ሻሿ, 
ܣ௧௧ ൌ െܧ௥௥∆ିଵሺݖ ൅ ܴ݃௚௧ሻଶሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧௚ሻଶ െ ܴ௧௧ܧ௥൫1 ൅ ܴ௚௧൯. 
       Plugging the above expressions into Equations (14) to (16), we obtain 
ܦሺܾ݀ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൌ െܥ௕ఏܾଶሺ1 ൅ ܴ௚௧ሻଷܧ௥௥ܧ௥ܴ௧௧∆ିଵ൐ 0,																																							ሺ17ሻ 
ܦሺ݀ݐ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൌ 0,																																																																																																								ሺ18ሻ 
ܦሺ݀ߚ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൌ ܥ்ఏ൛െሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧௚ሻଶܾൣܧ௥௨ܧ௨ି ଵߚ∆ିଵ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ܧ௥௥
൅ ߝݐݎିଵሺߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ሻ൧ܴ௧௧ܧ௥ൟ		݁݅ݐ݄݁ݎ ൐ 0	݋ݎ ൏ 0.																																											ሺ19ሻ 
       Based on Equation (17), due to the result (ܾ݀ ݀ߠ⁄ ൐ 0), it is evident that ߠ 
positively affects the amount of CDM investment. Similarly, Equation (18) clearly indicates 
that ߠ has no effect on a GHG emission tax rate. Lastly, it is less clear whether or not ߠ has 
a certain effect on the proportion of CDM revenue allocated to GHG reduction activities, ߚ 
(Equation (19)). The reason for this ambiguity is attributed to an assumption that a change in 
݃ has no impact on ܴ௚ (i.e.,	ܴ௚௚ ൌ 0). 
       Finally, the effect on net GHG emissions in the case of the Nash equilibrium can be 
expressed 
ሺ݀ݎ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൌ െ∆ିଵ൫1 ൅ ܴ௧௚൯ሾߚሺܾ݀ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻ ൅ ܾሺ݀ߚ ݀ߠ⁄ ሻሿ 
																										ൌ ሺ∆ܦሻିଵܥ௕ఏܾଶሺ1 ൅ ܴ௧௚ሻଷܧ௥ܴ௧௧ሾܧ௥௨ܧ௨ି ଵ ൅ ߝݐݎିଵሺߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ሻሿ.									ሺ20ሻ 
       If ߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ ൒ 0, we have ݀ݎ ݀ߠ⁄ ൏ 0, that is, that increases in the environmental 
awareness in the Annex I country will reduce pollution emissions. Since ߟ௥௨ demotes the 
host country’s marginal propensity to pay for pollution abatement and rr  is a host 
country’s marginal WTP for the reduction in pollution, ߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ ൒ 0 means that the host 
country is willing to pay for pollution abatement more than pollution reduction. This is 
because if the host country’s marginal propensity to pay for pollution abatement is large 
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enough, the government would allocate a larger amount of CDM revenue to public GHG 
reduction activities and would raise the GHG emission tax rate resulting in the reduction of 
production activities in the private sector. In this case, the host country, receiving CDM 
investment, will reduce GHG emissions. On the other hand, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that ߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ ൏ 0. If ߟ௥௨ െ ߟ௥௥ ൏ 0 and the absolute value is sufficiently great, we have 
݀ݎ ݀ߠ⁄ ൐ 0. In this case, the host country’s high marginal WTP for the reduction of GHG 
emissions means a high price of GHG reductions. If this “price” is sufficiently great, the 
government would need a larger amount of budget to reduce GHG emissions and thus the 
host country results in accepting higher GHG emission, receiving CDM revenue from the 
Annex I country. However, it is plausible that ߟ௥௥ ൏ 1, that is, consumers will not be willing 
to pay for more than their additional income for pollution abatement (Hatzipanayotou et al. 
2002). With small rr , it can be considered the case of ݀ݎ ݀ߠ⁄ ൏ 0 as realistic. 
        In addition, this study considers the impact of the effectiveness of CDM projects, ߝ. 
It can be said that, if ߝ is sufficiently great (i.e., ߝ ൐ 1), meaning that CDM projects, ceteris 
paribus, reduce GHG emissions more efficiently than other GHG reduction activities, we 
may have (݀ݎ ݀ߠ⁄ ൏ 0), that is, higher awareness of the environment in the Annex I country 
that reduces the amount of net GHG emissions. Although this is not necessarily the case, 
when a CDM project can adopt more efficient GHG abatement technologies and know-how 
transferred by the Annex I country, this is the case. 
2.5  Conclusions 
This chapter examined the effects of the CDM on the host country’s GHG emission tax rate 
and GHG reduction policies by examining the effects of increased environmental awareness 
in the Annex I country utilizing the two-country model created by Hatzipanayotou et al. 
(2002). In the Nash equilibrium where the Annex I country chooses the amount of CDM 
investment and the host sets the proportion of CDM revenue used in GHG reduction activities 
and GHG emission tax rate, this study finds that a rise in the environmental awareness of the 
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Annex I country increases the CDM investment and does not affect the GHG emission tax 
rate and, plausibly, reduces GHG emissions of the host country. These results are similar to 
those obtained by Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002). In addition, this study can formally show that 
the degree of the effectiveness of CDM projects in reducing GHG emissions affect the 
behavior of the Annex I country. It is also shown that, in a plausible case, the more effective 
the CDM investment is, the greater the reduction of GHG emissions in the host country is. If 
the effectiveness reflects the recipient country’s ability to adopt the advanced technologies 
(e.g., education levels or human capital stock of the country) the Annex I country tends to 
undertake CDM investments in such countries with greatest human capital. This prediction 
arises from our theoretical consideration. In the following chapters, we will take into account 
the human capital as one of possible factors determining the directions of CDM investments 
from Annex I countries. Furthermore, one obvious advantage of tackling the reduction of 
GHG emissions by implementing CDM projects is that CDM projects can directly reduce 
GHG emissions while providing financial aids has an inevitable risk which is the diversion of 
the funds by the host country’s government. 
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3. Empirical Analysis Focusing on Business Environment: 
A Cross-Country Analysis 
3.1  Background 
As explained in Introduction, CDM projects have become disproportionately allocated 
various parts of the world. There is a wide agreement that the distribution of the CDM 
projects has been quite uneven among the developing nations (e.g. Muller, 2007; Boyd et al., 
2009; Flamos, 2010). 
       Responding to this status, many developing countries lodged complaints against the 
unequal distribution of CDM benefits on the basis of Decision 17/CP.7 of the Marrakesh 
Accords which stipulates the necessity of the promotion of equitable distribution of CDM 
activities at regional and sub-regional levels (UNFCCC, 2001). This situation seems to be 
nearing critical status since the Kyoto Protocol stipulates two conditions for an inurement of 
the protocol: one is to secure the ratifications of no less than 55 countries; and the other is to 
secure 55% of the total GHG emissions of all developed nations in 1990 level regardless of 
the number of ratified nations (UNFCCC, 1998). If a number of developing countries secede 
from the protocol, Annex I Parties would be in a position to criticize the effectiveness and 
equitability of the protocol and, as a result, the effects of the protocol might be diminished. 
Therefore, this issue should be solved for a stable operation of the Kyoto Mechanism 
including CDM. 
       As the most possible cause of this issue, low potentials for GHG emission reductions 
in LDCs are frequently mentioned in the literature (e.g., Haites, 2004) and empirical studies 
on the distribution of CDM projects have had interesting results. For instance, Flues (2010) 
found that the number of CDM projects is explicitly influenced by factors categorized into 
three groups: CDM potential, feasibility, and profitability. However, findings identified by 
previous empirical studies contain many contradictions. Responding to these previous studies, 
the objective of this chapter is to identify additional significant decisive factors of CDM 
project hosting not found in previous studies, especially those focusing on identifying specific 
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elements of business environments using the sub-indices of the Doing Business Index5. 
       The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews previous 
studies and creates a conceptual framework with assumptions; the data and methodology used 
in this study are explained in Section 3.3; and finally, Section 3.4 presents estimation results 
and discussions. 
3.2  Literature Review 
This section reviews previous studies on the unequal distribution of CDM projects. In 
previous studies, the determinants of CDM project hosting have been theoretically presumed 
with the exception of some empirical studies that identify several determinants based on 
quantitative analyses. The major findings of existing theoretical and empirical studies are 
summarized in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, respectively. Finally a conceptual framework is 
expounded in Section 3.2.3. 
3.2.1  Theoretical Studies 
The already sizeable and continually growing theoretical literature argues that the low 
potentials for GHG emission reductions hinder the establishment of CDM projects in LDCs 
(e.g., Haites, 2004; Jung, 2006). For instance, Jung (2006) states that the countries that are 
well-endowed with CDM projects emitted a large amount of GHGs before the CDM came 
into effect in 2005 and they appear eager to boost their shares further without any investment 
from advanced nations. In contrast, there have been few industries emitting vast amounts of 
GHGs in LDCs and the potential for launching CDM projects in LDCs is, thus, likely to be 
fundamentally very low (Haites, 2004) because projects that produce small amounts of CERs 
must be judged as commercially unattractive by CDM investors following the principle of the 
market mechanism. 
       Jahn et al. (2004) and Michaelowa (2007) argue theoretically that certain levels of 
                                                 
5 The Doing Business Index is an index created by the World Bank where higher rankings indicate 
more effective, usually simpler, regulations for business and stronger protection for property rights. 
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human capital, institutional and infrastructural capacities, and financial capital availability are 
required in order for a country to successfully host CDM projects. Accordingly, in case a host 
countries’ risk premiums for CDM investors are high, unilateral CDM projects must be 
feasible and economically viable (Jahn et al., 2004). In addition, Flues (2010) alleges that, 
while some emerging nations can adopt advanced GHG reduction technologies to be 
transferred by CDM investors with comparative ease, LDCs must confront considerable 
technical barriers owing to their insufficient technological advancements.   
3.2.2  Empirical Studies 
Compared to theoretical studies, the number of empirical studies on the distributional issue is 
limited and many of their conclusions have been mired in controversy. 
       First of all, Dinar et al. (2008) analysed the levels of cooperation between host and 
investor countries using regression analysis, and revealed five significant factors: economic 
development, institutional development, the energy structure, the level of vulnerability to 
impacts of climate change; and ties to Annex I Parties. Likewise, Flues (2010) affirms, also 
through regression analyses, that the number of CDM projects is positively affected by 
economic development and growth, fossil fuel, the potential of renewable energy, links to 
developed countries, and institutional quality as significant determinants. Furthermore, the 
study reveals that there are clear differences in the size of coefficients between the 
determinants of bilateral and unilateral CDM projects6. A similar study carried out by Wang 
and Firestone (2010) additionally confirms that GHG emissions of Annex I Parties are also 
one of the major determinants in addition to the host countries’ educational level and a certain 
level of infrastructures. In addition, Winkelman and Moore (2011) studied the determinants of 
CDM activities using a Probit model across the eligible host countries that have ratified the 
                                                 
6 Bilateral CDM projects are the standard form of CDM projects involving an Annex I Party and a host 
country. Projects involving more than one Annex I Parties are called multilateral CDM projects, though, 
in this article, bilateral projects include multilateral projects for convenience. Unilateral CDM projects 
are projects embarked on by a host country independently without the participation of Annex I Parties at 
the time of registration. 
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Kyoto Protocol and established a Designated National Authority (DNA)7. As a result, the 
study verifies the significance of three explanatory variables: GHG emissions, electricity 
capacity growth rates, and educational levels. 
3.2.3  Conceptual Framework 
Based on the literature review, we developed the conceptual framework which includes four 
groups of explanatory variables. Those are explained in the following paragraphs. 
       As mentioned in the previous section, the significance of GHG reduction potential is 
proven by both existing theoretical and empirical studies and this study also adopts it into a 
model. The next group is human capital which is theoretically thought of as an important 
factor in implementing CDM projects. However, there are contradictions among the results of 
empirical studies. For instance, while the study carried out by Wang and Firestone (2010) was 
unable to observe any significance of tertiary education obtained from the Global Competitive 
Report, Winkelman and Moore (2011) illustrated the significance of the education index, one 
of the components of the Human Development Index (HDI). These two findings seem to 
offer opposite results. When considering the CDM project hosting, the quality of human 
capital must be considered very important, especially with regard to scientific and 
technological levels, as to be able to effectively embark on CDM projects a certain level of 
scientific knowledge is inevitably required. This study, thereby, adopts two independent 
variables to verify the significance of human capital: the log of tertiary school enrolment rates 
and the log of the number of scientific and technical journal articles as proxies for general 
education levels and scientific levels, respectively. 
       The most important factor this study attempts to reveal is the quality of business 
environment in host countries. Combined with the results of existing empirical studies, there 
                                                 
7 DNA is the body granted responsibility by a Party to authorize and approve participation in CDM 
projects. The main task of the DNA is to assess potential CDM projects to determine whether they will 
assist the host country in achieving its sustainable development goals and to provide a letter of approval 
to project participants in CDM projects. 
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is an obvious contradiction between the theoretical and the empirical literature. On the one 
hand, Jung (2006) theoretically maintains that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are 
good predictors of host countries’ attractiveness for CDM investments particularly for 
countries receiving abundant FDI. Furthermore, Dinar et al. (2008) imply that the CDM can 
be regarded as a type of FDI. On the other hand, although the study carried out by Winkleman 
and Moore (2011) adopted FDI inflows as proxies for the qualities of business environment in 
their analytical models, the result did not show its significance. Moreover, Niederberger and 
Saner (2005) refute the connection between FDI and CDM investment by stating that some 
countries, after having failed to induce FDI, have actually succeeded in hosting CDM projects. 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the results with respect to the business 
environment are not homogenous. There appears to be two problems with the previous 
studies in terms of the precise estimation of business environment: first, the notion of business 
environment is vague and has a broader concept, resulting in various approaches and results 
from one another; and second, previous studies did not analyse sufficient aspects of business 
environment. Thus, in this study, sub-indices of the Doing Business Index are applied because 
of its comprehensive coverage.  
       The last group is links to advanced nation. This also seems to be a substantial factor 
as host countries need to find CDM investors or at least certified emission reduction (CER) 
buyers. In the previous studies, Dinar et al. (2008) and Flues (2010) demonstrated the 
importance of links to advanced nations in order to promote CDM projects, though the results 
of the study carried out by Flues (2010) have limited credibility (10% significance level) 
using a dummy valuable which indicates 1 if a country is one of former British, Spanish, 
Dutch, German, and French colony. As colonial relationships between advanced nations and 
eligible host countries are likely to affect investment decisions, this study adopts a former 
British colony dummy in order to know how the largest CDM investor utilizes colonial 
relationships in their CDM business. 
       Based on the above discussions, this study differs from the past studies by attempting 
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to verify the significance of 1) sub-indices of the Doing Business Index as proxies for specific 
elements of a business environment; 2) scientific and technology levels using the number of 
scientific and technical journal articles; and 3) former British colony dummy. 
3.3  Data and Methodology 
3.3.1  Data 
This survey covered 125 eligible host countries which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and 
established a Designated National Authority (DNA). Dependent variables used in this study 
are the log of the numbers of bilateral and unilateral CDM projects, sourced from the CDM 
project database as of 29 April 2011, created by the Institute for Global Environmental 
Strategies (IGES).   
       Definitions of all variables are explained in Table 3-1. Because the CDM registration 
was started in 2005, this study utilises data from 2005 for all independent variables except the 
data of colonial status which come from literature written by Hensel (2006).  
Table 3-1  Definitions of independent and dependent variables 
Variable Description Source 
Log of no. of bilateral 
CDM projects i 
The natural logarithm of the number of registered 
bilateral CDM projects of the country i (as of April 29 
2011). 
CDM project 
database (2011), 
IGES  
Log of no. of unilateral 
CDM projects i 
The natural logarithm of the number of registered 
unilateral CDM projects of the country i (as of April 29 
2011). 
CDM project 
database (2011), 
IGES  
Log of GHG emissions i The natural logarithm of GHG emissions of the 
country i (ktCO2e) including CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, 
PFCs, and SF6. (2005) 
World Resources 
Institute (2005), 
World Bank 
Net energy imports i Net energy imports of the country i (% of energy use). 
A negative value indicates that the country i is a net 
exporter. (2005) 
World Development 
Indicators (2005), 
World Bank 
Log of no. of scientific 
articles i 
The natural logarithm of the number of scientific and 
technical journal articles of the country i. (2005) 
World Development 
Indicators (2005), 
World Bank 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate i 
The natural logarithm of gross tertiary school 
enrollment rate of the country i. (2005) 
World Development 
Indicators (2005), 
World Bank 
Ease of starting a 
business i 
The percentile rank of starting a business of the 
country i. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
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No. of procedures for 
starting a business i 
The number of procedures required for starting a 
business of the country i. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Log of time for starting 
a business i 
The natural logarithm of the time required for starting a 
business of the country i (days). (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Log of cost for starting 
a business i 
The natural logarithm of the cost required for starting a 
business of the country i (% of income per capita). 
(2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Min. capital for starting 
a business i 
The paid-in minimum capital required for starting a 
business of the country i (% of income per capita). 
(2005)  
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Ease of dealing with 
construction permit i 
The percentile rank of dealing with construction 
permits percentile rank of the country i. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Ease of registering 
property i 
The percentile rank of registering property of the 
country i. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Ease of getting credit i The index of getting credit of the country i. (2005) Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Ease of protecting 
investors i 
The index of protecting investors rank of the country i. 
(2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Ease of paying taxes i The percentile rank of paying taxes rank of the country 
i. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
No. of tax  payments i The number of tax payments of the country i (number 
per year). (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Time for paying taxes i The time required for paying taxes of the country i 
(hours per year). (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Log of total tax rate i The natural logarithm of the total tax rate of the country 
i (% of commercial profit), which measures the amount 
of taxes and mandatory contributions borne by the 
business in the second year of operation. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Ease of trading across 
borders i 
The percentile rank of trading across borders of the 
country i. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Ease of enforcing 
contracts i 
The percentile rank of enforcing contracts of the 
country i. (2005) 
Doing Business 
(2007), World Bank
Colonial dummy i Dummy variable (Former British colonies =1, 0 
otherwise) 
Hensel (2006) 
Log of net ODA i The natural logarithm of net ODA of the country i 
(million US$). (2005) 
World Development 
Indicators (2005), 
WB 
Note: Doing Business Index 2007 contains data in 2005. 
    Descriptions of variables and the correlation coefficients among independent variables 
are shown in Tables 3-2 and 3-3. There are some missing values in explanatory variables due 
to data availability but the number is much smaller than the total number and thus, these 
deficits must have very limited impacts on the analytical results. 
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Table 3-2  Descriptive Table of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for simplicity. 
Table 3-3  Correlations Among Independent Variables 
        lnoda    -0.3817   0.0224  -0.1618   0.1180   0.2216   0.1765  -0.0734  -0.2621   0.1951   1.0000
      colony     0.1432   0.2390   0.1198   0.0115  -0.1541  -0.1023   0.1558  -0.0399   1.0000
    contract     0.1229  -0.1462   0.1194  -0.0646  -0.1393  -0.0089   0.0403   1.0000
       trade     0.2952   0.2418   0.1378  -0.3011   0.2274  -0.2063   1.0000
  lntax_rate    -0.2169  -0.2231  -0.7707   0.4465   0.3110   1.0000
    tax_time     0.1062   0.0038  -0.6506   0.1658   1.0000
     tax_num    -0.0979  -0.1236  -0.7212   1.0000
         tax     0.0512   0.1803   1.0000
     protect     0.5537   1.0000
      credit     1.0000
                                                                                                        
                 credit  protect      tax  tax_num tax_time lntax_~e    trade contract   colony    lnoda
       lnoda     0.2917   0.0634   0.1676  -0.4898  -0.2452   0.0364  -0.0558   0.3176   0.0659  -0.1832  -0.3949
      colony     0.0994   0.0692   0.1458  -0.2697  -0.0741   0.1480  -0.0438   0.2153   0.2965  -0.0919  -0.0734
    contract    -0.1515   0.3081   0.0122   0.3382   0.3430  -0.0473  -0.3071  -0.5187   0.0578  -0.0590   0.4529
       trade     0.2999   0.1501   0.4799   0.3726   0.2681  -0.0527  -0.3022  -0.2052   0.0025   0.2249   0.2175
  lntax_rate     0.2779  -0.1270   0.2475   0.1423  -0.0407   0.1207  -0.1460  -0.0287  -0.0927  -0.3527  -0.1884
    tax_time     0.3158   0.0435   0.4088   0.0803   0.0926  -0.0145  -0.0170  -0.1354  -0.1888   0.0789  -0.0902
     tax_num    -0.2128   0.0821  -0.2457  -0.0139  -0.0721   0.0507  -0.0322   0.0809  -0.0710  -0.1990  -0.1254
         tax    -0.1245   0.0544  -0.1395  -0.0991   0.0193  -0.1132   0.0346   0.0339   0.1714   0.1311   0.1789
     protect     0.3369  -0.1979   0.1453   0.0649   0.1809   0.0262   0.0243  -0.0106  -0.1847   0.1227   0.0334
      credit     0.0590   0.1240   0.1693   0.2941   0.4748  -0.0380  -0.0123  -0.3957  -0.3674   0.2288   0.2810
    property    -0.1849   0.2360   0.0313   0.5658   0.2122   0.0231  -0.1742  -0.3935   0.1053   0.2023   1.0000
      permit    -0.1377  -0.0781  -0.0880   0.0812   0.1536  -0.1915   0.0016  -0.0493   0.1924   1.0000
  start_capi     0.0192  -0.2161  -0.1156  -0.0693  -0.4186   0.0360  -0.0135   0.3944   1.0000
lnstart_cost    -0.0341  -0.3397  -0.4167  -0.5660  -0.8056   0.3068   0.4919   1.0000
lnstart_time     0.0186  -0.2728  -0.3151  -0.3915  -0.6653   0.5438   1.0000
 start_proce     0.1809  -0.3338  -0.0416  -0.1000  -0.6433   1.0000
       start    -0.0960   0.4299   0.2877   0.4089   1.0000
  lntertiary     0.0383   0.1352   0.2776   1.0000
   lnjournal     0.7640   0.1179   1.0000
    energyim    -0.3209   1.0000
       lnghg     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
                  lnghg energyim lnjour~l lntert~y    start start~ce lnstar~e lnsta~st start_~i   permit property
Category Variable Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent 
variables 
Log bilateral CDM projects 125 0.759 1.31 0 7.18 
Log unilateral CDM projects 125 0.481 1.10 0 6.27 
GHG reduction 
potential 
Log GHG emissions 123 10.1 1.94 5.70 15.8 
Net energy imports 88 -0.453 1.66 -7.55 1.00 
Human capital Log scientific articles 122 3.75 2.44 -1.61 10.6 
Log tertiary school enrolment rate 75 2.370 1.18 -0.755 4.52 
Business 
environment 
Ease of starting a business 113 53.7 20.9 3.33 99.6 
No. of procedures for starting a 
business 
115 10.3 2.91 5 20 
Log time for starting a business 115 3.68 0.713 1.79 6.54 
Log cost for starting a business 115 3.72 1.49 -0.223 8.76 
Min. capital for starting a business 115 191.5 509.5 0 4,234 
Ease of dealing with construction 
permits 
112 51.4 20.3 13.6 97.1 
Ease of registering property 113 52.5 20.6 0 97.7 
Ease of getting credit 113 3.52 1.62 0 8 
Ease of protecting investors 113 4.70 1.47 1.68 9.33 
Ease of paying taxes 113 50.5 21.8 10 100 
Tax payments 115 37.2 17.0 3 89 
Time for paying taxes  110 302.7 168.3 0 872 
Log total tax rate 115 3.79 0.578 2.23 5.68 
Ease of trading across borders 113 52.3 22.8 2.08 99.6 
Ease of enforcing contracts 113 51.2 18.6 13.8 95.9 
Links to 
advanced 
nations 
Colonial dummy 125 0.328 0.471 0 1 
Log net ODA 111 -1.491 1.38 -4.85 1.86 
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3.3.2  Methodology 
In order to examine the characteristics of eligible host countries, this study utilizes the Tobit 
model developed by Tobin (1958), because data on independent variables are available for all 
eligible host countries, including countries not hosting CDM projects. The data, therefore, can 
be regarded as censored data in which any negative values of dependent variables are set to a 
lower bound of zero. Hence, a Type I Tobit model (censored regression model) shown below 
(Amemiya, 1984) is utilized in the analysis: 
ݕ௜∗ ൌ x௜	β ൅ ε௜, ε௜|x௜, c௜	~Normalሺ0, σଶሻ 
ݕ௜ ൌ ൜		y௜
∗							ݕ௜∗ ൒ 0
0									ݕ௜∗ ൏ 0 
where y௜∗ is a latent response variable, x௜	 is an independent variable, and ε௜ is a residual. 
The latent variable y௜∗ satisfies the classical linear model assumptions that have a normal 
homoscedastic distribution with a linear conditional mean. An observed variable ݕ௜ is equal 
to ݕ௜∗ when ݕ௜∗ ൒ 0, but y equals 0 when ݕ௜∗ ൏ 0. Since ݕ௜∗ is normally distributed, ݕ௜ 
has a continuous distribution over strictly positive values. 
       In line with the conceptual framework, independent variables are thoroughly selected 
from variables used in the previous studies and newly adopted variables are added, all of 
which are categorized into four groups as listed in the models shown below: 
lnbii or lnunii = f ( Gi, Hi, Bi, Li ) 
where dependent variables, lnbii and lnuii, are the log of numbers of bilateral and unilateral 
CDM projects of host country i, respectively. Gi , Hi , Bi , and Li represent sets of 
characteristics of host country i relevant to GHG reduction potential (Gi), human capital (Hi), 
business environment (Bi), and links to advanced nations (Li), respectively. The details of all 
independent variables are explained in detail in the following paragraphs. 
1) GHG reduction potential 
This study uses the log of GHG emissions as a proxy for GHG reduction potential following 
the previous study carried out by Winkelman and Moore (2010). In general, it can be said that 
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countries with larger GHG emissions have larger GHG reduction potential. Net energy 
imports are also adopted as a proxy for energy independency. This is because countries 
depending heavily on imports for energy must have bigger motivations to tackle GHG 
reduction activities than other countries who may be responding to current soaring fossil fuel 
prices and the concerns of resource depletion (Kasai, 2012a). 
2) Human capital 
This study adopts the log of tertiary school enrolment rate to investigate the impacts of 
general education levels of people in eligible host countries. In addition, the log of the number 
of scientific and technical journal articles is used in the models of the other countries as the 
number of journal articles can be thought of as a good proxy of the science levels of eligible 
host countries (Kasai, 2012a). 
3) Business environment 
This study utilizes the data of the sub-indices of the Doing Business Index as proxies for the 
qualities of a business environment. The Doing Business Index is published by the World 
Bank and consists of nine sub-indices. However, one of them, “ease of closing a business,” is 
excluded from the models due to its tenuous connection to CDM project hosting. Therefore, 
data of eight sub-indices of the Doing Business Index are included in the model (Kasai, 
2012a). 
4) Links to advanced nations 
This study utilizes the log of net official development assistance (ODA) and a former British 
colonial dummy. As discussed in the previous section, the study carried out by Flues (2010) 
indicates that a colonial status dummy has vague positive effects. Thereafter, the definition of 
the colonial dummy used in this study is revised, which indicates 1 if a country is only former 
British colony. This is because the U.K. is the largest investor and many major CDM 
investors (CERs buyers) are headquartered in the U.K. (UNEP Risø Centre, 2012), leaving 
other colonial powers far behind (Kasai, 2012a). 
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3.4  Results and Discussions 
The regression results for determinants of bilateral and unilateral CDM project hosting are 
shown in Tables 3-4 and 3-5, respectively.   
       In the models for bilateral and unilateral CDM projects, six specifications are set and 
examined.  Specification 1 is the base specification containing major independent variables. 
One additional independent variable is added to the base specification to test the validities of 
four additional independent variables that are: the colonial dummy, the log of net ODA, net 
energy imports, and the log of tertiary school enrolment rate. In Specification 6, the 
components of “ease of starting a business” and “ease of paying taxes” are included to 
examine the reasons for their negative results, which are explained and discussed as follows. 
1) GHG reduction potentials 
As can be seen from Tables 3-4 and 3-5, the log of GHG emissions is statistically significant 
and positive for all specifications of bilateral CDM projects at a 1% significance level and is 
statistically significant only for Specification 4 of unilateral projects with the maximum limit 
of significance level (10%). Therefore, the results for unilateral projects are not very robust. 
Bilateral CDM projects tend to rely on assistance from advanced nations, for things such as 
investment and technology borrowing. CDM investors usually decide the projects’ locations 
following the market mechanism (i.e., profitability) and thus it is important to have reasonable 
abatement costs to host bilateral projects (Flues, 2010). 
       On the other hand, unilateral projects essentially need to be developed by host 
countries themselves, so it is not necessarily required to have large GHG reduction potentials. 
These results can be regarded as reasonable and are consistent with the arguments and 
findings of previous studies (Kasai, 2012a). 
       From the standpoint of energy independence, net energy imports are statistically 
significant and positive for both bilateral and unilateral projects. This result is likely to express 
that countries relying heavily on energy imports tend to be motivated to participate in GHG 
reduction projects since those activities quite often reduce fossil fuel consumptions which is 
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one positive side effect of CDM projects for their host countries (Kasai, 2012a). 
2) Human capital 
As Tables 3-4 and 3-5 show, the log of the tertiary school enrolment rates is statistically 
significant and positive for bilateral projects but insignificant for unilateral projects. The 
former is in accordance with previous studies, though their significance levels are at the 
maximum limit. The latter might indicate that the important factor of promoting CDM 
projects is not the general educational level, but other specific fields of education. This study 
also confirms that the log of the number of scientific and technical journal articles is 
significant and positive specifically for unilateral CDM projects. Taking into account the 
feature of unilateral projects, scientific levels seem to be more important for unilateral projects 
because those projects must be implemented independently. Therefore, this analysis is likely 
to demonstrate that scientific levels are a significant determinant of CDM project hosting, 
especially for unilateral projects, which is fully consistent with the assumption of this study 
(Kasai, 2012a). 
3) Business environment 
As Tables 3-4 and 3-5 indicate, two independent variables, namely “ease of dealing with 
construction permits” and “ease of enforcing contracts,” are statistically insignificant. The 
results of the remaining six variables related to the business environment are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
This study was able to obtain three significant and positive variables: firstly, “ease of 
registering property” is statistically significant and positive in all specifications for both 
bilateral and unilateral projects; secondly, “ease of getting credit” is also statistically 
significant and positive in four specifications out of six for bilateral projects and in five 
specifications for unilateral projects; thirdly, “ease of trading across borders” is statistically 
significant and positive in all specifications for bilateral projects as this might imply that 
efficient trading systems are important assets for bilateral projects. These positive results are 
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in line with the assumption of this study (Kasai, 2012a). 
       In contrast, the regression results indicate that three other variables have significant 
negative effects. Nevertheless, one of them, “ease of enforcing contracts,” is judged as 
insignificant since the negative result seems to be strongly influenced by an outlier. In fact, by 
running the regression model excluding it, the results become insignificant. Next, “ease of 
starting a business” is statistically insignificant for bilateral projects but significant and 
negative for unilateral projects. Similarly, “ease of paying taxes” indicates the significant 
negative effects in all specifications for bilateral projects and in Specification 1 for unilateral 
projects. These two variables contradict the expectations (Kasai, 2012a). 
       The significant and negative effects are not expected amongst variables regarding a 
business environment. In order to identify factors causing the negative results, all components 
of those two variables are incorporated into Specification 6. Consequently, the analysis 
suggests that the cause of the negative result of “ease of starting a business” could be the cost 
for starting a business. At the same time, the analysis finds that “minimum capital for starting 
a business” has significant and positive effects on unilateral project hosting at a 5% 
significance level. Regarding “ease of paying taxes,” “number of procedures for tax 
payments,” and “time for paying taxes” are statistically significant and negative only for 
bilateral projects. These negative results are likely to present the difficulty of measuring a 
comprehensive business environment. One explanation for this set of results is that countries 
with a more matured business environment tend to impose more severe rules and regulations 
on private firms (Kasai, 2012a). 
Overall, the business environment can be judged as a significant determinant because 
the regression result identifies four significant and positive factors, namely “ease of 
registering property,” “ease of getting credit,” “ease of trading across borders,” and 
“minimum capital for starting a business.” This is consistent with the assumption and 
regarded as reasonable since it is envisaged that CDM investors prefer not invest in countries 
with unfavourable business environments (Kasai, 2012a). 
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4)  Links to advanced nations 
There are two independent variables in the links to advanced nations, both of which are 
insignificant for both bilateral and unilateral project hosting. The results of the colonial 
dummy might allude to the fact that CDM investors in the U.K. do not give credence to 
colonial ties and this may be due to the impacts caused by growing globalization. In addition, 
the statistical insignificance of the log of net ODA may imply that CDM investors act 
differently from their governments for other factors or simply by following the market 
mechanism (Kasai, 2012a).  
Table 3-4  Regression Result for Determinants of Bilateral CDM Projects 
Category Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GHG 
reduction 
potential 
Log of GHG emissions 0.666*** 0.654*** 0.595*** 0.933*** 0.663*** 0.505***
Net energy imports    0.632***   
Human capital Log of the number of 
scientific articles 
0.165 0.173 0.171 -0.0489 0.0934 0.278**
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
    0.433*  
Business 
environment 
Ease of starting a 
business 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.013 -0.002  
Number of procedures 
for starting a business 
     0.059
Log of time for starting 
a business 
     0.311
Log of cost for starting 
a business 
     -0.015
Min. capital for starting 
a business 
     0.000
Ease of dealing with 
construction permits 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.003
Ease of registering 
property 
0.020** 0.0182** 0.020** 0.023*** 0.019* 0.022**
Ease of getting credit 0.315** 0.317** 0.316*** 0.155 0.104 0.306**
Ease of protecting 
investors 
-0.087 -0.071 -0.053 0.064 0.146 -0.036
Ease of paying taxes -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.031*** -0.043*** -0.046***  
No. of tax payments      0.034***
Time for paying taxes       0.002**
Log of total tax rate      0.547
Ease of trading across 
borders 
0.019** 0.019** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.025** 0.017**
Ease of enforcing 
contracts 
0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.006
Links to 
advanced 
nations 
Colonial dummy  -0.233     
Log of net ODA   0.160    
N 110 110 102 78 72 105 
Pseudo R-sq 0.381 0.382 0.403 0.382 0.447 0.395
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table 3-5  Regression Result for Determinants of Unilateral CDM Projects 
Category Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GHG 
reduction 
potential 
Log of GHG emissions 0.241 0.249 0.076 0.475* 0.108 0.283
Net energy imports    0.685**   
Human capital Log of the number of 
scientific articles 
0.668*** 0.682*** 0.683** 0.500** 0.761*** 0.769***
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
    0.495  
Business 
environment 
Ease of starting a 
business 
-0.037** -0.032* -0.045** -0.046*** -0.020  
Number of procedures 
for starting a business 
     0.092
Log of time for starting 
a business 
     0.126
Log of cost for starting 
a business 
     0.452*
Minimum capital for 
starting a business 
     -0.004**
Ease of dealing with 
construction permits 
0.008 0.004 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.003
Ease of registering 
property 
0.039*** 0.035** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.0422** 0.043***
Ease of getting credit 0.452** 0.507** 0.486** 0.374** -0.0361 0.358*
Ease of protecting 
investors 
-0.149 -0.126 -0.070 -0.112 0.286 -0.326
Ease of paying taxes -0.023* -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 -0.017  
No. of tax payments      0.008
Time for paying taxes      0.002
Log of total tax rate      -0.312
Ease of trading across 
borders 
0.009 0.008 0.014 0.004 -0.000 0.019
Ease of enforcing 
contracts 
-0.028* -0.034** -0.027 -0.032** -0.031 -0.039**
Links to 
advanced 
nations 
Colonial dummy  -1.012     
Log of net ODA   0.297    
N 110 110 102 78 72 105 
Pseudo R-sq 0.348 0.359 0.357 0.322 0.373 0.363 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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4. The Revisit of Empirical Analysis: A Panel Data Analysis 
4.1  Background 
Chapter 3 successfully identified hidden determinants for CDM project hosting. Having said 
that, as well as in previous studies, the data set used in the analysis is cross-sectional data, 
which caused the limited reliability of its analytical results. Moreover, due to the existence of 
many independent variables with respect to the business environment, several vital variables 
do not seem to be included in the model. Therefore, we try to carry out a panel data analysis 
with the twofold objectives in this chapter: firstly, to specify more precise and appropriate 
factors affecting CDM project hosting; and secondly, to figure out more promising 
approaches for less endowed countries.  
       This chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a conceptual framework to 
be utilized for establishing empirical models and selected hypotheses generated based on 
findings from literature review; Section 4.3 explains analytical methodologies and data used 
in this study; and estimated results and relevant discussions are presented in Section 4.4. 
4.2  Literature Review 
This section reviews the earlier literature on the decisive factors of CDM project hosting. All 
in all, whilst many theoretical studies have presumed and argued the determinants of CDM 
project hosting, the number of empirical studies based on quantitative analysis has been very 
limited. The major findings of existing theoretical and empirical studies are summarized in 
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively. Based on the findings of the literature, the conceptual 
framework for a panel data analysis is illustrated in Section 4.2.3. 
4.2.1  Theoretical Studies 
The growing theoretical literature has shown that the low potentials for GHG emission 
reductions hinder the implementation of CDM project activities in LDCs (e.g., Haites, 2004; 
Jung, 2006). For instance, Jung (2006) states that countries well-endowed with CDM projects 
emitted a large amount of GHGs before the CDM came into effect in 2005 and, seem eager to 
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boost their number of independent CDM activities further without investments from 
advanced nations. In contrast, there have been few industries emitting the vast amount of 
GHGs in the LDCs. The potential for launching CDM projects in LDCs is, therefore, likely to 
be fundamentally very low (Haites, 2004). This is because projects that produce small 
amounts of CERs may be considered commercially unattractive by investors following the 
principle of the market mechanism (Kasai, 2012a).  
       With respect to disputes about socioeconomic factors, Jahn et al. (2004) and 
Michaelowa (2007) theoretically argue that certain levels of human capital, institutional and 
infrastructural capacities, and financial capital availability are required to host CDM project 
activities. Accordingly, if host countries have higher risk premiums for CDM investors, it 
ought to be more appropriate and feasible for those countries to implement CDM activities 
unilaterally (Jahn et al., 2004). Flues (2010) alleges that, while some eligible industrialized 
host countries are able to adopt relatively advanced GHG reduction technologies with 
comparative ease, LDCs must confront considerable technical barriers for the use of those 
technologies due to their insufficient technological levels. Moreover, governance levels can 
be regarded as one of determinants in theoretical literature as effective governance is needed 
to facilitate CDM activities due to its complex procedures. For instance, Olawuyi (2009) 
implies that the gaps in economic, social and administrative conditions among developing 
countries directly and powerfully affect the attractiveness of CDM host countries. 
       In summary, based on the theoretical literature, GHG emission levels, economic 
conditions, and social conditions are thought to play important roles in promoting CDM 
project activities and are likely to be found as decisive factors of CDM project hosting in this 
study. 
4.2.2  Empirical Studies 
Prevailing empirical research papers have applied various analytical methods and their results 
have been occasionally mired in controversy. Compared to theoretical studies, the number of 
empirical studies on the distributional issue is limited including the study in Chapter 3, and 
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are chronologically explained in the following paragraphs and summarized in Table 4-1. The 
data in the table helps to describe the appropriateness and effectiveness of the conceptual 
framework and the selection of methodologies that appear later. 
       Dinar et al. (2008) conducted an empirical study focused on identifying significant 
factors influencing the levels of cooperation between host and investor countries. They 
hypothesized that theories of international relations (FDI inflows and trade) play roles in the 
promotion of CDM activities and thus applied theories of international economic activities as 
mentioned above. As a result, their analyses utilizing four models (Poisson, Logit, Probit, and 
Tobit models) identifies several significant factors for the levels of cooperation in CDM 
activities: economic development, institutional development, the energy structure levels of 
vulnerability to climate change impacts, and relationships between the host and investor 
countries. Finally, they emphasized the importance of simplifying regulations and registration 
processes regarding the CDM towards a CDM reform, improving the governance levels of 
host countries, and strengthening economic activities between host and investor countries. 
Similarly, Wang and Firestone (2010) analysed the determinants of the amount of 
CERs using a gravity model based on an international trade theory. Consequently, the study 
demonstrates that the domestic GHG emission levels of both host and investor countries are 
the primary determinant of CDM project hosting, which is consistent with their hypotheses. 
The regression result also indicates that the degrees of openness to international trade, 
infrastructure, and project sizes are significant determinants. Based on their findings, Wang 
and Firestone (2010) speculated the importance of technical support and official development 
assistance (ODA) from advanced nations in the context of improving infrastructure in host 
countries. 
       A study conducted by Flues (2010) also considered the uneven CDM distribution 
issue. They created a framework consisting of three dimensions: potential, feasibility, and 
profitability on the basis of a hypothesis that the probability of CDM projects is thought to be 
determined by the three dimensions. The estimation results affirm, based on the estimation 
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results of the Poisson QML model and negative binomial hurdle model, that the number of 
CDM projects is positively affected by economic development and growth, fossil fuel, 
renewable energy potential, and institutional qualities as significant determinants of CDM 
project distribution. Of special note is that the study reveals the fact there are clear differences 
in the size of coefficients between the determinants of bilateral and unilateral CDM projects. 
Ultimately, Flues (2010) concluded that the CDM is not a promising mechanism for LDCs, 
noting the need for financial assistance from the GEF (Global Environmental Facility)8 to 
LDCs. 
       Subsequently, Winkelman and Moore (2011) investigated the determinants of CDM 
projects and CERs distributions using Probit and truncated regression models, respectively. 
The study differs from the past studies in terms of the selection of independent variables and 
the scope of a dependent variable. The Probit model covered 115 eligible host countries, 
excluding developing countries that have not established DNAs yet as it is technically 
impossible to host CDM projects without establishing a DNA. As a result, the study confirms 
that GHG emissions, electricity capacity growth rates, CDM capacity building, and 
educational levels have positive and significant effects on both the number of CDM project 
hosting and the amount of CERs. Meanwhile, the institutional index and FDI inflows are 
statistically and insignificantly different from their expectations. Lastly, Winkelman and 
Moore (2011) pointed out that their findings proved the inevitability of poor opportunities of 
developing CDM projects in LDCs. 
       In the most recent empirical research paper on the CDM imbalance issue, Kasai 
(2012a) also attempted to identify the determinants of CDM project hosting using the Tobit 
model. Following the study conducted by Flues (2010), the study adopted dependent 
variables of registered unilateral and bilateral, including multilateral, CDM projects. 
Independent variables used were categorised into four categories: GHG reduction potentials, 
                                                 
8 The GEF is the world’s largest international fund which grants funds and technical support to help 
developing countries tackle global environmental issues. It also performs as a financing mechanism for 
the FCCC. 
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human capital, business environment, and links to advanced nations. The study particularly 
focused on two factors, namely the qualities of business environment and scientific levels in 
host countries. Consequently, the study found that three factors relevant to the business 
environment and the scientific levels in eligible host countries using proxies of the sub-indices 
of the Ease of Doing Business Index and the number of scientific and technical journal 
articles. As a result, Kasai (2012a) stated that LDCs would be better off considering using 
programmatic CDM with emphasis on the need of capacity building programs by 
international organisations.  
Table 4-1  Previous Empirical Studies on Determinants of CDM Projects 
Author(s) 
and year 
Model Dependent variable Significant factors 
Dinar et al. 
(2008) 
Poisson, 
Logit, Probit, 
and Tobit 
models 
The number of CDM 
projects, the amount 
of CO2 abatement, 
and the volume of 
investments. 
GDP, energy use, governance, 
Ease of Doing Business, 
renewable energy, level of 
vulnerability, and trade. 
Wang and 
Firestone 
(2010) 
Gravity model The expected 
amounts of CERs 
during the 1st period. 
GHG emissions of host and 
investor countries, project size, 
openness to world trade, and 
infrastructure. 
Flues (2010) Poisson QML 
and negative 
binomial 
hurdle models 
The number of 
registered CDM 
projects (as of the end 
of 2008). 
GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, 
trade per GDP, renewable energy 
potential, and political freedom. 
Winkelman 
and Moore 
(2011) 
Probit model, 
Truncated 
regression 
model  
The number of CDM 
projects, the amount 
of expected CERs. 
GHG emissions, electricity capacity 
growth, CDM capacity building, 
and education index. 
Kasai 
(2012a) 
Tobit model The numbers of 
bilateral and unilateral 
CDM projects. 
GHG emissions, energy imports, 
science levels, tertiary school 
enrolment rates, ease of registering 
property, ease of getting credit, and 
ease of paying tax. 
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4.2.3  Conceptual Framework 
This section describes a conceptual framework which is structured based on the findings of 
existing papers and further hypothetical theories in accordance with the study carried out by 
Kasai (2012b). This framework guides the selection of dependent and independent variables 
used in the analytical models of this study. 
       To begin with, this study utilizes a dependent variable of the number of registered 
CDM project activities. When considering the amount of cash flows stemming from CER 
sales to host countries, the amount of (expected) CERs generated by CDM project activities 
should be used as a dependent variable. This study, however, chose the number of CDM 
projects because its objective is to make realistic suggestions that enable LDCs to embark 
upon CDM project activities even with small-scale projects. Furthermore, it is not really 
feasible to adopt CERs in this case since the amount of CERs is heavily distorted by the stage 
of industrial development of a host country, meaning that there are few chances for LDCs 
owing to lower industrial levels (Kasai, 2012b). In fact, as can be seen from Table 4-2, only 
advanced developing countries have possessed CDM projects, thereby generating a larger 
amount of CERs by reducing GHGs with higher global warming potentials (GWPs) (see 
Appendix I), such as HFCs, PFCs, and SF6. The CERs generated from such productive 
projects have been widening the gap between advanced host countries and other potential host 
countries including LDCs (e.g., Kasai, 2013), and this was a controversial issue at early stage 
of the CDM (Hourcade and Toman, 1999). 
       With regard to independent variables, as Figure 4-1 shows, variables used in this 
study are categorized into four groups, each of which contains one to three variables selected 
based mainly on the aforementioned findings of existing theoretical and empirical studies. For 
the sake of carrying out more valuable analysis, those variables are chosen by thoroughly 
taking into account the importance and data availabilities of those variables to build better 
panel data sets in long format. The independent variables’ expected effects are shown in Table 
4-3. 
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Table 4-2  Nnumber of CDM Projects Reducing HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 
The table clearly shows that CDM projects reducing high GWP gases are located only in 
industrially well developed countries. 
Host country The number of CDM projects 
HFCs          PFCs           SF6            Total 
China 11 0 1 12 
India 7 1 0 8 
South Korea 1 0 6 7 
Brazil 0 1 1 2 
Argentina 1 1 0 2 
Israel 0 0 2 2 
Indonesia 0 1 0 1 
Mexico 1 0 0 1 
Source: IGES (2012) 
 
Figure 4-1  Four Categories of Independent Variables 
Table 4-3  Expected Regression Results 
Factors Control possibility a Expected result Expected effect b 
CO2 emissions Low Significant Positive (+++) 
GDP per capita 
Government effectiveness 
Control of corruption 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Significant 
Significant 
Significant 
Positive (+++) 
Positive (++) 
Positive (+) 
Tertiary school enrolment rate 
No.of scientific journal articles 
High 
High 
Significant 
Significant 
Positive (++) 
Positive (+++) 
ODA received 
FDI inflows 
Former British colony dummy 
Medium 
Medium 
n/a 
Significant 
Significant 
Significant 
Positive (++) 
Positive (+++) 
Positive (+) 
a Control possibility shows the ease of control of a factor by host countries. 
b The number of “+” reflects the degree of expected influences on CDM project hosting. 
       The reasons of the selection of independent variables and hypotheses derived from 
controversial and/or inadequate points in the earlier researches are illustrated in the following 
paragraphs. 
GHG reduction 
potentials
• CO2 emissions
Socioeconomic 
factor
• GDP per capita
• Government 
effectiveness
• Control of 
corruption
Human capital
• Tertiary school 
enrolment rates
• No. of scientific 
journal articles
Ties to advanced 
countries
• ODA received
• FDI inflows
• Former British 
colony dummy
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1)  GHG reduction potentials 
As frequently argued in many theoretical literatures (e.g., Haites, 2004; Jung, 2006), GHG 
reduction potentials is likely to be one of the crucial factors for CDM project hosting and has 
actually been proven by three empirical studies carried out by Kasai (2012a),  Wang and 
Firestone (2010), and Winkelman and Moore (2011). The importance of GHG reduction 
potentials can be regarded as reasonable because any CDM activities cannot be developed in 
host countries without certain levels of GHG emissions in the past. Hence, this study adopts 
an independent variable of CO2 emissions, which is a GHG making the most significant 
contribution to global warming, as a proxy for GHG reduction potentials in accordance with 
the findings of previous studies. 
2)  Socioeconomic factors 
A mainstream perspective in the theoretical literature has argued that socioeconomic factors 
are important for hosting CDM projects. It has been maintained that economic, political, 
governance, and infrastructure conditions all have the influence to attract CDM investors. 
This study adopts three independent variables regarding socioeconomic factors: GDP per 
capita, governance effectiveness, and the control of corruption. 
       Independent variables explaining economic conditions in host countries are 
confirmed as significant determinants of CDM project hosting in two empirical studies 
conducted by Dinar et al. (2008) and Flues (2010) which utilized the variables of GDP and 
GDP per capita, respectively. These findings are consistent with the theoretical literature and 
are reasonable considering the fact that GHG emission levels and GDP levels are highly 
correlated (e.g., a correlation coefficient between GHG emissions and GDP in 2009 = .961). 
This study judges that GDP per capita is a better variable than GDP because GDP per capita 
can decrease the population gap among eligible host countries and capture their real economic 
conditions more appropriately (Kasai, 2012b). GDP per capita, thus, is selected as a proxy of 
an economic status in this study. 
       As one of factors explaining socioeconomic conditions, a growing theoretical 
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literature has explained that governance levels in host countries matters in order to attract 
CDM investors (e.g., Jahn et al., 2004; Michaelowa, 2007). This argument is supported by 
one empirical study (Dinar et al., 2008) which analyzed the factors affecting the cooperation 
levels between developing and developed countries in terms of the CDM. Alternatively, the 
other empirical study carried out by Winkelman and Moore (2010) reports the insignificance 
of the institutional index from the World Governance Indicators (WGI)9. The significance of 
governance levels, thereafter, needs to be further assessed to figure out its real influence on 
CDM activities. This study, therefore, employs an independent variable of governance 
effectiveness sourced from WGI. In line with Kasai (2012b), the first hypothesis is formulated 
here as shown below: 
H1: The better governance capacity eligible host countries have, the more CDM projects the 
countries will be able to host. 
       Another factor that may or may not hold influence in the promotion of CDM 
activities is corruption. As it is often assumed in the literature regarding developing 
economics (e.g., Gupta et al., 2002; Mauro, 1995), corruption is likely to be a major factor 
responsible for income inequality and poverty in developing nations, lowering the probability 
of the implementation of CDM projects. The mechanism that causes inequality of CDM 
project distribution seems to be similar to that of income inequality (Kasai, 2012b). Therefore, 
this study attempts to test the impacts of corruption on CDM project hosting using one of 
indicators of WGI, namely the control of corruption. 
3)  Human capital 
Theoretically speaking, human capital must be one of the significant factors promoting CDM 
project activities (Michaelowa, 2007) and the diversity of views can be found in the empirical 
literature. For example, Winkelman and Moore (2011) show that the educational index, which 
                                                 
9 WGI reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 countries over the period 
between 1996 and 2010. 
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is one of the components of the Human Development Index (HDI) created by UNDP, is 
positively and statistically significant. On the other hand, Wang and Firestone (2010) were not 
able to observe the significance of the general educational level using an independent variable 
of tertiary education percentages obtained from the Global Competitive Report. These 
contradicting findings are to be assessed in this study. As is often argued in the literature, 
when considering hosting CDM project activities, it must be important for host countries to 
secure qualified personnel in general because developing and managing CDM projects are 
complex tasks which require persons in charge of CDM activities to correctly grasp 
complicated regulations, procedures, methodologies, and tools (Kasai, 2012b). 
       Taking into account the realistic implementation of CDM project activities, host 
countries require personnel particularly familiar with scientific knowledge as CDM projects 
reduce GHGs normally using scientific and technical methodologies (Kasai, 2012b). Such 
abilities may not be necessarily important if project participants (PPs) from Annex I countries 
were fully in charge of writing project design documents (PDDs), validations and 
verifications carried out by designated operational entities (DOEs) 10 , and actual 
implementation of CDM projects. Having said that, PPs in host countries must manage CDM 
projects including monitoring the amounts of GHGs reduced by CDM projects. Thus, science 
and technology levels of host countries still seem to matter (Kasai, 2012b). Based on the 
above discussions, the second hypothesis (H2) has been formulated in accordance with Kasai 
(2012b): 
H2: The better scientific and technical levels eligible host countries have, the more CDM 
projects the countries will be able to host. 
       In summary, this study uses two variables related to human capital: tertiary school 
enrolment rate; and the number of scientific and technical journal articles. This follows the 
                                                 
10 DOEs are independent auditors accredited by the CDM Executive Board to validate proposed CDM 
projects and verify whether or not implemented CDM projects have achieved expected GHG 
reductions. 
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study conducted by Kasai (2012a) which revealed the significance of those two factors. 
4)  Ties with advanced countries 
In addition to host countries’ endogenous factors, exogenous factors are also important. Given 
that the CDM is a mechanism to be implemented by PPs in both host and investor countries, 
holding strong links to advanced countries should increase the probability of receiving 
investment in CDM projects (Flues, 2010).    
       An example of empirical literature (Dinar et al., 2008) demonstrates the importance 
of tighter links to advanced nations using an independent variable of total trade (the sum of 
the volume of bilateral imports and exports) between the host and investor countries. On the 
contrary, whilst Flues (2010) attempted to confirm the significance of links to advanced 
nations using a dummy variable of colonial status, which indicates 1 if countries were the 
former British, Spanish, Dutch, German, and French colonial counties and 0 otherwise, the 
result fails to demonstrate it. Also, another empirical literature (Wang and Firestone, 2010) 
shows insignificant results on common colony dummies. Considering this result, this study 
adopts a revised colonial dummy, stating 1 as countries that were in the British colony in the 
past and 0 otherwise. This revision is based on the fact that the U.K. is the largest CDM 
investor in the world. As can be seen from Figure 4-2, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
France have had limited influence in CDM markets. This study therefore hypothesizes that: 
H3: Former British colonies will be able to host a larger number of CDM projects thanks to a 
strong connection to the U.K. (a leading CDM investor).  
       In addition to the revised colonial dummy, this study utilizes two more independent 
variables as proxies of links to advanced countries, namely foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows and ODA received. This is because both factors can be thought to be good indicators 
for the relationship between the host and the developed countries as explained in the 
following paragraphs.  
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Figure 4-2  Number of CDM Projects by Investor Countries 
CDM investors in the U.K. have participated in 2,211 projects out of the total 5,916 projects in 
the pipeline (as of 1 July 2012). It is obvious that CDM investors in the U.K. have an 
outstanding presence in the CDM market.  
Source: UNEP Risø Centre (2012) 
       With regard to FDI inflows, there is a contradiction amongst the existing literature. 
On the one hand, a theoretical literature (Jung, 2006) states that host countries having 
abundant FDI inflows tend to host a larger number of CDM activities and Dinar et al. (2008) 
insist that the CDM can be regarded as a type of FDI. On the other hand, when looking at the 
result of an empirical study (Winkleman and Moore, 2011), the insignificance of FDI inflows 
is shown, though it was adopted as a proxy of a business environment. Furthermore, 
Niederberger and Saner (2005) keenly refute the effects of FDI inflows on CDM investment 
based on the fact that some countries, after having failed to induce FDI, have actually 
succeeded in hosting CDM projects. This study attempts to verify whether or not FDI inflows 
has significant impacts in promoting CDM activities since, as discussed above, the results 
regarding FDI are not identical in the previous literature. The fourth hypothesis, therefore, is 
formulated in accordance with Kasai (2012b) as follows: 
H4: The larger the FDI inflows eligible host countries receive, the more CDM projects the 
countries will be able to host. 
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       Another factor to consider is ODA as no study so far has analyzed its significance 
except for Kasai (2012a) whose results indicate the statistically insignificance of ODA 
received. This result seems inconclusive as the variable of ODA is employed only in one 
specification out of six. This study expects that the amount of receiving ODA reflects the 
political and/or economic closeness between developing and developed countries. This study 
attempts to testify the significance of ODA. Hence, in line with Kasai (2012b), this study 
proposes the fifth hypothesis as shown below: 
H5: The larger amount of ODA eligible host countries receive, the more CDM projects the 
countries will be able to host. 
4.3  Methodology and Data 
4.3.1  Methodology 
This study attempts to identify decisive factors of CDM project hosting by using, not only a 
cross-section analysis, but also a panel data analysis which never before been undertaken. 
There are two major obstacles to creating a panel data set: firstly, its complexity of data 
analysis; and secondly, the limited data availabilities as a panel data requires a lot of data 
collected from both time series and cross-section dimensions. However, it is worth 
performing a panel data analysis since, according to Kitamura (2006), the panel data analysis 
can bring several advantages, such as the improved precisions of regression results and the 
negative influence of outliers or errors that can subsequently be weakened due to the 
increased number of observations. Hence, although some restrictions occur when selecting 
variables, this study carries out panel data analyses in addition to a multiyear cross-section 
data analysis as a reference. 
       More specifically, this study adopts the Tobit model as a primary estimator, 
developed by Tobin (1958). Data of independent variables are available for all eligible host 
countries, including countries not currently hosting CDM projects. The data set, thereafter, 
can be regarded as censored data in which any negative values of dependent variables are set 
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to a lower bound of zero. Therefore, the Type I Tobit model (censored regression model) 
described below, defined by Amemiya (1984), is utilized for cross-section analyses:  
ݕ௜∗ ൌ x௜	β ൅ ݑ௜, 		ݑ௜~݅݅݀Normalሺ0, σଶሻ 
ݕ௜ ൌ ൜		y௜
∗							ݕ௜∗ ൒ 0
0									ݕ௜∗ ൏ 0 
where y௜∗ is a latent response variable of individual i, x௜	 is an independent variables of 
individual i, and ݑ௜ is a residual of individual i. The latent variable y௜∗ satisfies the classical 
linear model assumptions that have a normal and homoscedastic distribution with a linear 
conditional mean. An observed variable ݕ௜ is equal to ݕ௜∗ when ݕ௜∗ ൒ 0, but y equals 0 
when ݕ௜∗ ൏ 0. Since ݕ௜∗  is normally distributed, ݕ௜  has a continuous distribution over 
strictly positive values. 
       With respect to panel data analyses, panel Tobit model with random effect estimators 
are employed. The panel Tobit model is described as follows: 
ݕ௜௧∗ ൌ ݔ௜௧ᇱ β ൅ ݑ௜௧, 		ݑ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅	ݒ௜௧	, 	ݒ௜௧~݅݅݀Normalሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ൜		y௜௧
∗ 							ݕ௜௧∗ ൒ 0
0									ݕ௜௧∗ ൏ 0 
where ݕ௜௧∗  represents a latent variable of individual i at time t. ݔ௜௧ᇱ  is a vector of independent 
variable of individual i at time t. ݑ௜௧ is an error term of individual i at time t, which captures 
the unobserved factors influencing dependent variables. ߤ௜ represents the unobserved time 
invariant individual effects which measures unobserved individual heterogeneity. Lastly, ݒ௜௧	 
is an unobserved time variant errors which is assumed to be normal distribution as described 
in the equation above. However, if ݒ௜௧	  is influenced by unobserved independent 
heterogeneity, the assumption which ݒ௜௧	 is iid normal distribution cannot be maintained, 
meaning that the unobserved characteristics of individual countries have significant impacts 
on the number of CDM projects they are hosting. For instance, the level of motivation 
towards CDM activities might be unobserved characteristics significantly affecting the 
number of CDM projects. In theory, it is reasonable to simulate that such factors and 
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unobserved heterogeneity exist and this problem can be resolved by making use of the proxy 
of an unobserved factor. However, the variable of such a factor is not available in reality. This 
is the reason why the panel Tobit model contains additional equation,	ݑ௜௧ ൌ ߤ௜ ൅	ݒ௜௧	. In 
other words, ߤ௜ is the proxy of an unobserved characteristic of host countries and the 
unobserved effects ߤ௜ is assumed to be either fixed or random effects. Fixed effects imply 
that ߤ௜ is correlated with the observed variables. On the contrary, a random effect means that 
ߤ௜ is not correlated with any of the observed variables in the model. When considering 
applying this model to this study, since the Tobit model is a non-linear model, it is technically 
impossible to utilize the fixed effect estimator (Wooldridge, 2002). Thus, this study adopts 
random effects estimator. 
       In order to observe the variation of the regression results and to capture the effect of 
each factor separately, this study forms six specifications. The main model (Specification 6) 
contains nine independent variables, which can be categorized into four groups (i.e., GHG 
reduction potential, G, socioeconomic factors, S, human capital, H, and ties to advanced 
countries, T) following the conceptual framework created on the basis of thorough literature 
reviews on both theoretical and empirical studies as shown below: 
݈݊ܿ݀݉௜௧ ൌ 	݂ሺܩ௜௧, ௜ܵ௧, ܪ௜௧, ௜ܶ௧ሻ	 
where 
lncdmit: the log of the number of registered CDM projects of country i at time t; 
ܩ௜௧:	lnco2it-2, the log of CO2 emissions of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
௜ܵ௧:	lngdppcit-2, the log of GDP per capita of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
:govefit-2, governance effectiveness of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
:corrupit-2, control of corruption of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
ܪ௜௧: lntertiaryit-2, the log of tertiary school enrolment rate of country i at time t with a 
two-year lag; 
:lnarticleit-2, the log of the numbers of scientific and technical journal articles of 
country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
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௜ܶ௧:	lnfdiit-2, the log of FDI inflows of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
:lnodait-2, the log of ODA received of country i at time t with a two-year lag; 
:colonyi, the former British colony dummy of country i. 
       As shown above, all independent variables have a two-year lag as it generally took 
around two years for proposed CDM projects to be registered as CDM projects by the CDM 
EB (Figure 4-3). Thus, to capture the characteristics of host countries at the time when they 
launch CDM activities, two-year lags are applied to this study. 
 
Figure 4-3  Periods Needed to Obtain CDM Status 
This graph shows the actual number of days needed for proposed projects to be registered as 
CDM projects (i.e., the periods from the request for registration to registrations by the CDM 
executive board). 
Source: UNEP Risø Centre (2012) 
4.3.2  Empirical Strategy 
This study utilizes cross-sectional Tobit models, pooled and random effects panel Tobit 
models applying robust standard errors owing to heterogeneity of error terms in accordance 
with Kasai (2012b). 
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4.3.3  Data Descriptions 
This section explains definitions, units, data sources and their validities to be used in the 
econometric models of all data used in this study. Both dependent and independent variables 
are thoroughly selected based on the conceptual framework developed by reviewing the 
existing literature and are derived from various data sources. Some data are processed and 
transformed into the logarithmic form for the purpose of empirical analysis. Definitions, units 
and data sources of both dependent and independent variables are listed in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4  Descriptions of Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables Descriptions Sources 
lncdmi,t The natural logarithm of the number of registered CDM 
projects of a host country i at year t (2005-2010). 
CDM project 
database (2012), 
IGES  
lnco2i,t The natural logarithm of CO2 emissions stemming from 
the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of 
cement of a host country i at year t (Mt) (2003-2008). 
World Development 
Indicators (2012), 
The World Bank 
(WB) 
lngdppci,t The natural logarithm of GDP per capita of a host 
country i at year t. (US$1,000). (2003-2008) 
World Development 
Indicators (2012), 
World Bank 
govefi,t Government effectiveness is an indicator reflecting the 
degree of the quality of public services, its in- 
dependence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to those 
policies of a host country i at year t. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (2012), 
WB 
corrupti,t Control of corruption which reflects perceptions to the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as the "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (2012), 
WB 
lntertiaryi.t The natural logarithm of gross tertiary school enrolment 
rate of a host country i at year t (%) (2003-2008). 
World Development 
Indicators (2012), 
WB 
lnarticlei,t The natural logarithm of the number of scientific and 
technical journal articles of a host country i at year t 
(2003-2008). 
World Development 
Indicators (2012), 
WB 
lnfdii,t The natural logarithm of net FDI inflows of a host 
country i at year t (US$ million) (2003-2008). 
World Development 
Indicators (2012), 
WB 
lnodai,t The natural logarithm of net ODA of the country i at 
year t (US$ million) (2003-2008). 
World Development 
Indicators (2012), 
WB  
colonyi Dummy variable (Former British colonies = 1, 0 
otherwise) 
Hensel (2006) 
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       Dependent variables used in this study are the log of the numbers of CDM projects 
registered between 2005 and 2010 which are sourced from the CDM project database created 
by the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES, 2012). The data of registered 
CDM projects is listed in Appendix II. The selection of a dependent variable is in accordance 
with that of Flues (2010) and Kasai (2012a). The econometric models cover 128 eligible host 
countries which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and established the Designated National 
Authority (DNA)11. 
       Independent variables are obtained from various data sources as shown in Table 4-4. 
Two-year lags are set for all independent variables except for the colony dummy and the 
two-year lagged independent variables consist of data between 2003 and 2008. There are 
some missing values in the independent variables because of the data unavailability. In the 
case that a missing value can be reasonably estimated by taking the average between adjacent 
years’ data, the average value is inputted in the data set as an instant solution. Essentially, it 
can be predicted that those deficits are unlikely to have crucial impacts on the regression 
results since the numbers of missing values are limited. 
       Descriptive statistics of both dependent and independent variables and correlation 
coefficients among independent variables with cross-section data sets are shown in Tables 4-5 
to 4-10 (2005 to 2010). Those of the panel data set are shown in Table 4-11 (2005-2010). 
Furthermore, scatter diagrams indicating the relationships between dependent variables and 
independent variables of the panel data set are shown in Figure 4-4. The following paragraphs 
provide the overviews of the data of independent variables by category. 
1)  GHG reduction potentials 
Although it is desirable to use GHG emission data consisting of six GHGs, this study adopts 
the log of CO2 emissions as a proxy of GHG reduction potentials due to the necessity of 
                                                 
11 DNA is a body granted responsibility by a developing country to authorize and approve participation 
in CDM projects. The main task of the DNA is to assess potential CDM projects to determine whether 
they will assist the host country in achieving its sustainable development goals and to provide a letter of 
approval to PPs. 
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creating a panel data set. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that historical emission data of CH4, 
N2O, HFCs and PFCs have been regularly collected even by major international organizations 
and institutes. Using CO2 emission does not seem to have a crucial negative impact as CO2 
emission accounts for around 80% of total GHG effects. The CO2 emission data between 
2003 and 2008 are sourced from World Development Indicators (WDI) created by the World 
Bank which shows there is a clear upward trend across the all eligible host countries. The 
average increase rate is approximately 27% during the six-year period. Furthermore, there is 
an obvious trend that major CDM host countries have larger amounts of CO2 emissions 
during the period. 
2)  Socioeconomic factors 
This study adopts three independent variables in this category. Firstly, the log of GDP per 
capita as a proxy of economic level of host countries and, needless to say, richer countries can 
develop CDM project activities much easier than poorer countries can. This clear conjecture, 
however, can be viewed differently if per capita base GDP is used because the larger 
economies in terms of GDP levels very often have larger populations (Figure 4-4). This trend 
can be observed in the data of GDP per capita (2003-2008) and are sourced from the WDI. 
       Aside from that, the eligible host countries’ entire increase rate of GDP per capita 
during the six-year period is approximately 45%. Secondly, government effectiveness and 
control of corruption as proxies of important social factors in eligible host countries and the 
data about “government effectiveness” and “control of corruption” cover the period from 
2003 to 2008 and originate from Worldwide Governance Indicators. In general, good 
governance is likely to help in promoting CDM activities. However, there is a wide gap in the 
average percentile ranks between LDCs and other eligible host countries; for instance, the 
average percentile rank within LDCs in 2010 is about 24 and within non-LDCs it is around 48. 
Likewise, “control of corruption” measured in a percentile rank has an obvious gap. While the 
average percentile rank among LDCs is approximately 29, non-LDC countries’ average 
percentile rank is around 49. 
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3)  Human capital 
In this category, there are two independent variables: “the log of tertiary school enrolment rate” 
and “the log of the number of scientific and technical journal articles”. The data of both 
variables from 2003 to 2008 are derived from the WDI. As can be seen from Figure 4-4, the 
data of “tertiary school enrolment rate” do not show clear trends. In contrast, the data of 
“scientific and technical journal articles” indicate a strong proportionality relation implying its 
positive effects on hosting CDM projects. 
4)  Ties with advanced countries 
Three independent variables are employed in this category. Firstly, the log of FDI inflows as a 
proxy of the economic cooperation levels in private sectors between developed and 
developing countries: Based on the trends shown in the scatter diagrams in Figure 4-4, it is 
evident that FDI inflows are highly correlated with the number of CDM projects (e.g., ρ=.953 
in 2008). Secondly, the log of ODA received as a proxy of cooperation levels in the 
governmental sector: In contrast to FDI inflows, there is no strong relationship between the 
CDM activities and ODA. Thirdly, former British dummy variables where, according to 
Hensel (2006), 43 out of 128 eligible host countries are the former British colonies. 
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Table 4-5  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2005) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128 0.123 0.414 0 2.833 
Log of CO2 emissions (lnco2) 126 2.024 2.166 -2.302 8.417 
Log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) 126 0.286 1.344 -2.407 3.471 
Government effectiveness (govef) 128 41.04 23.85 0 96.59 
Control of corruption (corrupt) 128 40.64 24.87 0 98.05 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate (lntertiary) 105 2.293 1.275 -1.56 4.486 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 
(lnarticle) 
122 3.722 2.343 -0.693 10.26 
Log of FDI inflows (lnfdi) 118 5.373 2.046 -0.673 10.75 
Log of ODA received (lnoda) 103 5.03 1.263 1.818 6.905 
Former British colony dummy (colony) 128 0.334 0.474 0 1 
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for the sake of simplicity. 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.446  1.000                
govef 0.294  0.687  1.000             
corrup 0.087  0.536  0.844 1.000           
lntertiary 0.599  0.618  0.370 0.195 1.000          
lnarticle 0.816  0.291  0.362 0.193 0.451  1.000       
lnfdi 0.752  0.528  0.361 0.162 0.517  0.641 1.000      
lnoda 0.193  -0.504  -0.347 -0.322 -0.140  0.206 0.107  1.000    
colony 0.013  -0.028  0.194 0.080 -0.206  0.111  -0.009  -0.171  1.000 
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Table 4-6  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2006) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128 0.327 0.886 0 4.82 
Log of CO2 emissions (lnco2) 126 2.074 2.178 -2.302 8.573 
Log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) 126 0.416 1.351 -2.407 3.682 
Government effectiveness (govef) 128 40.38 24.16 0.490  96.10 
Control of corruption (corrupt) 128 39.74 24.44 0.490  98.54 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate (lntertiary) 105 2.344 1.26 -1.609 4.505 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 
(lnarticle) 
123 3.725 2.377 -1.204 10.45 
Log of FDI inflows (lnfdi) 123 5.493 2.21 -3.218 10.91 
Log of ODA received (lnoda) 99 4.979 1.22 0.488 6.899 
Former British colony dummy (colony) 128 0.335 0.474 0 1 
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for the sake of simplicity. 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.421  1.000                
govef 0.343  0.733  1.000              
corrup 0.121  0.680  0.855  1.000           
lntertiary 0.602  0.590  0.405  0.278 1.000          
lnarticle 0.852  0.312  0.390  0.193 0.502  1.000       
lnfdi 0.754  0.537  0.449  0.228 0.510  0.644 1.000      
lnoda 0.232  -0.452  -0.238 -0.333 -0.060  0.247 0.083  1.000    
colony -0.083  0.058  0.140  0.126 -0.233  -0.044 -0.031  -0.199  1.000 
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Table 4-7  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2007) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128 0.311 0.882 0 5.081 
Log of CO2 emissions (lnco2) 127 2.105 2.172 -2.207 8.664 
Log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) 126 0.534 1.365 -2.207 3.884 
Government effectiveness (govef) 128 39.38 23.68 0.490  98.54 
Control of corruption (corrupt) 128 39.83 24.24 0.490  98.05 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate (lntertiary) 102 2.452 1.152 -0.755 4.520 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 
(lnarticle) 
126 3.661 2.48 -2.302 10.64 
Log of FDI inflows (lnfdi) 120 5.923 2.083 -0.579 11.67 
Log of ODA received (lnoda) 98 5.054 1.159 2.052 6.901 
Former British colony dummy (colony) 128 0.335 0.474 0 1 
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for the sake of simplicity. 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.484  1.000                
govef 0.216  0.702  1.000             
corrup 0.076  0.625  0.865 1.000           
lntertiary 0.604  0.708  0.416 0.300 1.000          
lnarticle 0.857  0.309  0.232 0.106 0.436  1.000        
lnfdi 0.736  0.496  0.374 0.252 0.494  0.674  1.000      
lnoda 0.172  -0.512  -0.327 -0.321 -0.193  0.259  0.093  1.000    
colony -0.169  0.147  0.327 0.243 -0.104  -0.110  -0.085  -0.294  1.000 
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Table 4-8  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2008) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128  0.296  0.851  0.000  5.403  
Log of CO2 emissions (lnco2) 127  2.136  2.175  -2.120  8.766  
Log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) 126  0.662  1.369  -2.120  4.102  
Government effectiveness (govef) 128  39.82  23.86  0.98  99.02  
Control of corruption (corrupt) 128  39.87  24.57  0.49  98.05  
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate (lntertiary) 102  2.478  1.147  -0.713  4.540  
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 
(lnarticle) 
127  3.810  2.402  -1.204  10.81  
Log of FDI inflows (lnfdi) 120  6.177  2.134  -0.799  11.73  
Log of ODA received (lnoda) 98  4.998  1.241  1.188  6.849  
Former British colony dummy (colony) 128  0.336  0.474  0  1  
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for the sake of simplicity. 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.506  1.000                
govef 0.219  0.721  1.000             
corrup 0.014  0.576  0.820 1.000           
lntertiary 0.609  0.688  0.451 0.244 1.000         
lnarticle 0.830  0.306  0.260 0.096 0.453 1.000        
lnfdi 0.682  0.528  0.374 0.116 0.552 0.581  1.000     
lnoda 0.105  -0.575  -0.373 -0.426 -0.174 0.245  -0.014 1.000    
colony -0.143  0.167  0.268 0.231 -0.166 -0.143  -0.028 -0.334  1.000 
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Table 4-9  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2009) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128 0.403  1.013  0.000  5.866 
Log of CO2 emissions (lnco2) 127 2.178  2.175  -2.120  8.823 
Log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) 126 0.811  1.367  -2.040  4.263 
Government effectiveness (govef) 128 40.24  24.03  0.49  99.51 
Control of corruption (corrupt) 128 40.10  24.72  0.49  98.06 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate (lntertiary) 102 2.546  1.134  -0.713  4.689 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 
(lnarticle) 
126 3.923  2.385  -1.204  10.95 
Log of FDI inflows (lnfdi) 123 6.554  1.897  1.747  11.98 
Log of ODA received (lnoda) 96  5.189  1.146  1.999  6.863 
Former British colony dummy (colony) 128 0.336  0.474  0  1  
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for the sake of simplicity. 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.491  1.000                
govef 0.268  0.678  1.000             
corrup 0.066  0.601  0.814 1.000           
lntertiary 0.602  0.704  0.395 0.231 1.000          
lnarticle 0.837  0.358  0.337 0.142 0.483  1.000       
lnfdi 0.722  0.456  0.372 0.176 0.515  0.671 1.000      
lnoda 0.222  -0.491  -0.257 -0.357 -0.150  0.308 0.204  1.000    
colony -0.229  0.197  0.329 0.282 -0.165  -0.221 -0.192  -0.466  1.000 
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Table 4-10  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients (2010) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 128  0.346 0.960  0.000  6.223 
Log of CO2 emissions (lnco2) 127  2.201 2.192  -2.120  8.858 
Log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) 126  0.962 1.371  -1.966  4.459 
Government effectiveness (govef) 128  40.49 24.15  0.490  100  
Control of corruption (corrupt) 128  40.39 24.94  0.490  98.54 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate (lntertiary) 102  2.600 1.130  -0.693  4.800 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 
(lnarticle) 
127  3.830 2.542  -1.204  11.09 
Log of FDI inflows (lnfdi) 122  6.622 2.024  0.000  12.07 
Log of ODA received (lnoda) 94  5.232 1.199  1.963  6.880 
Former British colony dummy (colony) 128  0.336 0.474  0  1  
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for the sake of simplicity. 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.540  1.000                
govef 0.270  0.670  1.000             
corrup 0.025  0.583  0.847 1.000           
lntertiary 0.581  0.693  0.473 0.300 1.000          
lnarticle 0.833  0.399  0.354 0.148 0.529  1.000       
lnfdi 0.659  0.439  0.356 0.171 0.442  0.612 1.000      
lnoda 0.079  -0.506  -0.321 -0.360 -0.215  0.173 0.111  1.000    
colony -0.197  0.138  0.263 0.276 -0.146  -0.158 -0.116  -0.352  1.000 
  
69 
 
Table 4-11  Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients of  
the Panel Data (2005-2010) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.D. Min Max 
Log of the number of CDM projects 1024 0.226  0.755  0.000  6.223 
Log of CO2 emissions (lnco2) 760  2.120  2.170  -2.303  8.858 
Log of GDP per capita (lngdppc) 756  0.612  1.376  -2.408  4.459 
Government effectiveness (govef) 768  40.23  23.89  0  100  
Control of corruption (corrupt) 768  40.10  24.55  0.000  98.54 
Log of tertiary school enrolment rate (lntertiary) 618  2.451  1.186  -1.609  4.800 
Log of the number of scientific journal articles 
(lnarticle) 
751  3.779  2.417  -2.303  11.09 
Log of FDI inflows (lnfdi) 726  6.027  2.116  -3.219  12.07 
Log of ODA received (lnoda) 588  5.079  1.205  0.489  6.905 
Former British colony dummy (colony) 1024 0.336  0.473  0.000  1.000 
Note: This study regarded log 0 as zero (0) for the sake of simplicity. 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients among independent variables 
 lnco2 lngdppc govef corrup lntertiary lnarticle lnfdi lnoda colony
lnco2 1.000                  
lngdppc 0.465  1.000                
govef 0.269  0.671  1.000             
corrup 0.064  0.588  0.839 1.000           
lntertiary 0.593  0.667  0.409 0.258 1.000          
lnarticle 0.837  0.313  0.324 0.146 0.468  1.000        
lnfdi 0.166  -0.487  -0.310 -0.352 -0.150  0.235  1.000      
lnoda 0.697  0.523  0.366 0.187 0.518  0.612  0.094  1.000    
colony -0.133  0.117  0.252 0.208 -0.168  -0.092 -0.303  -0.065  1.000 
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Figure 4-4  Scatter Diagrams: Dependent Variable vs. Independent Variables 
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4.4  Results and Discussions 
In this section, estimation results are reported and discussed. Firstly, Section 4.4.1 presents the 
results of cross-section data analyses. Secondly, the main results derived from the random 
effects panel Tobit models are examined and five hypotheses formulated in the conceptual 
framework are verified in Section 4.4.2. 
4.4.1  Cross-Country Data Analyses 
This study analyzed cross-country data using Tobit models as a first step. The regression 
results for the years from 2005 to 2010 are shown in Tables 4-12 to 4-14.  
       Looking at log pseudo likelihood values, the main specification (Specification 6) fits 
the data sets of every year much better than other specifications, ranging from -44.8 in 2006 
to -14.7 in 2010. Specification 6 has the highest pseudo R-squared value among six 
specifications throughout the period, representing the best fit for the Tobit models as well, 
ranging from .286 in 2006 to .741 in 2010. 
       The majority of the estimation results indicate the same signs and significance levels 
throughout the period. Specifically, “the log of CO2 emissions” is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in most specifications. The similar results can be found for 
“government effectiveness,” “the log of FDI inflows,” and “the log of ODA” for several 
reasons. Firstly, “government effectiveness” has statistically significant positive effects on 
hosting CDM projects except for the results for 2006. The models indicating insignificance 
for this variable also show the same positive signs. Secondly, “the log of FDI inflows” is 
significant, below the 1% level in most specifications, with positive signs. Lastly, “the log of 
ODA” is significant and positive in four specifications in 2006, 2008, and 2010. In contrast, 
the “former British colony dummies” clearly denote significant negative impacts on CDM 
project hosting. Of 36 models, 11 are statistically significant and negative, contrary to the 
expectation of this study. As for “control of corruption”, it indicates significant positive effects 
at the maximum limit, the 10% significance level, in Specification 3 in 2007. This is the only 
model showing significance and all other models result in insignificance. 
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       As can be seen from Tables 4-12 to 4-14, the remaining independent variables, 
namely “the log of GDP per capita,” “the log of tertiary school enrolment rates,” and “the log 
of scientific and technical journal articles,” have both statistically significant positive and 
negative effects on hosting CDM activities. Their effects, therefore, are less clear and, as a 
result, their real effects cannot explicitly be judged by looking merely at the estimation results 
of single year cross-section data analyses. One possible reason for this is the smaller size of 
observations (e.g., the numbers of observations in Specification 6 range from 69 to 72) which 
make regression results less reliable. In addition, the multicollinearity is causally-related to the 
unstable estimation results. These problems are discussed in the next section which explains 
the results of panel Tobit models, the main analysis in this study. 
       Sensible time series variances cannot be observed from the estimation results with 
the exception of a trend that coefficients of “the log of CO2 emissions” have been soaring year 
after year from .663 in 2006 to 1.964 in 2010. This is likely to imply that more and more 
CDM investors tend to focus on GHG reduction potentials rather than other factors in the 
light of projects’ profitability. 
4.4.2  Panel Data Analyses 
This section discusses the regression results of the pooled and panel Tobit models with 
random effects. The estimation results are shown in Table 4-15. As stated in the methodology 
section, the panel data analysis enables the identification of more reliable decisive factors 
owing to its larger size of observations. In fact, the number of observations for the main panel 
Tobit model (Specification 6) is 433, which is six times larger than that of the cross-country 
data. Hence, it can be expected to obtain more accurate estimation results. 
       First of all, when looking at the results of the Wald tests, those in all specifications 
are significant, Prob > chi2 is 0.000, rejecting the null hypothesis; this means the models have 
explanation power at the 1% significance level. Hence, the results support the potencies of 
coefficients computed by the random effects Tobit estimators. Analogous to the 
cross-sectional Tobit models, the panel Tobit model with Specification 6 is the most 
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appropriate model because the value of the log pseudo likelihood of Specification 6, -181.1, is 
the largest among the six specifications. The estimation results are examined by category in 
the following paragraphs. 
1)  GHG reduction potentials 
Regarding GHG reduction potentials, this study achieves similar findings to the existing 
empirical literatures (Wang and Firestone, 2010; Winkelman and Moore, 2011; Kasai, 2012a). 
       As can be seen from Table 4-15, “the log of CO2 emissions” is statistically significant 
and positive at the 1% significance level for all specifications as expected and the pooled 
Tobit models have the same results as well. As there are few huge GHG emission sources in 
those countries, the result indicates the fundamental difficulty of hosting CDM project 
activities for LDCs. Unsurprisingly, CDM investors would prefer to invest in eligible host 
countries with larger GHG reduction potentials following the principle of the market 
mechanism. Additionally, it is important for host countries to have modest GHG abatement 
costs to attract CDM investors (Flues, 2010). By further extension, the results seem to imply 
that levels of economic development influence the number of CDM projects as economically 
well developed countries should have succeeded at industrialization, which is the most 
common cause of being major GHG emitters. More importantly, the results reveal that 
industrially well developed countries receive a larger amount of CDM benefits (CER sales) 
because those countries have greater potential to implement CDM projects that generate a lot 
of CERs by reducing GHG and having higher GWPs such as HFCs, N2O, and SF6 (Kasai, 
2012b). 
       To sum up, this study regards GHG reduction potentials as one of the important 
determinants of CDM project hosting. This finding is fully consistent with the study’s 
expectations and those previously. GHG reduction potentials are solely determined by past 
GHG emission performances and cannot be controlled afterwards. As Kasai (2012b) states, it 
is hugely unfair that countries that have emitted a vast amount of GHGs in the past can easily 
benefit from the CDM despite the fact that they should assume stronger responsibilities for 
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preventing global warming. 
2)  Socioeconomic factors 
Three independent variables, namely “the log of GDP per capita,” “government effectiveness,” 
and “control of corruption,” are the socioeconomic factors that are expected to have positive 
effects on CDM project hosting. However, their individual results are not identical and some 
are inconsistent with findings of previous studies.  
        As for “the log of GDP per capita” used as a proxy of economic condition of host 
countries, this study finds significant negative effects on CDM project hosting at the 5% 
significance level in Specification 6 of panel Tobit models. Specifications 1, 4, and 5 are 
insignificant holding different signs. When looking at the results of the pooled Tobit model 
with Specification 5, it turns out statistically significant and positive at the 5% significance 
level, whereas it has significant negative effects in Specification 6 as well as that of the panel 
Tobit model. This study basically considers the result of the main panel Tobit model with 
Specification 6 as the most appropriate. However, from a theoretical point of view, this result 
cannot easily be acceptable since better economic conditions must be an advantage for the 
development of CDM activities. In fact, some empirical studies confirm its positive effects 
(Dinar et al., 2008; Flues, 2010). This may be attributable to the impacts of major CDM host 
countries which have relatively lower GDP per capita that have been derived from their huge 
population sizes. This study, therefore, concludes that GDP per capita levels cannot directly 
be thought of as a determinant of CDM project hosting but must have positive impacts 
indirectly. 
       Next, governance levels measured by an indicator of “government effectiveness” are 
significant and positive in all specifications at the 1% significance level. This result is in 
accordance with findings of a study carried out by Dinar et al. (2008). In contrast, this study 
cannot observe the significance of the “the control of corruption” which is a proxy of the 
degree of corruption in eligible host countries. Certainly, multicolleniarity must have occurred 
in the panel Tobit model with Specification 6 owing to a strong correlation between 
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“government effectiveness” and “the control of corruption,” .839. Yet, since the variable also 
is insignificant in Specification 3, this study judges that “the control of corruption” is not 
statistically significant, whilst this finding is inconsistent with the finding of literatures 
associated with development economics (Gupta et al., 2002; Mauro, 1995). 
       Based on the estimation results, acquiring effective governance levels is likely to 
help promote CDM project activities. This study, however, implies that clean governance is 
not an absolute necessity in so far as the governments are effective enough (Kasai, 2012b). 
Consequently, the first hypothesis below is proven here. 
H1: The better governance capacity eligible host countries have, the more CDM projects the 
countries will be able to host. 
 Fail to reject 
3)  Human capital 
In line with the study carried out by Kasai (2012a), this study employed two independent 
variables concerning human capital: “the log of tertiary school enrolment rates” adopted as a 
proxy of general educational levels, and “the log of the number of scientific and technical 
journal articles” as a proxy of science and technology levels of host countries. 
       As Table 4-15 indicates, contrary to this study’s expectation, “the log of tertiary 
school enrolment rates” is found to be insignificant in all specifications under both pooled and 
panel Tobit models, though signs are positive in most specifications. This result differs from 
the findings of the existing literatures (Winkelman and Moore, 2011 and Kasai, 2012a). The 
results of the panel Tobit models are thought to be more reliable than the previous findings 
thus, this study judges that “tertiary school enrolment rates” are not a direct determinant for 
CDM project hosting (Kasai, 2012b). On the other hand, this study demonstrates the 
significance of “science and technology levels” at the 1% significance level in Specification 5 
under the panel Tobit model though the variable is insignificant in Specification 6. This must 
be due to a strong correlation between the log of the number of scientific and technical journal 
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articles and the log of CO2 emissions, .837 and therefore, the results must have been distorted 
by the impact of muticolleneiarity (Kasai, 2012b). In this case, the effects between those two 
variables cannot be clearly captured individually. 
       Consequently, this study concludes that “science and technology levels” positively 
affect the number of CDM project hosting based on the result of the panel Tobit model with 
Specification 5. This conclusion is backed by the results of cross-country analyses, the 
majority of which indicates statistically significant and positive. Moreover, this finding is 
rational as it is imperative for PPs to grasp the technical aspects of GHG reduction 
technologies applied for CDM project activities (Kasai, 2012b). 
       Summing up, as Kasai (2012a) suggested, human capital is likely to be one of the 
crucial factors in developing CDM projects. Eligible host countries that are eager to promote 
CDM activities should improve scientific and technical levels to retain qualified personnel. 
Accordingly, the second hypothesis is demonstrated below. 
H2: The better scientific and technical levels eligible host countries have, the more CDM 
projects the countries will be able to host. 
 Fail to reject 
4)  Ties with advanced countries 
To host CDM projects, links to advanced countries must be one of material factors as CDM 
projects are usually developed by PP(s) in the host countries in cooperation with PP(s) in the 
Annex I countries. This category comprises of three independent variables: “the log of FDI 
inflows,” “the log of ODA,” and “the former British colony dummy.” 
       Firstly, it is confirmed that the “former British colony dummy” has statistically 
significant negative impacts on the CDM project hosting contrary to expectations. The 
majority of estimation results of cross-country analyses and pooled Tobit show the same 
results, whereas this is consistent with the study carried out by Wang and Firestone (2010). 
The adverse effects of the former British colonies obviously allude to the fact that CDM 
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investors in the U.K. do not give credibility to colonial ties but focus mainly on the 
profitability of projects (with larger GHG reduction potentials). This tendency must be due to 
the nature of CDM, which in turn can be attributed to as one of the mainstream issues that 
needs to be addressed (Kasai, 2012b). Given the above discussions, while this study cannot 
verify whether or not the former British colonies have strong ties with the U.K., it reveals that 
the former British colonies host less CDM projects. Therefore, the third hypothesis below is 
refuted by the analytical results. 
H3: Former British colonies will be able to host a larger number of CDM projects thanks to a 
strong connection to the U.K. (a leading CDM investor). 
 Reject 
       Secondly, the regression results of the panel Tobit models show that the log of “FDI 
inflows” is statistically significant and positive at the 1% level in Specification 4 and the 5% 
level in Specification 6. Similarly, the cross-sectional and pooled Tobit models have the same 
results. This result is in accordance with the argument of the previous theoretical literature 
(Niederberger and Saner, 2005), but contradicts the empirical result of Winkleman and Moore 
(2011). Taking into account the characteristics of the CDM, CDM projects are normally 
invested in by private firms in Annex I countries and, it appears that economic ties between 
the host countries and developed nations in the private sector certainly help facilitate CDM 
activities. This study, hence, regards FDI inflows as a significant factor of CDM project 
hosting based on both theoretical and empirical points of views. Therefore, the forth 
hypothesis below is proven. 
H4: The larger the FDI inflows eligible host countries receive, the more CDM projects the 
countries will be able to host. 
 Fail to reject 
       Lastly, “the log of ODA” is not significant in all specifications under the panel Tobit 
models and this result is consistent with that of the study carried out by Kasai (2012a). The 
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primary reason must be the impacts of well-developed emerging countries, some of which 
have graduated from Japan’s ODA loans. For example, the cash flow of ODA between Japan 
and China is positive from Japan’s perspectives as China has been repaying a significant 
amount of money to Japan and this negative estimation result is likely to suggest that CDM 
investors act differently to their governments by following the market mechanism or other 
factors (Kasai, 2012b). Although this study generated the fifth hypothesis by supposing that 
the amount of receiving ODA reflects the political and/or economic closeness between 
developing and developed countries, the results explicitly refuted the hypothesis. 
H5: The larger amount of ODA eligible host countries receive, the more CDM projects the 
countries will be able to host. 
 Reject 
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Table 4-12  Estimation Results of Cross-Country Data Analysis in 2005&2006 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2005  Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2006 
Independent variables                          
Log of CO2 emissions 0.577*** 0.501** 0.561***     0.174  0.963*** 0.824*** 0.862***     0.663* 
(3.74) (2.62) (2.90)     (0.65)  (5.48) (4.06) (4.22)     (1.84) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.058     0.047 0.251 -1.212**  0.017     0.279 0.899* -0.188 
(-0.25)     (0.13) (0.55) (-2.47)  (0.07)     (0.53) (1.69) (-0.25) 
Government effectiveness   0.035***       0.051    0.017       0.022 
  (2.78)       (1.24)    (0.93)       (0.50) 
Control of corruption     0.020     -0.005      0.008     -0.007 
    (1.50)     (-0.15)      (0.57)     (-0.22) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  -0.184 -0.030     0.178    0.465 0.560     0.335 
  (-0.60) (-0.09)     (0.62)    (1.22) (1.44)     (0.52) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.559*** 0.078          0.797*** -0.151 
        (2.94) (0.31)          (3.39) (-0.43) 
Log of FDI inflows       0.691***   0.579**        1.265***   0.697* 
      (2.73)   (2.20)        (4.43)   (1.84) 
Log of ODA received       0.339 0.359 -0.088        0.816* 0.979** 0.488 
      (1.10) (0.87) (-0.24)        (1.97) (2.08) (1.07) 
Former British colony dummy -0.804 -1.839** -1.642** -0.309 -0.794 -1.637**  -0.883 -1.090 -0.922 -0.829 -1.458* -0.921 
(-1.09) (-2.59) (-2.24) (-0.41) (-1.07) (-2.05)  (-1.38) (-1.46) (-1.21) (-1.02) (-1.84) (-1.03) 
Observations 124 104 104 93 96 74  124 104 104 92 94 74 
Log pseudo likelihood -46.4 -38.2 -39.2 -37.3 -36.5 -28.5  -71.3 -64.2 -64.4 -50.6 -53.6 -44.8 
Pseudo R-squared 0.173 0.245 0.226 0.197 0.222 0.305  0.231 0.230 0.227 0.271 0.232 0.286 
Values in parentheses are t statistics.            
*p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01 
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Table 4-13  Estimation Results of Cross-Country Data Analysis in 2007&2008 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2007 Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2008 
Independent variables                          
Log of CO2 emissions 1.125*** 0.894*** 1.015***     1.148***  1.108*** 0.944*** 1.021***     0.533 
(6.37) (4.75) (5.10)     (2.89)  (7.05) (5.92) (6.47)     (1.37) 
Log of GDP per capita 0.127     0.635 1.170*** -0.739  0.010     0.625 0.870* -0.040 
(0.50)     (1.29) (2.64) (-1.18)  (0.04)     (1.35) (1.78) (-0.07) 
Government effectiveness   0.053***       0.112***    0.032*       0.031 
  (3.31)       (3.45)    (1.85)       (0.97) 
Control of corruption     0.025*     -0.015      0.020     -0.001 
    (1.68)     (-0.52)      (1.41)     (-0.05) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  0.083 0.488     0.719    -0.070 0.073     -0.137 
  (0.24) (1.16)     (1.54)    (-0.16) (0.18)     (-0.28) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.508*** -0.893**          0.602*** -0.066 
        (2.72) (-2.63)          (3.56) (-0.20) 
Log of FDI inflows       0.803***   0.580        0.911***   0.481* 
      (2.65)   (1.48)        (3.28)   (1.82) 
Log of ODA received       0.469 0.568 0.168        0.729* 0.724 0.431 
      (1.13) (1.29) (0.47)        (1.75) (1.64) (1.05) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
-0.886 -1.562** -1.001 -0.575 -0.794 -2.513***  -1.040 -1.494** -1.268* -1.753 -1.470* -1.899** 
(-1.29) (-2.27) (-1.28) (-0.61) (-0.90) (-3.47)  (-1.62) (-2.17) (-1.78) (-1.54) (-1.71) (-2.13) 
Observations 125 101 101 89 95 72  125 101 101 89 95 72 
Log pseudo likelihood -60.5 -50.4 -53.0 -41.8 -43.0 -29.2  -58.8 -52.3 -53.1 -34.9 -37.3 -32.6 
Pseudo R-squared 0.288 0.349 0.315 0.257 0.248 0.417  0.301 0.321 0.310 0.291 0.293 0.299 
Values in parentheses are t statistics.                      
*p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01                        
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Table 4-14  Estimation Results of Cross-Country Data Analysis in 2009&2010 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2009  Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2010 
Independent variables                          
Log of CO2 emissions 1.249*** 1.116*** 1.263***     1.222***  1.244*** 1.143*** 1.190***     1.964*** 
(10.36) (10.34) (9.77)     (4.82)  (11.12) (10.68) (9.96)     (4.47) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.119     -0.089 0.159 -0.884*  -0.548***     -0.303 -0.371 -3.757*** 
(-0.60)     (-0.14) (0.30) (-1.80)  (-2.88)     (-0.52) (-0.68) (-6.98) 
Government effectiveness   0.046***       0.059***    0.033***       0.048*** 
  (3.01)       (4.03)    (2.71)       (6.40) 
Control of corruption     0.022     0.003      0.005     0.025 
    (1.55)     (0.20)      (0.36)     (1.60) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  -0.344 0.067     -0.271    -0.683** -0.300     2.242*** 
  (-1.28) (0.19)     (-0.73)    (-2.57) (-0.99)     (3.78) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.961*** -0.640***          1.069*** -0.631*** 
        (3.78) (-2.91)          (5.05) (-3.23) 
Log of FDI inflows       1.380***   0.750***        1.487***   1.214*** 
      (4.34)   (3.96)        (5.33)   (7.92) 
Log of ODA received       0.399 0.545 0.116        -0.239 -0.232 0.443*** 
      (1.00) (1.05) (0.50)        (-0.66) (-0.49) (3.52) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
0.348 -0.287 0.253 0.564 -0.069 -0.858  0.037 -0.315 0.079 -0.085 -0.019 -0.355* 
(0.66) (-0.52) (0.39) (0.71) (-0.08) (-1.66)  (0.08) (-0.65) (0.15) (-0.09) (-0.02) (-1.96) 
Observations 125 101 101 89 92 69  125 101 101 87 91 72 
Log pseudo likelihood -64.9 -49.7 -52.8 -40.5 -44.8 -19.5  -54.2 -47.9 -50.5 -25.1 -25.8 -14.7 
Pseudo R-squared 0.362 0.417 0.381 0.333 0.268 0.601  0.426 0.424 0.394 0.402 0.391 0.741 
Values in parentheses are t statistics.           
*p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01              
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Table 4-15  Estimation Results of Pooled and Panel Tobit Models (2005-2010) 
Models Pooled Tobit   Panel Tobit (random effect) 
Specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2005-2010   Log of the number of CDM projects registered in 2005-2010 
Independent variables                           
Log of CO2 emissions 1.083*** 0.941*** 1.014***     0.925***   1.013*** 0.877*** 0.924***     0.722*** 
(15.75) (12.98) (13.30)     (5.90)   (12.00) (11.56) (11.00)     (3.01) 
Log of GDP per capita -0.081     0.060 0.440** -0.919***   0.052     -0.271 0.080 -0.798** 
(-0.83)     (0.28) (2.34) (-3.64)   (0.38)     (-1.34) (0.47) (-2.32) 
Government 
effectiveness 
  0.033***       0.063***     0.027***       0.054*** 
  (4.62)       (4.32)     (2.63)       (2.76) 
Control of corruption     0.014**     -0.007       0.006     -0.014 
    (2.26)     (-0.54)       (0.73)     (-0.56) 
Log of tertiary school 
enrolment rate 
  -0.083 0.159     0.158     0.042 0.283     0.048 
  (-0.51) (0.93)     (0.66)     (0.19) (1.29)     (0.17) 
Log of the number of 
scientific journal articles 
        0.766*** -0.336**           0.835*** -0.062 
        (8.16) (-2.29)           (11.72) (-0.27) 
Log of FDI inflows       1.077***   0.553***         0.793***   0.411** 
      (7.36)   (3.92)         (4.54)   (2.16) 
Log of ODA received       0.363** 0.422** 0.109         -0.026 0.026 -0.032 
      (2.18) (2.28) (0.65)         (-0.17) (0.22) (-0.17) 
Former British colony 
dummy 
-0.435* -0.929*** -0.593* -0.385 -0.807** -1.694***   -0.542** -0.934** -0.584* -0.707** -1.165*** -1.818*** 
(-1.66) (-3.20) (-1.94) (-0.97) (-2.20) (-4.44)   (-2.21) (-2.50) (-1.90) (-2.35) (-3.68) (-5.63) 
Observations 748 612 612 539 563 433   748 612 612 539 563 433 
Log pseudo likelihood -374.0 -324.0 -331.3 -247.5 -251.9 -193.0   -332.5 -292.5 -295.1 -217.3 -214.6 -181.1 
Pseudo R-squared 0.279 0.297 0.281 0.242 0.244 0.339               
Wald test: Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
sigma_u               1.536 1.415 1.509 1.898 1.819 1.293 
sigma_e               1.278 1.253 1.254 1.167 1.16 1.188 
Rho               0.591 0.561 0.591 0.726 0.711 0.542 
Values in parentheses are t statistics;  *p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01                   
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5.  Conclusions 
5.1  Research Summary 
The latest integrated assessment report on climate change (IPCC, 2013) alleges that “It is 
extremely likely that human activities caused more than half of the observed increase in 
global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010.” IPCC (2013) estimates that climate 
change influences human lives in various ways, not just in temperature rises, but also in 
changes in sea levels, change in rainfall patterns and changes in frequency of droughts, heat 
waves, cold waves, and typhoons. It is extremely important to avoid the serious repercussions 
of climate change by ensuring a temperature rise of no more than 2°C which has emerged as 
the principal focus of international consensus (Anderson and Bows, 2008). 
       UNEP (2011) argues that reducing GHG emissions to the level that can hold a 
temperature rise within 2°C is technologically and economically feasible. To realize this goal, 
it is necessary to undertake immediate and pertinent actions with the international community 
(UNEP, 2010b). Theoretically speaking, it may be possible to take immediate actions and 
prevent from rapid temperature rises. However, in reality, it is highly unlikely for this to be 
actualized this considering the current human activities, such as increasing global economic 
activities and the sluggish pace of the agreements about the details of the post-Kyoto Protocol. 
In this social context, the CDM, the world’s first innovative financial mechanism enabling 
GHG reductions internationally in a cost-effective manner, was put into force in 2005. The 
CDM has played an important role in the international GHG reduction activities (e.g., Sutter 
and Parreño, 2007) for the first several years after its initiation but it is currently nearly 
defunct due to due to the deterioration of the market condition. There are three major reasons 
why the CER market has an imbalance of demand versus supply: first is the issue of equality 
on legally binding targets, as the targets were set with on the basis of inadequate evidence and 
inequitably. Due to this, Russia, Canada, and Japan did not join the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol; the second reason is the lower GHG emissions in Annex I 
countries as the Lehman Brother's fall in 2008 caused economic stagnation and many Annex I 
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countries, especially within the EU, did not have much demand for CERs to fulfil their 
targets; and third, the increasing amount of CER issuance as this accelerated the sharp 
depreciation of CER price. Aside from the rapid decrease of the CER price, the skewed 
distribution of CDM projects has been a controversial issue (e.g., Muller, 2007; Boyd et al., 
2009; Flamos, 2010). The majority of LDCs have not reaped benefits from the CDM, 
whereas the major GHG emitters, especially China and India, have been receiving a lot of 
fund flows from Annex I countries (Kasai, 2013) which have had a variety of positive side 
effects, such as technology transfers, electricity generated from clean renewable sources, and 
the promotion of SD in their own countries, in various ways. Hence, considering the current 
distributional imbalance of CDM projects, this study was conducted aiming to identify the 
determinants of CDM project hosting in order to recommend promising approaches for LDCs 
based on empirical evidence. 
       Prior to conducting empirical analyses, the effect of the CDM on the host country’s 
GHG emission tax rate and GHG reduction policies were investigated by examining the 
effects of increased environmental awareness in the Annex I country using the two-country 
model created by Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002) in Chapter 2. This macroeconomic analysis 
shows that, in a Nash equilibrium where the Annex I country chooses the amount of CDM 
investment and the host sets the proportion of CDM revenue used in GHG reduction activities 
and GHG emission tax rate, a rise in environmental awareness of the Annex I country 
increases the CDM investment, does not affect the GHG emission tax rate, and plausibly 
reduces GHG emissions of the host country. These results are similar to those obtained in 
Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002). Of special note, however, the results indicate that the degree of 
effectiveness of CDM projects in reducing GHG emissions affects the behavior of the Annex 
I country. This means that, in a plausible case, the more effective the CDM investment is, the 
greater the reduction of GHG emissions in the host country is. If the effectiveness reflects the 
recipient country’s ability to adopt advanced technologies (e.g., education levels or human 
capital stock of the country), the Annex I country tends to undertake CDM investments in 
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such countries with greatest human capital. This prediction arises from our theoretical 
consideration. 
       Following the theoretical analysis above, cross-country empirical analyses were 
carried out to identify the determinants of CDM project hosting in Chapter 3. These analyses 
focused mainly on two factors: 1) the qualities of the business environment and 2) scientific 
levels in the host countries. The reasons are that: 1) although many previous studies have 
analyzed the significance of a business environment, their results were not homogenous. 
Further, their notions of business environment seemed to be narrow and limited; 2) no 
previous studies attempted to verify the significance of scientific levels. Consequently, the 
results of cross-country analyses indicate that several factors regarding a business 
environment (i.e., “ease of registering property,” “ease of getting credit,” and “ease of trading 
across borders”) are significant for both bilateral and unilateral CDM projects. Similarly, the 
scientific and technical levels were found to be significant, but only for unilateral CDM 
projects (Kasai, 2012a). 
         In Chapter 4, panel data analyses were carried out to obtain more sophisticated 
estimated results utilizing panel Tobit models with four categories of independent variables 
(i.e., GHG reduction potentials, socioeconomic factors, human capital, and ties to advanced 
countries) towards the dependent variable, the number of CDM projects. By running random 
effects panel Tobit models, several significant decisive factors have been identified (see Table 
5-1). Although it was expected that all independent variables would be found to be significant 
in the analytical results, four variables, namely “GDP per capita,” “control of corruption,” 
“tertiary school enrolment rate,” and “ODA received,” were found to be statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, contrary to the expectations, it was confirmed that the “former 
British colony dummy” has negative significant effects on CDM project hosting. This implies 
that CDM investors in the U.K. have not utilized networks with former colonies in their CDM 
business. On the other hand, as expected, the analytical results reveal four important factors 
that have a significant and positive impact on CDM project hosting. They are: “GHG 
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reduction potentials,” “government effectiveness,” “science and technology levels,” and 
“economic ties with advanced countries in the private sector.” This empirical evidence is in 
accordance with expectations from a theoretical point of view (Kasai, 2012b). 
Table 5-1  Summary Table of Estimation Results 
Categories Factors Control Possibilitya Regression Result Effects 
GHG reduction 
potentials 
CO2 emissions Low Significant Positive 
Socioeconomic 
factors 
GDP per capita 
Government 
effectiveness 
Control of corruption 
Medium 
High 
 
Medium 
Insignificant 
Significant 
 
Insignificant 
N/A 
Positive 
 
N/A 
Human capital Tertiary school enrolment 
rate 
Number of scientific 
journal articles 
High 
 
High 
Insignificant 
 
Significant 
N/A 
 
Positive 
Links to 
advanced 
countries 
ODA received 
FDI inflows 
Former British colony 
dummy 
Medium 
Medium 
n/a 
Insignificant 
Significant 
Significant 
N/A  
Positive 
Negative 
a Control possibility shows the ease of control of a factor by host countries. 
5.2  Policy Implications 
It is considered to be appropriate that LDCs’ future concerning the CDM and other similar 
mechanisms will depend on how successfully they can utilize the findings of this paper in a 
factual manner. The important point to note is that some determinants can be controlled by 
host countries, but other determinants cannot. It is impossible to boost the past GHG emission 
levels in the base year. LDCs, hence, should focus exclusively on improving factors that they 
can control (i.e., “business environment,” “government effectiveness,” “science and 
technology levels,” and “economic ties between host and Annex I countries in the private 
sector”) (Kasai, 2012a and Kasai, 2012b). If this is actually achieved, LDCs will have better 
conditions for attracting CDM investors. 
       Alternatively, by taking a different perspective on a promising approach for LDCs, it 
seems feasible to develop the programmatic CDM (see Appendix III). Because LDCs have a 
serious disadvantage in their lower GHG reduction potentials, they cannot be expected to 
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simulate the major GHG emitters, such as China (Kasai, 2012a). The programmatic CDM 
allows a collection of a vast number of small-scale interventions (e.g., the use of 
energy-saving fluorescent bulbs and clean cookstoves) to be grouped, registered, and verified 
as a single CDM program. This is intended to reduce the transaction costs of processing a 
number of small-scale activities and these are generally the types of projects that have a direct 
impact on community development (ACP, 2014). In recent years, several international 
organizations have assisted in disseminating the programmatic CDM in LDCs. As a result, the 
number of CDM activities in LDCs has been increasing slowly but steadily. As of February 
28, 2014, there were 247 registered programmatic CDM activities (UNFCCC, 2014). Using 
this case as a good example, it is hoped that more promising and useful new market-based 
mechanisms will be developed by international organizations, such as UNFCCC. 
       In addition, as a more realistic suggestion, LDCs should continue to request financial 
assistance from the international society. When looking at negotiation circumstances at COPs, 
LDCs basically have cooperated with articulating common needs. However, it also appears 
that specific countries may have been affected by particular world powers, whereas others 
have not been greatly interested in the issue. It is not imperative that LDCs always work 
together. However, by working together, they probably would be able to obtain greater 
proportion of the assistance that they require. Thus, LDCs should consider working together 
more closely to explain and elaborate their strategies. From a theoretically point of view, a rise 
in the level of citizens’ environmental awareness in the Annex I country reduces GHG 
emissions in the host country and increases the amount of investment required in CDM 
activities. This is confirmed by the macroeconomic analysis of the effects of the CDM in 
Chapter 2. LDCs should raise the environmental awareness level not only by enhancing 
political dialogues, but also implementing various activities at the grassroots level in 
cooperation with international organizations and NGOs. This is because, from a standpoint of 
equality, LDCs have a right to receive more financial assistance from developed countries and 
some emergent nations. 
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       In summary, an effective strategy to promote CDM activities in LDCs is 
constructed with three dimensions. The first is the effort made by the host country. LDCs 
should improve the significant factors that they can control by themselves and attempt to 
implement the programmatic CDM. The second aspect focuses on the effort of international 
organizations, especially UNFCCC, as it would be helpful to improve and/or simplify the 
CDM policies/rules and create new mechanisms, such as the programmatic CDM. The third 
dimension is the effort by the international community, particularly developed countries, 
which are responsible for a vast amount of GHG emissions that are of concern in the climate 
change discussion. Their further efforts are absolutely necessary to provide funds, subsidiaries, 
technical assistance, capacity development programs and other forms of assistance. 
5.3  Remaining Challenges 
With respect to empirical analyses of the determinants of CDM project hosting, the findings 
of this papers is based on the limited data for the period between 2005 and 2010 due to data 
unavailability. It is hoped that further empirical studies will be carried out utilizing data that 
has been collected after 2011. Furthermore, it is worth applying other analytical models 
and/or independent variables if there are better models and/or variables for a panel data 
analysis. More specifically, it might be interesting to add regional dummies in an empirical 
model because the significance and effects of each variable may be different according to the 
region where the eligible host countries are situated. This method appears to help LDCs 
identify more useful and practical approaches. 
5.4  Concluding Statement 
The CDM is a mechanism, utilized not only for alleviating the impacts of global warming, but 
also for enhancing sustainable development in host countries and, furthermore, it can generate 
a new type of fund flows as it has similar features to subsidies. Assuming that the CDM will 
be continuously developed as a GHG reduction mechanism under the post-Kyoto Protocol 
after 2020, this paper underscores the importance of aggressively pressing ahead with the 
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development of CDM projects activities for the sake of improving their quality of life as well 
as reducing the impacts of global warming. 
       Having said this, in light of the current status of international climate negotiations, it 
feels challenged to have all major countries agree to the legally binding targets at COP21 to 
be held in Paris, France in 2015. As mentioned before, though the CDM market functioned 
well until 2008, as the market got an imbalance of demand versus supply, the CER price 
started falling down in 2009 and the current secondary CER price is extremely low at less 
than one Euro/ton (ICE, 2014). This might be considered a typical fate of a financial 
commodity which relies on the market mechanism. Thus, learning from a lesson from the 
CDM, LDCs might want to seek other possibilities including subsidiary programs as well as 
promising market-based mechanisms (e.g., VCS12, NAMA13, JCM14, REDD+15) while 
carefully watching developments of the CDM at CDM EB meetings and COPs. 
     Looking back over history, humankind has improved the quality of life by making 
innovations happen such as the industrial and green revolutions (Kasai, 2012b). Hence, it is 
hoped that both the Annex I and non-Annex I countries tackle the climate change issue while 
stimulating the effective use of innovative mechanisms including the CDM and make 
innovations happen in terms of both sustainable socioeconomic systems and technology 
advancement for the future generations. 
                                                 
12 The Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) is the world’s leading voluntary GHG reduction scheme which 
was founded by a collection of business and environmental leaders who saw a need for greater quality 
assurance in voluntary carbon markets.  
13 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) refers to a set of policies and actions that 
countries undertake as part of a commitment to reduce GHG emission. The term recognizes that 
different countries may take different nationally appropriate action on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. It also 
emphasizes financial assistance from developed countries to developing countries. 
14 The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) is a program in which Japan’s contribution to the reduction of 
GHG emissions in partner countries through transferring low-carbon technology and products. 
Currently, bilateral agreements on the JCM have been signed by twelve countries (i.e., Mongolia, 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Maldives, Viet Nam, Laos, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Palau, Cambodia, and 
Mexico). 
15 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation plus (REDD+) is a mechanism that 
has been under negotiation by the UNFCCC since 2005, with the twin objectives of mitigating climate 
change through reducing emissions of GHG and removing GHG through enhanced forest management 
in developing countries. 
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       Last but not least, time is limited but it is unquestionable that our possibilities are 
unlimited. The author strongly hopes that this dissertation will be read by as many people as 
possible in order for LDCs to utilize “latecomer’s advantages” to realize sustainable 
development by implementing various multi-benefit type projects/programs in their countries.
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Appendix I: Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) 
GWPs referenced to the updated decay response for the Bern carbon cycle model and future 
CO2 atmospheric concentrations held constant at current levels.  
Table A-1  List of GWPs 
Species 
Chemical 
formula 
Lifetime 
(years) 
GWPs (Time horizon) 
20 years 100 years 500 years 
CO2 CO2 5 – 200b 1 1 1 
Methane a CH4 12±3 56 21 6.5 
Nitrous oxide N2O 120 280 310 170 
HFC-23 CHF3 264 9100 11700 9800 
HFC-32 CH2F2 5.6 2100 650 200 
HFC-41 CH3F 3.7 490 150 45 
HFC-43-10mee C5H2F10 17.1 3000 1300 400 
HFC-125 C2HF5 32.6 4600 2800 920 
HFC-134 C2H2F4 10.6 2900 1000 310 
HFC-134a CH2FCF3 14.6 3400 1300 420 
HFC-152a C2H4F2 1.5 460 140 42 
HFC-143 C2H3F3 3.8 1000 300 94 
HFC-143a C2H3F3 48.3 5000 3800 1400 
HFC-227ea C3HF7 36.5 4300 2900 950 
HFC-236fa C3H2F6 209 5100 6300 4700 
HFC-245ca C3H3F5 6.6 1800 560 170 
Sulphur hexafluoride SF6 3200 16300 23900 34900 
Perfluoromethane CF4 50000 4400 6500 10000 
Perfluoroethane C2F6 10000 6200 9200 14000 
Perfluoropropane C3F8 2600 4800 7000 10100 
Perfluorobutane C4F10 2600 4800 7000 10100 
Perfluorocyclobutane c-C4F8 3200 6000 8700 12700 
Perfluoropentane C5F12 4100 5100 7500 11000 
Perfluorohexane C6F14 3200 5000 7400 10700 
a The GWP for methane includes indirect effects of tropospheric ozone production and 
stratospheric water vapour production.   
b No single lifetime can be defined for CO2 due to the different rates of uptake by different 
removal processes. 
Source: UNFCCC (2012e)  
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Appendix II: Registered CDM Projects by Host Countries 
(2005-2010) 
Table A-2  List of CDM Projects by Host Countries 
Eligible host country 
(* indicates LDCs) 
The number of registered CDM projects 
Sum 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Albania 1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Algeria   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Angola *  0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Antigua and Barbuda   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Argentina   20 2 4 4 4  2  4 
Armenia  5 1 1 1 1  1  0 
Azerbaijan   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Bahamas   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Bahrain   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Bangladesh *   2 1 1 0 0  0  0 
Barbados   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Belize   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Benin *  0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Bhutan *  2 1 0 0 0  0  1 
Bolivia   4 1 0 1 0  1  1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Botswana   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Brazil   186 5 83 25 35  18  20 
Burkina Faso *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Burundi *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Cambodia *   4 0 1 0 2  1  0 
Cameroon   1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Cape Verde   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Chad *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Chile   42 6 8 8 5  9  6 
China   1,229 3 33 114 222  353  504 
Colombia   26 0 5 2 6  7  6 
Comoros * 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Congo, Dem. Rep. * 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Costa Rica   6 1 1 3 1  0  0 
Cote d'Ivoire   2 0 0 0 0  1  1 
Cuba   2 0 0 1 0  1  0 
Cyprus   6 0 2 0 0  3  1 
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Eligible host country 
(* indicates LDCs) 
The number of registered CDM projects 
Sum 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Djibouti *  0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Dominican Republic   2 0 1 0 0  0  1 
Ecuador   14 0 8 1 4  0  1 
Egypt   7 0 2 1 1  0  3 
El Salvador   6 0 2 3 0  0  1 
Equatorial Guinea * 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Eritrea *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Ethiopia *   1 0 0 0 0  1  0 
Fiji   1 1 0 0 0  0  0 
Gabon   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Gambia *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Georgia   2 0 0 1 0  1  0 
Ghana   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Grenada   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Guatemala   11 1 4 0 3  3  0 
Guinea *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Guinea-Bissau *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Guyana   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Haiti   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Honduras   16 5 5 3 1  1  1 
India   612 17 124 161 82  94  134 
Indonesia   58 0 8 4 9  21  16 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1 0 0 0 0  1  0 
Israel   18 0 1 6 6  3  2 
Jamaica   1 0 1 0 0  0  0 
Jordan   2 0 0 0 1  1  0 
Kenya   3 0 0 0 1  0  2 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Korea, Rep.   53 2 5 10 4  14  18 
Kuwait   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Kyrgyzstan   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Lao PDR * 1 0 0 1 0  0  0 
Lebanon   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Lesotho *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Liberia *   1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Macedonia, FYR   1 0 0 0 0  1  0 
Madagascar *   1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
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Eligible host country 
(* indicates LDCs) 
The number of registered CDM projects 
Sum 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Malawi *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Malaysia   87 0 12 14 9  43  9 
Maldives *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Mali   1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Mauritania *   1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Mauritius   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Mexico   125 3 69 28 10  10  5 
Moldova, Rep. 4 0 3 0 0  1  0 
Mongolia   3 0 1 2 0  0  0 
Montenegro   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Morocco   5 2 1 1 0  1  0 
Mozambique *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Myanmar *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Namibia   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Nepal *   3 2 0 0 0  0  1 
Nicaragua   4 0 2 1 0  1  0 
Niger *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Nigeria   5 0 1 0 0  2  2 
Oman   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Pakistan   11 0 1 0 0  4  6 
Panama   6 3 1 1 0  1  0 
Papua New Guinea   1 0 1 0 0  0  0 
Paraguay   2 0 0 0 0  1  1 
Peru   23 2 1 5 8  5  2 
Philippines   46 0 7 8 5  20  6 
Qatar   1 0 0 1 0  0  0 
Rwanda *   1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Samoa *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Saudi Arabia   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Senegal *   2 0 0 0 0  0  2 
Serbia   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Sierra Leone *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Singapore   2 0 0 0 1  0  1 
Solomon Islands * 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
South Africa   19 1 4 7 2  3  2 
Sri Lanka   7 3 1 0 0  2  1 
St. Lucia   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
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Eligible host country 
(* indicates LDCs) 
The number of registered CDM projects 
Sum 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Sudan *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Suriname   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Swaziland   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Syrian Arab Republic   2 0 0 0 0  2  0 
Tajikistan   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Tanzania, United Rep. *   1 0 0 1 0  0  0 
Thailand   42 0 0 5 5  20  12 
Togo *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Trinidad and Tobago   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Tunisia   2 0 2 0 0  0  0 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Uganda *   2 0 0 1 0  1  0 
United Arab Emirates   4 0 0 0 0  4  0 
Uruguay   4 0 0 1 2  0  1 
Uzbekistan 10 0 0 0 0  7  3 
Viet Nam   47 0 2 0 0  18  27 
Yemen *   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Zambia *   1 0 0 0 0  0  1 
Zimbabwe   0 0 0 0 0  0  0 
Source: IGES (2012) 
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Appendix III: The programmatic CDM (PoA) 
Background 
The CMP at its first session decided that a local/regional/national policy or standard 
cannot be considered as a clean development mechanism project activity, but that 
project activities under a programme of activities can be registered as a single clean 
development mechanism project activity provided that approved baseline and 
monitoring methodologies are used that, inter alia, define the appropriate boundary, 
avoid double counting and account for leakage, ensuring that the net anthropogenic 
removals by sinks and emission reductions are real, measurable and verifiable, and 
additional to any that would occur in the absence of the project activity.  
32nd Meeting of the CDM Executive Board (EB32) 
The EB adopted procedures at its 32nd meeting regarding the registration of a 
programme of activities as a single CDM project activity and issuance of certified 
emission reductions for a programme of activities. DOEs may now publish 
documentation related to programmes for global stakeholder consultation during 
validation. Such documentation will be made available via this webpage. As the process 
of registering programme of activities evolves further information will be made 
available on this section of the CDM website. 
33rd Meeting of the CDM Executive Board (EB33) 
The Board, at its thirty-third meeting, approved the CDM Programme of Activities 
Design Document form (PoA-DD), CDM Programme Activity Design Document form 
(PoA-CPA- DD), Small-Scale CDM Programme of Activities Design Document form 
(SSC-PoA-DD) and Small-Scale CDM Programme Activity Design Document form 
(PoA-CPA-SSC-DD). 
       The Board clarified that the registration fee for a PoA is based on the total 
expected annual emission reductions of the CPAs that will be submitted together with 
the request for registration of the PoA. The calculation of the amount to be paid and the 
106 
 
procedures for payment will follow mutatis mutandis the existing rules for the payment 
of a registration fee (annex 35 to ‘EB 23 Report’). For each CPA which is included 
subsequently, no fee is to be paid. Fees are to be paid by the coordinating/managing 
entity to the secretariat. 
(Source: UNFCCC website) 
Advantages of the Programmatic CDM 
The procedures for the CDM Programme of Activities (PoA) were adopted in the EB 
meeting in June 2009. The new programme has some specific advantages over the 
normal CDM. One of them is the existence of the Coordinating or Managing Entity 
(CME) of a PoA. CME coordinates the projects under a PoA, or CDM Programme 
Activities (CPAs), and manages their operations and CER issuances.  
       In addition to the existence of a CME, the PoA has other interesting original 
features. There is no limit on the number of CPAs under a PoA and no requirement for 
additional registration fees after the registration of its first CPA. Also, each CPA can set 
its own crediting period. This individual crediting period may reduce losses of CERs 
issued out of the uniformly-set crediting period for a bundled normal CDM project and 
be more beneficial to a CME (IGES, 2010) (see Figure A-1). 
Figure A-1  Comparison of the Project Based CDM and the PoAs 
Note: CMEs are entities which manage a number of CPAs which can be added after the 
registration of programmatic CDM activities (PoAs). 
Source: Kasai (2011) 
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       As Figure A-2 shows, the number of programmatic CDM activities has been 
keeping increasing different from the project-based CDM projects. There are 270 registered 
PoAs as of November 13, 2014 (Table A-3). 
 
Notes: Trend is a locally weignted regression at a bandwidth of 0.5. PoAs/CPAs entering 
registration can be discontinued at any stage. 
Figure A-2  PoAs/CPAs included/registered and registering 
Source: UNFCCC (2014a) 
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Table A-3  List of Registered CDM Programme of Activities (PoAs) 
As of 13 November 2014, 270 CDM programme activities have been registered. 
Registered Title Host Parties Other Parties Methodology * Reductions ** Ref 
12 Aug 14 Production of biogas from animal manure for rural 
household 
Sudan AMS-I.E. ver. 5 55890 10018 
01 Aug 14 Transport Programme of Activities in the Cement Industry, 
Chile 
Chile AM0090 5671 9801 
22 Jul 14 Up Energy Improved Cookstove Programme, Uganda Uganda AMS-II.G. ver. 5 44874 9956 
18 Jul 14 Programme for Promotion of Access to Domestic Biogas in 
Rural Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Japan AMS-I.E. ver. 5 662 9992 
24 Jun 14 West African Biodigester Programme of Activities Benin
Burkina Faso 
AMS-I.E. ver. 5 22561 9977 
19 Jun 14 Installation of Energy Efficient Transformers (IEET) Kenya The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AM0067 ver. 2 23021 9164 
18 Jun 14 Man and Man Enterprise Improved Cooking Stoves 
Programme in Togo 
Togo The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 5 48001 9815 
05 Jun 14 Demand side energy efficiency measures in building lighting 
systems 
Singapore AMS-II.C. ver. 14 6291 9593 
21 May 14 Programme of Activities for Local Improved Cookstoves in 
West Africa 
Mali
Benin 
AMS-II.G. ver. 5 105362 9941 
21 May 14 Promotion of Energy Efficient Cook Stoves within Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) 
Malawi
Zambia 
AMS-II.G. ver. 5 40653 9780 
16 May 14 Landfill gas capture, flaring and utilization program in Africa Ghana ACM0001 ver. 15 103249 9136 
08 May 14 Tanzania Renewable Energy Programme United Republic of Sweden AMS-I.F. ver. 2 28321 9904 
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Registered Title Host Parties Other Parties Methodology * Reductions ** Ref 
Tanzania AMS-I.D. ver. 17
01 May 14 Energy and Water Saving Promotion Programme for Textile 
Dyeing Process of Bangladesh Textile and Garment 
Industries 
Bangladesh Japan AMS-II.D. ver. 12 908 9940 
01 May 14 Impact Carbon Global Safe Water Programme of Activities 
(PoA) 
Rwanda
Uganda 
AMS-III.AV. ver. 4 26438 9948 
16 Apr 14 CDM Africa Sustainable Energy Programme Malawi
Zambia 
Sweden AMS-I.E. ver. 5 49601 9934 
28 Mar 14 Advanced Energy Solutions for Buildings. Programme of 
Activities (PoA) 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Egypt 
Ireland AMS-II.K. ver. 2 6014 9153 
20 Mar 14 Run of River Hydro Power Plants in Chile Chile ACM0002 ver. 14 10989 9797 
13 Mar 14 Improved Cookstoves Program for Malawi and cross-border 
regions of Mozambique 
Malawi Netherlands AMS-II.G. ver. 5 38857 9558 
10 Mar 14 Programmatic CDM for Promotion of Solar Power 
Generation in India 
India AMS-I.D. ver. 17 7905 9908 
03 Mar 14 Biomass residues power generation Programme South Africa ACM0006 ver. 12 269952 8486 
17 Jan 14 Micro Hydro Power Plant Promotion Programme in Regions 
on the Upper Reaches of the Yangtze River, China  
China Japan AMS-I.E. ver. 5 848 9423 
06 Dec 13 Implementation of Grid connected Solar Photovoltaic Power 
Projects in Chile 
Chile ACM0002 ver. 13 134895 9683 
02 Dec 13 Renewable biomass fired improved cookstoves programme 
for households in Burundi by BQS 
Burundi Switzerland AMS-I.E. ver. 5 217458 9634 
29 Nov 13 Power generation using biogas from state-owned palm oil 
mills in the Republic of Indonesia 
Indonesia Japan AMS-III.H. ver. 
16  
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
18372 8389 
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Registered Title Host Parties Other Parties Methodology * Reductions ** Ref 
21 Nov 13 DelAgua Public Health Program in Eastern Africa Rwanda AMS-III.AV. ver. 4
AMS-II.G. ver. 5  
67656 9626 
19 Nov 13 Improved Cook Stove Programme with Carbon Finance 
(ICF), Nepal 
Nepal The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 5 41587 9811 
15 Nov 13 Animal Manure Treatment Programme in Shanxi Province, 
Guizhou Province and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.D. ver. 
18  
4217 8025 
17 Oct 13 Energy Efficient Stoves Program (EESP) Ethiopia Sweden, Australia,
The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 5 46528 9769 
01 Oct 13 CarbonSoft Open Source PoA, LED Lighting Distribution: 
Pan Africa 
Malawi AMS-III.AR.ver. 3 41850 7821 
11 Sep 13 FIRA AWMS Programme Mexico Mexico AMS-III.D. er. 18
AMS-III.F. ver. 11 
AMS-I.F.  
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
2214 9337 
06 Sep 13 Energy Efficiency through Micro irrigation system - India India AMS-II.F. ver. 10 3473 9731 
22 Aug 13 Anaerobic Digestion and Renewable Energy Generation in 
South Africa 
South Africa AMS-III.D.ver. 18
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
AMS-III.AO.  
3083 9219 
06 Aug 13 Programme of Activities for Small Scale Hydropower CDM in 
Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka Republic of Korea AMS-I.D. ver. 17 3179 9705 
05 Aug 13 Standard Bank Energy Efficient Commercial Lighting 
Programme of Activities 
South Africa, Kenya, 
Botswana 
The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.C. ver. 13 2422 7398 
01 Aug 13 Efficient Cook Stove Programme: Malawi Malawi The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 5 52877 9706 
26 Jul 13 Replacement of traditional charcoal stoves with efficient Haiti Italy AMS-II.G. ver. 4 41227 9698 
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EcoRecho stoves in Haiti 
01 Jul 13 Paradigm Sub Saharan Africa Cook Stove Programme Ethiopia
Rwanda 
AMS-II.G. ver. 5 64998 9672 
24 Jun 13 Promoting Efficient Stove Dissemination and Use in West 
Africa. 
Togo, Burkina Faso, 
Ghana,  
Mali, Senegal 
Sweden AMS-II.G. ver. 4 45193 9666 
12 Jun 13 Green Commercial Vehicles Projects Malaysia Netherlands AMS-III.S. ver. 3 2917 8678 
07 Jun 13 Energy Efficiency Program in Rural Bangladesh Bangladesh AMS-III.AV. ver. 3 55198 9276 
15 May 13 Southern African Solar Thermal Energy (SASTE) 
programme 
South Africa, Lesotho, 
Botswana, Mozambique,  
Namibia , Swaziland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 26440 7885 
26 Apr 13 Small-scale Hydropower Programme of Activities in Guizhou 
Province 
China AMS-I.D. ver. 17 3977 9617 
25 Apr 13 Distribution of Improved Cook Stoves in Sub-Saharan Africa Senegal , Ghana, Nigeria Netherlands AMS-II.G. ver. 4 39114 9007 
17 Apr 13 Coal Mine Methane Utilisation and Destruction Programme 
in DPR Korea 
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 
ACM0008 ver. 7 137270 7881 
28 Mar 13 Methane Utilisation and Destruction Programme from 
Industrial Wastewater in DPR Korea 
Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea 
AMS-III.H.ver. 16 22772 8990 
25 Mar 13 Tepeu Wind Programme of Activities Nicaragua
Peru 
Netherlands
Germany 
ACM0002 ver. 12 107375 7274 
18 Mar 13 Heat Retention Cooking in Less Developed Countries Rwanda The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 283179 9596 
31 Jan 13 Yemen Electricity Distribution Loss Reduction Programme Yemen Netherlands AMS-II.A. ver. 10 6710 9557 
31 Jan 13 Nepal Biogas Support Program-PoA Nepal AMS-I.E. ver. 4 61510 9572 
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29 Jan 13 Efficient Cook Stove Programme: Rwanda Rwanda The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 51819 7247 
29 Jan 13 FIRA Wastewater Treatment System, Methane Capture and 
Utilisation Programme in Mexico 
Mexico AMS-III.H.ver. 16
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
5243 8132 
28 Jan 13 Fuel Efficient Stoves in Zambia Zambia AMS-II.G. ver. 3 40684 6864 
28 Jan 13 SKG Sangha Biodigester PoA India Switzerland AMS-I.C. ver. 19
AMS-III.R. ver. 2  
AMS-I.E. ver. 4  
54217 9507 
25 Jan 13 Hebei Animal Manure Management System (AMMS) GHG 
Mitigation Programme 
China AMS-III.D.ver. 18
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
AMS-I.F. ver. 2  
21882 8019 
25 Jan 13 Southern African Renewable Energy (SARE) Programme South Africa , Botswana,  
Lesotho, Mozambique,  
Namibia, Swaziland 
ACM0002 ver. 13 51775 7676 
11 Jan 13 Vietnam National Biogas Programme Viet Nam AMS-I.C. ver. 18 28455 5816 
31 Dec 12 Kenya Improved woodstoves project Kenya France AMS-II.G. ver. 3 42257 9384 
31 Dec 12 Argentinean Wind Power Programme (AWPP) Argentina Germany ACM0002 ver. 13 24110 9393 
31 Dec 12 Residential Hot Water Efficiency Programme in South Africa South Africa AMS-I.J.
AMS-II.C. ver. 13 
28808 9146 
31 Dec 12 Greenlight Solar PV Lighting India India The U.K.and
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.AR.ver. 3 56397 9488 
31 Dec 12 Programme of activities for the recovery and use of 
associated petroleum gas, normally combusted in flare 
stacks in oil-producing fields 
Colombia AM0009 ver. 6 159640 8659 
31 Dec 12 Promotion of renewable energy generation in India- India ACM0002 ver. 13 48585 9416 
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Programme of Activities 
31 Dec 12 TATS Solar Lantern Programme of Activities Kenya AMS-III.AR.ver. 4 13823 9071 
31 Dec 12 Henan Province Zhoukou City Rural Household Biogas 
Development Programme (2007-2010) 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 465 8390 
31 Dec 12 Small Hydropower Programme of Activities in Albania and 
Serbia 
Albania Austria AMS-I.D. ver. 17 9130 6825 
31 Dec 12 Renewable Energy based PoA in Pakistan Pakistan ACM0002 ver. 13 54640 9442 
31 Dec 12 Energy Efficiency of Nigeria’s Residential Lighting Stock by 
Distributing up to 40 Million Compact Fluorescent Lamps 
(CFLs) to Residential Households Connected to the National 
Grid 
Nigeria The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.J. ver. 4 28892 9441 
31 Dec 12 Cogeneration and/or trigeneration at commercial sites South Africa AMS-II.K. 4742 9437 
31 Dec 12 Chilean small scale renewable energy programme of 
activities 
Chile AMS-I.D. ver. 17 18091 9411 
31 Dec 12 Macedonian Microscale Grid-connected Hydroelectricity 
Programme 
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
Netherlands AMS-I.D. ver. 17 10590 9477 
31 Dec 12 Southern African Solar LED Programme South Africa , Namibia,  
Zambia 
AMS-III.AR.ver. 3 12236 9497 
31 Dec 12 SoWiTec Wind PoA in the Caribbean, Central and South 
America ("SoWiTec-PoA") 
Uruguay Germany ACM0002 ver. 13 190135 8964 
31 Dec 12 BWC Sustainable Landfill Gas Recovery Programme of 
Activities in Indonesia 
Indonesia Netherlands ACM0001 ver. 12 11591 8866 
31 Dec 12 Chilean Programme of Activities for integrated Non 
Conventional Renewable Energies 
Chile ACM0002 ver. 12 191134 9431 
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31 Dec 12 PoA on RE India AMS-I.D. ver. 17 7557 9502 
31 Dec 12 Solar Water Heater Program in India India Netherlands
Germany 
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 31500 8855 
31 Dec 12 Petrotrin Oil Fields Associated Gas Recovery and Utilization 
PoA 
Trinidad and Tobago AM0009 ver. 6 82282 9358 
31 Dec 12 ONE Wind Program of Activity, Morocco Morocco ACM0002 ver. 13 653608 9491 
30 Dec 12 Sustainable Deployment of the LifeStraw® Family in rural 
Indonesia 
Indonesia Switzerland AMS-III.AV. ver. 2 52674 7067 
30 Dec 12 Improved Cook stoves Programme – India India AMS-II.G. ver. 3 11005 7997 
30 Dec 12 LNG Bus Promoting Programme in Guangdong Province China AMS-III.AY. 3346 9421 
30 Dec 12 Water Purifiers Programme in India India AMS-III.AV. ver. 2 899 9432 
29 Dec 12 Energy Efficiency Improvements in Furnaces used in SME 
Steel industry clusters in India 
India AMS-II.D. ver. 12 3006 9387 
29 Dec 12 Rural Household Biogas Development Programme in 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Hebei Provinces 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 19
AMS-III.R. ver. 3  
7880 9399 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region 
China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 37463 8384 
28 Dec 12 Methane Capture, Combustion and Possible Electricity 
Generation from AWMS in Mexico 
Mexico AMS-III.D.ver. 18
AMS-III.F. ver. 10 
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
1581 6142 
28 Dec 12 Promotion of POME and EFB Co-Composting Ecuador AMS-III.H.ver. 16
AMS-III.F. ver. 10 
14236 9354 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Guizhou Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 28912 6422 
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28 Dec 12 Renewable Energy Carbon Programme for Africa (RECPA) South Africa ACM0002 ver. 13 132526 6386 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Hebei Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 33673 7730 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Shanxi Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 36550 7068 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Shaanxi Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 34845 8462 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Hunan Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 30961 8463 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Jiangxi Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 30808 6424 
28 Dec 12 Small Scale Renewable Energy Carbon Programme 
(SRECP) 
South Africa AMS-I.D. ver. 17 23353 9059 
28 Dec 12 PV Project Development in Chile Chile ACM0002 ver. 12 80207 9251 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Sichuan Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 30818 9020 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Liaoning Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 34257 8387 
28 Dec 12 South African Large Scale Grid Connected Solar Park 
Programme 
South Africa ACM0002 ver. 12 65597 9296 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Heilongjiang Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 38448 8497 
28 Dec 12 PoA for fuel switching at micro and small-sized enterprises in 
Egypt 
Egypt AMS-III.B.ver. 16
AMS-III.Z. ver. 4  
155 9339 
28 Dec 12 Wind Energy Project PoA India AMS-I.D. ver. 17 19879 9292 
28 Dec 12 National Programme for Improved Cookstoves in India India AMS-II.G. ver. 3 468140 8949 
28 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Henan Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 29555 8498 
28 Dec 12 Renewable Energy Programme of Activities in Middle East 
and North Africa 
Saudi Arabia, Oman,  
Egypt 
Ireland ACM0002 ver. 12 1259 9299 
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27 Dec 12 Programme of Activities to introduce renewable energy 
system into collective housing, Republic of Korea 
Republic of Korea AMS-I.F. ver. 2 1326 9247 
27 Dec 12 The programme to introduce renewable energy system into 
Seoul 
Republic of Korea AMS-I.F. ver. 2 20 9260 
27 Dec 12 Energy efficiency programme for ceramic kilns in Liaoning 
Faku Economic Development Zone 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.D. ver. 12 19542 9174 
27 Dec 12 CFL Distribution Programme in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region 
China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 28125 8029 
27 Dec 12 Animal Manure Treatment Programme in Gansu Province China France
The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.D.ver. 18 3023 8139 
27 Dec 12 RE2Grid PoA Philippines Sweden ACM0002 ver. 13 53543 9206 
27 Dec 12 UpEnergy Open Access Improved Cookstoves Program in 
Latin America 
Mexico, El Salvador,  
Nicaragua 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 43646 9218 
27 Dec 12 MicroEnergy Credits – Microfinance for Clean Energy 
Product Lines – India 
India AMS-II.G. ver. 3
AMS-III.AV. ver. 2 
AMS-I.A. ver. 14  
35131 9181 
27 Dec 12 AeroPod Composting and Co-composting Programme in 
Malaysia. 
Malaysia Netherlands AMS-III.F. ver. 10 16681 9217 
27 Dec 12 Solar PV Power Development Programme in Shandong 
Province 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.F. ver. 2
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
8938 9160 
27 Dec 12 Qinghai Province Solar PV Power Generation Programme China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
ACM0002 ver. 13 30807 9188 
27 Dec 12 Top Third Ventures Stove Programme Kenya AMS-II.G. ver. 4 34765 9265 
26 Dec 12 Wind and solar PoA in South Africa South Africa France ACM0002 ver. 12 16477 7467 
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25 Dec 12 Animal Manure Treatment Programme in Hubei Province China Sweden, The U.K.
and Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.D.ver. 18 3663 8147 
25 Dec 12 Rural Household Biogas Digester Programme in Seven 
Regions of Sichuan Province 
China Switzerland AMS-III.R. ver. 2
AMS-I.I. ver. 3  
6800 9169 
25 Dec 12 Sichuan Province Rural Efficient Biomass Cooking Stoves 
Programme Project 
China AMS-II.G. ver. 4 9761 9191 
24 Dec 12 Sustainable Development Programme of Rural 
Electrification by Husk Power Systems 
India AMS-I.L. 215 8864 
24 Dec 12 Small Scale Grid-connected Solar Power Programme South Africa The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 11191 9126 
24 Dec 12 PoA Solar PV in Pakistan Pakistan ACM0002 ver. 13 32070 9094 
24 Dec 12 CarbonSoft Open Source PoA, LED Lighting Distribution: 
Emerging Markets 
India AMS-III.AR.ver. 3 3968 7889 
24 Dec 12 African Clean Energy Switch – Biogas (ACES-Biogas) Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda,  
Ethiopia 
AMS-I.E. ver. 5 63934 8239 
24 Dec 12 BWC Sustainable Biogas Recovery Programme of Activities 
in Indonesia 
Indonesia Netherlands AMS-III.H.ver. 16
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
19844 9096 
22 Dec 12 Animal Manure Treatment Programme in Anhui Province, 
Jiangsu Province and Yunnan Province 
China AMS-III.D.ver. 18
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
AMS-I.F. ver. 2  
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
3882 9103 
21 Dec 12 Programme for the Capture and Destruction or Utilization of 
Landfill Gas in Colombia 
Colombia AMS-III.G. ver. 7 20998 8856 
21 Dec 12 Standard Bank MSW Composting Programme Ghana AM0025 ver. 13 27889 7893 
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21 Dec 12 SimGas Biogas Programme of Activities Kenya Netherlands AMS-III.R. ver. 2
AMS-I.E. ver. 4  
AMS-I.I. ver. 3  
45156 7734 
21 Dec 12 BWC Wind Farm Power Programme of Activities in Viet 
Nam 
Viet Nam Netherlands ACM0002 ver. 13 48969 8963 
21 Dec 12 China Coal Mine Ventilation Air Methane Oxidization 
Programme 
China Japan ACM0008 ver. 7 413219 7654 
21 Dec 12 NuPlanet Small Scale Hydropower PoA South Africa AMS-I.D. ver. 17 24353 7887 
20 Dec 12 Guacamaya Small Scale Hydropower Programme of 
Activities 
Honduras, Nicaragua,  
Costa Rica 
Netherlands
Germany 
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 5762 8950 
20 Dec 12 Development of Programmatic CDM Project for SWH 
installation under MNRE, UNDP/GEF Global Solar Water 
Heating Market Transformation and Strengthening 
Initiatives: India Country Programme 
India AMS-I.J. 8832 8919 
20 Dec 12 The National CFL Project, Pakistan Pakistan AMS-II.J. ver. 4 550134 7811 
20 Dec 12 Programme for SSC Hydropower Plants in rural areas China AMS-I.D. ver. 17 18228 8824 
19 Dec 12 Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon Efficient Cookstoves Program Côte d`Ivoire
Cameroon 
AMS-II.G. ver. 4 46716 8696 
19 Dec 12 East Africa Renewable Energy Programme (EA-REP) Kenya
Rwanda 
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 18442 8777 
19 Dec 12 Distribution of ONIL Stoves—Guatemala Guatemala Netherlands AMS-II.G. ver. 3 42773 8480 
19 Dec 12 Mexico Water, Energy, & Emissions Efficiency Residential 
Program 
Mexico Switzerland AMS-II.M. 439 7767 
19 Dec 12 Vietnam Renewable Energy Development Program (REDP) Viet Nam Sweden ACM0002 ver. 13 30115 6810 
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19 Dec 12 Sustainability CFL Replacement Programme of Activities in 
South Africa 
South Africa France AMS-II.J. ver. 4 29518 7479 
18 Dec 12 Solar Energy Programme for South Africa South Africa ACM0002 ver. 13 347557 8535 
18 Dec 12 Grid Connected Photovoltaic (PV) Renewable Electricity 
Generating Facilities PoA 
South Africa ACM0002 ver. 13 18241 8630 
18 Dec 12 Landfills’ gas capture, flaring and use program in Morocco Morocco Sweden ACM0001 ver. 12 138377 6568 
18 Dec 12 South African Wind Power Projects South Africa ACM0002 ver. 13 93093 8742 
18 Dec 12 Grid Connect Solar PV Power Generation Plant Programme China Japan ACM0002 ver. 12 13215 8868 
17 Dec 12 Programme of activities to switch from residual fuel oil to 
LPG in manufacturing industries in Peru 
Peru AMS-III.B.ver. 16 209 6826 
17 Dec 12 India Wind Energy Programme of Activities India Netherlands
Germany 
ACM0002 ver. 12 38414 8734 
14 Dec 12 Ecoener Small Hydro Programme of Activities Guatemala AMS-I.D. ver. 17 24135 8655 
14 Dec 12 BWC Sustainable Small Hydropower Programme of 
Activities in Viet Nam 
Viet Nam Netherlands AMS-I.D. ver. 17 28590 8627 
14 Dec 12 Green Power for South Africa South Africa The U.K.and
Northern Ireland 
ACM0002 ver. 12 80907 7167 
13 Dec 12 South African Grid Connected Wind Farm Programme South Africa ACM0002 ver. 12 57847 7849 
13 Dec 12 Sichuan Animal Farms GHG Mitigation Programme China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.D.ver. 18 5093 8733 
12 Dec 12 Grid connected electricity generation from wind source 
under Programme of Activities in Brazil 
Brazil ACM0002 ver. 12 38979 8432 
12 Dec 12 Malaysia Biomass Power Plant Project Malaysia The U.K.and ACM0018 ver. 2 123449 5758 
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Northern Ireland
12 Dec 12 Green Light for Africa Kenya
Zimbabwe 
Switzerland AMS-II.J. ver. 4 31099 8637 
12 Dec 12 Energy Efficient Cook stoves in South Africa South Africa AMS-II.G. ver. 3 31576 8640 
11 Dec 12 Philippines Mini-Hydro PoA. Philippines Germany AMS-I.D. ver. 17 2000 8674 
07 Dec 12 Distribution of ONIL Stoves—Mexico Mexico Netherlands AMS-II.G. ver. 3 40090 8521 
06 Dec 12 African Improved Cooking Stoves Programme of Activities Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 15477 5342 
06 Dec 12 Improved Cooking Stoves Programme of Activities in Africa Kenya
South Africa 
The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 13556 5341 
05 Dec 12 LED's kick-off South Africa Netherlands AMS-II.C. ver. 13 48434 7078 
04 Dec 12 Renewable energy utilization in the new and existing 
buildings in Henan Province 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 19
AMS-II.C. ver. 13 
896 8526 
03 Dec 12 Project to replace fossil fuel based lighting with Solar LED 
lamps in Africa 
Kenya AMS-III.AR.ver. 3 21393 7489 
03 Dec 12 Omega Energia CDM Programme of Activities for the 
Promotion of Small Hydropower Plants in Brazil 
Brazil ACM0002 ver. 12 21818 7062 
30 Nov 12 PoA for the Reduction of emission from non-renewable fuel 
from cooking at household level 
Madagascar, Ethiopia,  
Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria,  
Uganda, Zambia, Chad,  
Dominican Republic  
Côte d`Ivoire, Liberia,  
Rwanda, Sierra Leone,  
Namibia, Zimbabwe,  
Ghana, South Africa 
Norway AMS-I.E. ver. 4 51385 7359 
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30 Nov 12 Clean Cook Stoves in Sub-Saharan Africa by ClimateCare 
Limited 
Ghana AMS-II.G. ver. 4 136734 8438 
29 Nov 12 GRT Energy Small Scale Solar PV (PoA) Thailand Sweden AMS-I.D. ver. 17 3338 8457 
29 Nov 12 Implementation of Grid connected Wind Farm Projects in 
Chile 
Chile ACM0002 ver. 13 41948 8331 
29 Nov 12 India Small Scale Solar PV Programme of Activities India Netherlands AMS-I.D. ver. 17 1340 8426 
28 Nov 12 Zhongying Changjiang Small-scale Hydropower Programme 
of Activities 
China AMS-I.D. ver. 17 22001 8259 
26 Nov 12 Small-scale solar electrical programme, South Africa South Africa AMS-I.F. ver. 2
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
15022 7484 
23 Nov 12 Programme of Activities (PoA) for Sustainable Renewable 
Energy Power Generation in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
Papua New Guinea AMS-I.A. ver. 16
AMS-I.F. ver. 2  
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
15724 8383 
23 Nov 12 Grid Connect SSC Solar PV Power Generation Plant 
Programme 
China Japan AMS-I.D. ver. 17 14449 8232 
21 Nov 12 CDM Africa Wind and Solar Programme of Activities for 
South Africa 
South Africa ACM0002 ver. 12 352654 8260 
20 Nov 12 Biogas Development Programme at household/ small farm 
level in Gansu Province 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.I. ver. 4
AMS-III.R. ver. 3  
8082 8301 
19 Nov 12 Welspun Renewable Energy Program India ACM0002 ver. 12
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
37739 8261 
19 Nov 12 Livestock Farms Methane Engineering Programme in 
Jiangxi Province 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.D.ver. 18
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
1587 3143 
19 Nov 12 Biomass Power Development Programme in Thailand Thailand AMS-I.D. ver. 17 37941 8088 
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16 Nov 12 International water purification programme Ethiopia, El Salvador, 
Chile,  
Egypt, Kenya, Gambia,  
Madagascar, Nicaragua,  
Mexico, South Africa,   
Uganda, Viet Nam, Iran 
Switzerland AMS-III.AV. 6254 5962 
14 Nov 12 EN BADEN Large-Scale Hydro PoA in Peru Peru ACM0002 ver. 13 36222 7959 
13 Nov 12 Household Biogas Development Programme in Hubei 
Province 
China Sweden, The U.K.
and Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.I. ver. 4
AMS-III.R. ver. 2  
8318 2901 
13 Nov 12 Shinsung Solar Energy Grid Connected Photovoltaic Power 
Generation PoA 
Republic of Korea AMS-I.D. ver. 17 78 8188 
13 Nov 12 Pakistan Domestic Biogas Programme, CDM Programme of 
Activities 
Pakistan AMS-I.E. ver. 4 27881 8024 
12 Nov 12 MicroEnergy Credits – Microfinance for Clean Energy
Product Lines - Mongolia 
Mongolia The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.E. ver. 10 50133 8142 
09 Nov 12 Thailand Small Scale Livestock Waste Management 
Program 
Thailand Portugal AMS-III.D.ver. 18 55771 8027 
07 Nov 12 Distribution of fuel-efficient improved cooking stoves in 
Nigeria 
Nigeria Sweden
Netherlands 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 46717 6283 
07 Nov 12 Improved Cookstoves Program for Zambia Zambia Netherlands AMS-II.G. ver. 3 41046 8060 
07 Nov 12 Regional Biogas PoA Malaysia France AMS-III.H.ver. 16
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
AMS-I.F. ver. 2  
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
AMS-I.A. ver. 14  
27646 7892 
06 Nov 12 HuaQi Livestock Farms Methane Engineering Programme 
of Activities 
China AMS-III.D.ver. 18
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
5345 8058 
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AMS-I.F. ver. 2
06 Nov 12 Thailand energy efficiency improvement for street lightings Thailand Sweden AMS-II.L. 23 8055 
30 Oct 12 "LED's save energy" India Netherlands
Germany 
AMS-II.C. ver. 13 6258 7897 
30 Oct 12 Hydro Alliance Programme of Activities Guatemala
El Salvador 
Switzerland AMS-I.D. ver. 17 3642 7883 
29 Oct 12 Recovery and Avoidance of Methane from Industrial 
Wastewater Treatment Projects 
Indonesia AMS-III.H.ver. 16 38913 7864 
29 Oct 12 Programme for Grid Connected Renewable Energy in the 
Mediterranean Region 
Egypt, Lebanon, 
Morocco,  
Tunisia 
France ACM0002 ver. 12 20883 7847 
24 Oct 12 Wind Programme of Activities in Chile Chile ACM0002 ver. 12 19000 7763 
18 Oct 12 SH Corporation Solar photovoltaic housing complex 
programme in Republic of Korea 
Republic of Korea AMS-I.F. ver. 2 1417 6913 
17 Oct 12 AWMS Composting Project Brazil AMS-III.F. ver. 10 3457 7760 
15 Oct 12 Hot Water Heating Programme for South Africa South Africa Liechtenstein AMS-I.C. ver. 19
AMS-II.C. ver. 13 
12084 7699 
15 Oct 12 Manufacture and Distribution of CFLs in India India AMS-II.C. ver. 13 13 6694 
10 Oct 12 Promotion of Energy-Efficient lighting using Compact 
Fluorescent Light Bulbs in rural areas in Senegal 
Senegal Italy AMS-II.C. ver. 13 4173 5927 
09 Oct 12 South Africa Renewable Energy Programme (SA-REP) South Africa Switzerland AMS-I.D. ver. 17 24758 7570 
09 Oct 12 Solar Power Programme of Activities Thailand Netherlands AMS-I.D. ver. 17 5784 7636 
05 Oct 12 Caixa Econômica Federal Solid Waste Management and Brazil Spain ACM0001 ver. 11 794672 6573 
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Carbon Finance Project 
05 Oct 12 “Programme for the promotion and development of 
grid-connected solar PV projects in Latin America” 
Chile ACM0002 ver. 13 22830 7596 
03 Oct 12 Nuru Lighting Programme Kenya The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.AR ver. 2 34294 7470 
02 Oct 12 Standard Bank Renewable Energy Programme Ghana
Kenya  
Mauritius 
ACM0002 ver. 12 1074 7522 
27 Sep 12 Animal Manure Treatment Programme in Henan Province 
and Shaanxi Province 
China France, The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.D.ver. 18
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 
AMS-I.F. ver. 2  
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
6325 7460 
24 Sep 12 Renewable Energy PoA in India India Switzerland AMS-I.D. ver. 17 3251 6161 
14 Sep 12 South Africa Wind Energy South Africa Netherlands
Germany 
ACM0002 ver. 12 93647 6734 
14 Sep 12 KTDA Small Hydro Programme of Activities Kenya AMS-I.D. ver. 17 24305 6606 
13 Sep 12 Wind Power Programme of Activities in Brazil Brazil The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
ACM0002 ver. 12 21063 7271 
09 Sep 12 Municipal Waste Compost Programme in Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Republic of Korea AMS-III.F. ver. 10 6079 7237 
06 Sep 12 TUCANO CDM Programme of Activities for the Promotion of 
Small Hydropower Plants in Brazil 
Brazil Netherlands ACM0002 ver. 12 13149 7211 
05 Sep 12 Indonesia Biogas Projects Indonesia The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.H.ver. 16 51947 6209 
05 Sep 12 TBEC Biogas Programme for South East Asia Thailand ACM0014 ver. 4 21279 6819 
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04 Sep 12 Enlightened Solar PoA Israel Sweden AMS-I.D. ver. 17 3043 7191 
04 Sep 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Anhui Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 16493 6119 
31 Aug 12 Omega Wind Power Plants Programme of Activities Brazil Switzerland ACM0002 ver. 12 11229 7156 
31 Aug 12 Improved Cook Stoves programme for Rwanda Rwanda Germany AMS-II.G. ver. 3 39790 6207 
20 Aug 12 Sustainable Small Hydropower Programme of Activities 
(PoA) in Viet Nam 
Viet Nam Switzerland ACM0002 ver. 12 8012 6095 
17 Aug 12 Improved Cook Stoves for East Africa (ICSEA) Uganda, Kenya, 
Burundi,  
Rwanda, Lesotho, South 
Africa 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 40577 7014 
27 Jul 12 South East Asia Biogas Programme of Activities Indonesia Switzerland
Netherlands 
AMS-III.H.ver. 16
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
19270 6749 
25 Jul 12 Biogas Programme Nicaragua (PBN) Nicaragua Netherlands AMS-III.R. ver. 2
AMS-I.E. ver. 4  
10014 6813 
25 Jul 12 ETA Solar Water Heater Programme in South Africa South Africa Finland AMS-I.J. 20370 6159 
25 Jul 12 Chilean Small Hydroelectric Power Plants Programme of 
Activities 
Chile AMS-I.D. ver. 17 5988 6285 
25 Jul 12 Barefoot Power Lighting Programme Kenya
Uganda 
AMS-III.AR. 9749 6110 
23 Jul 12 Biomass Heat Generation Development Programme of 
Activities Managed by INTRACO 
Viet Nam AMS-I.C. ver. 19 23754 6731 
20 Jul 12 Landfill gas recovery and combustion with renewable energy 
generation from sanitary landfill sites under Land Bank of the 
Philippines Carbon Finance Support Facility 
Philippines ACM0001 ver. 11 469182 6707 
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13 Jul 12 Punjab State Electricity Board: High Voltage Distribution 
System for Agricultural Consumers in the Rural Areas of the 
Punjab. 
India Denmark AMS-II.A. ver. 10 3390 5787 
13 Jul 12 Inti Renewable Energy Program of Activities Peru ACM0002 ver. 12 89998 6622 
04 Jul 12 The programme to introduce renewable energy system into 
Jeju Island 
Republic of Korea AMS-I.F. ver. 2
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 
863 6584 
29 Jun 12 Co-composting and Composting Program of Activities for 
Palm Oil Mills in Indonesia 
Indonesia AMS-III.F. ver. 10 10130 6511 
28 Jun 12 Tunki Small Scale Hydropower Program of Activities Peru Sweden, Germany, 
Netherlands 
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 8634 6198 
26 Jun 12 Installation of Solar Home Systems in Bangladesh Bangladesh Denmark AMS-I.A. ver. 14 45713 2765 
21 Jun 12 Mexican Renewable Energy Alliance Programme of 
Activities (PoA) 
Mexico
Malaysia 
Switzerland ACM0002 ver. 12 18417 6434 
15 Jun 12 CFL Distribution Programme in Jiangsu Province China AMS-II.J. ver. 4 29970 5272 
12 Jun 12 Solarwave water purification United Republic of 
Tanzania 
Sweden AMS-III.AV. 5184 2900 
08 Jun 12 Installing Solar Water Heating Systems in the South of Viet 
Nam 
Viet Nam Japan AMS-I.J. 57 6337 
06 Jun 12 National Solar Power Development Programme, India India AMS-I.D. ver. 17 6683 6328 
31 May 12 Green Brick Development Programme of Activities Managed 
by INTRACO 
Viet Nam The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.Z. ver. 3 29488 6299 
15 May 12 Small-Scale Renewable Energy PoA in Thailand Thailand Switzerland
Sweden 
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 7918 6222 
10 May 12 Methane recovery and combustion with renewable energy Philippines Spain AMS-III.D.ver. 17 23105 5979 
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generation from anaerobic animal manure management 
systems under the Land Bank of the Philippines‘s (LBP) 
Carbon Finance Support Facility 
02 May 12 Sustainable Small Hydropower Programme of Activities 
(PoA) in Indonesia 
Indonesia Switzerland AMS-I.D. ver. 17 5321 5616 
27 Apr 12 Small hydropower programme in Mexico Mexico The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.D. ver. 17 4811 5931 
24 Apr 12 Standard Bank Low Pressure Solar Water Heater 
Programme for South Africa 
South Africa The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 19 39266 5997 
20 Apr 12 Than Thien Small Hydropower Programme of Activities 
Managed by INTRACO 
Viet Nam Netherlands AMS-I.D. ver. 17 3386 5324 
11 Apr 12 Sichuan Rural Poor-Household Biogas Development 
Programme 
China The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 19
AMS-III.R. ver. 2  
1493717 2898 
28 Mar 12 First Solar PoA in India by SENES Consultants India Switzerland AMS-I.D. ver. 16 22762 5588 
21 Mar 12 Efficient Cook Stove Programme: Kenya Kenya The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 50761 5336 
23 Nov 11 Malaysia Biogas Projects Malaysia France, The U.K,.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.H.ver. 15 38139 5034 
22 Nov 11 Composting and Co-composting Programme of Activities 
(PoA) in Indonesia 
Indonesia Switzerland AMS-III.F. ver. 8 22416 5104 
10 Nov 11 Improved Cooking Stoves for Nigeria Programme of 
Activities 
Nigeria AMS-II.G. ver. 3 8912 5067 
25 Oct 11 “Turbococinas”, rural cooking stove substitution program in 
El Salvador 
El Salvador Switzerland AMS-II.G. ver. 3 46584 5092 
19 Oct 11 The programme to promote efficient lightings in local areas Republic of Korea AMS-II.C. ver. 13 51 5019 
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19 Jul 11 Improved Cooking Stoves in Bangladesh Bangladesh The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.G. ver. 3 50233 4791 
13 May 11 Efficient Lighting Initiative of Bangladesh (ELIB) Bangladesh Denmark AMS-II.J. ver. 4 17540 4793 
11 May 11 Egypt Vehicle Scrapping and Recycling Program Egypt Denmark AMS-III.C. ver. 11 20 2897 
13 Apr 11 Solar Water Heater Programme in Tunisia Tunisia France AMS-I.C. ver. 17 7242 4659 
12 Mar 11 SASSA Low Pressure Solar Water Heater Programme South Africa The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 17 76945 4302 
12 Feb 11 SGCC In-advance Distribution Transformer Replacement 
CDM Programme 
China Spain AMS-II.A. ver. 10 4079 2896 
12 Jan 11 Promotion of Biomass Based Heat Generation Systems in 
India 
India Germany
The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-I.C. ver. 16 400000 4041 
21 Aug 10 Masca Small Hydro Programme Honduras Netherlands AMS-I.D. ver. 13 4395 3562 
29 Apr 10 CFL lighting scheme – “Bachat Lamp Yojana” India Netherlands AMS-II.J. ver. 3 34892 3223 
12 Apr 10 Uganda Municipal Waste Compost Programme Uganda AMS-III.F. ver. 6 83700 2956 
29 Oct 09 Methane capture and combustion from Animal Waste 
Management System (AWMS) of the 3S Program farms of 
the Instituto Sadia de Sustentabilidade 
Brazil The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-III.D.ver. 13 591418 2767 
31 Jul 09 CUIDEMOS Mexico (Campana De Uso Intelegente De 
Energia Mexico) - Smart Use of Energy Mexico 
Mexico Switzerland
The U.K.and 
Northern Ireland 
AMS-II.C. ver. 9 520365 2535 
a AM - Large scale, ACM - Consolidated Methodologies, AMS - Small scale  
b Estimated emission reductions in metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent per annum (as stated by the project participants) 
Source: UNFCCC (2014b) 
